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Summary
This thesis focuses on ‘New’ or ‘Resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein’s work, early and 
later, as presented in the work of, for instance, Cora Diamond and James Conant. One of 
the principal claims of such readings is that, throughout his life, Wittgenstein held an 
‘austere’ view of nonsense. That view has both a trivial and a non-trivial aspect. The 
trivial aspect is that any string of signs could, by appropriate assignment, be given a 
meaning, and hence that, if such a string is nonsense, that will be because we have failed 
to make just such an assignment. The non-trivial aspect is this: that there is no further, 
non-trivial story to be told, and so nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give 
signs a meaning. Hence, too, logically speaking, all nonsense is on a par.
That view, both of nonsense and of Wittgenstein, has attracted a great deal of 
controversy. It is particularly controversial in relation to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, where 
Wittgenstein famously declares, in the penultimate remark, that the reader is to recognise 
Wittgenstein’s own elucidatory propositions there as nonsensical, and must eventually 
throw them away in coming to understand Wittgenstein himself. I defend the austere 
view and its attribution to Wittgenstein, early and later (but focussing primarily on the 
earlier), against a number of exegetical and substantial criticisms put forward by, for 
instance, Peter Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock and Adrian Moore.
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1Introduction
Nonsense and the New Wittgenstein
/
This thesis is about nonsense and it is about the New Wittgenstein. Let me start with 
nonsense. It might be thought that there are many different kinds of (linguistic1) 
nonsense. There is, say, the case of absurdity -  when someone says something obviously 
false, or crazy. Here, one might exclaim ‘Nonsense!’ to express disbelief, or surprise, at 
a statement, or simply lack of patience with a particular point of view. Or there is the 
kind of nonsense one finds in a nonsense-poem, in the works of Edward Lear, for 
instance, or Lewis Carroll. Then again, a sentence might be nonsense because a word in 
it has not yet been given a meaning -  perhaps it is a made-up word, like Lear’s ‘runcible’, 
or it might be a familiar word used in an unfamiliar way; and of course, there is plain old- 
fashioned gibberish -  a string of signs with no apparent grammatical structure to it at all -  
a word-salad. We might think that there is a philosophically more interesting case, too: 
nonsense not resulting from absurdity or from a simple failure to give words a meaning, 
but that arises when you try to assert of something what it makes no sense to say of that
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kind of thing -  an example might be ‘Caesar is a prime number’ (more on this case anon) 
-  and so which involves some kind of category clash; the meanings of the words just are 
incompatible with one another.
So, we might think that, as well as absurdity, there are various kinds of nonsense 
resulting from various kinds of failures, and also another sort of nonsense that results 
from putting meanings together in an -  as yet unspecified -  illegitimate fashion. Some 
nonsense-sentences are just plain meaningless, but others combine only meaningful 
words, but in such a way that what they say, so combined, is nonsense. Not ordinary, 
common-or-garden nonsense, but nonsense that is, as it were, internally logically flawed. 
So, if you, for instance, think that people are one kind of thing and numbers quite 
another, you might be inclined to think that, in the sentence ‘Caesar is a prime number’, 
we have a sentence that claims of one kind of thing something it only makes sense to say 
of something of wholly another kind. Hence, the result -  what the sentence says -  is 
nonsense.
In this thesis, I will want to defend an alternative account of nonsense, one 
originally highlighted by Cora Diamond and that has come to be known as the ‘austere’ 
view of nonsense, or ‘austerity’, for short.2 I will introduce that view in detail in Chapter 
One. For now, it might be summed up in the following words: all nonsense, from the 
point of view of austerity, is plain nonsense, not nonsense that results from its own 
internally logically flawed nature. Thus, this view is characterised by its rejection of the 
idea that there are (at least) two logically distinct types of nonsense, a rejection of the
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idea that some nonsense is of a special kind, resulting from the violation of certain 
requirements upon what it is for a sentence to make sense -  whatever those requirements 
might be.3 That does not mean that there are no different kinds of nonsense at all, but we 
must be careful what we mean by that. For austerity, and leaving aside the case of 
absurdity, nonsense can differ in all kinds of ways: aesthetically, say, and 
psychologically, as Edward Lear’s poems differ from King Lear’s mad ramblings and 
from Wittgenstein’s nonsense-sentence ‘Ab sur ah’.4 But it does mean that there will be 
no differences of a certain sort between nonsense-sentences: logically speaking, all 
nonsense is equivalent. In that sense, then, there are neither kinds nor degrees of 
nonsense: it is all logically on a par.5
That view of nonsense -  the austere view -  I will want to argue was 
Wittgenstein’s view throughout his philosophical life, from the Tractatus onwards. It is 
not that Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘nonsense’ does not alter, for it clearly does: in 
the Tractatus, ‘nonsense’ (‘unsinn’) is, for instance, set against the term ‘senseless’ 
(‘sinnlos’) as applied to tautologies and contradictions6 -  sentences which can be formed 
within the language but which, for Wittgenstein, lack any thinkable content; in the later 
work, on the other hand, Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘nonsense’ is far more flexible -  
sometimes, for instance, it is used of cases of absurdity, and though Wittgenstein still 
uses the term ‘sinnlos’ alongside it, the two terms are used with a degree of 
interchangeability.7 So one might want to say that the later Wittgenstein does not have a 
view of nonsense per se at all, and I would not want to disagree with that.8 What is 
consistent, however, throughout his work, is the rejection of one kind of view of what
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nonsense might be -  a view that, for Wittgenstein, is far more widespread than might be
imagined9 -  and it might be put like this: for Wittgenstein, there is no nonsense that is
nonsense because of what it would have to mean, were it to mean anything, or because of
what the terms of which it is comprised do mean. Thus, Diamond, for instance, writes:
[F]or Wittgenstein there is no kind of nonsense which is nonsense on account of 
what the terms composing it mean -  there is as it were no ‘positive’ nonsense. 
Anything that is nonsense is so merely because some determination of meaning 
has not been made; it is not nonsense as a logical result of determinations that 
have been made.
I should claim that [that] view of nonsense ... is one that was consistently held to 
by Wittgenstein throughout his writings, from the period before the Tractatus was 
written and onwards. There is no ‘positive’ nonsense, no such thing as nonsense 
that is nonsense on account of what it would have to mean, given the meanings 
already fixed for the terms it contains.10
That rejection characterises Wittgenstein’s thought about nonsense from the Tractatus
onwards despite the apparent changes in his use of that term.
That view -  both of nonsense and of Wittgenstein -  is central to a new approach 
to reading Wittgenstein’s work, early and later. That approach, variously labelled (at 
least in relation to the Tractatus) ‘New’, ‘Resolute’, ‘Austere’, even ‘Deconstructive’ and 
‘Post-modernist’, is best understood as a set of more or less closely related readings; there 
is, I think, no such thing as the New reading.11 Nevertheless, such readings do share 
some things in common (even if much more besides is left open to disagreement), and 
one of those things is the attribution to Wittgenstein, early and later, o f an austere view of 
nonsense.12
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That view has itself come in for a great deal of criticism, and in particular with 
respect to its ascription to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. In this thesis, I will want to 
defend the austere view both substantially -  as the correct account of what nonsense is (or 
rather is not) -  and exegetically too -  as the correct account of Wittgenstein’s own view 
of what nonsense might be. In Chapter One, I outline the austere view in greater detail, 
and explore some of its consequences, in particular for our reading of the Tractatus. My 
focus throughout this thesis, as well as in this introduction, will be on that work, though I 
shall have some things to say with regard to the Philosophical Investigations too, and that 
approach is justified, I think, by the simple fact that this thesis is written in defence of 
austerity and that it is in relation to the early work that that view has received by far the 
most criticism. (That itself may be a result of the fact that it is with respect to the early 
Wittgenstein that New readings have been explicitly presented, rhetorically, as 
constituting an alternative kind of reading, in opposition to ‘Standard’ or ‘Traditional’ 
readings.)
Each of the subsequent chapters defends the austere view against some of the 
more serious challenges made against it by P.M.S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock and A.W.
13 •Moore. Thus, Chapter Two discusses two accounts of nonsense and logical syntax in 
the Tractatus: those of Hacker and of James Conant. Hacker wants to reject the austere 
view of nonsense, but he also wants to reject an alternative, ‘substantial’ view of 
nonsense that, for instance, Conant attributes to Hacker. Instead, Hacker tries to carve 
out a third kind of stance, and for that he requires a notion of logical syntax and its rules 
such that violating those rules produces nonsense. In outlining that possibility, Hacker
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develops a number of -  forcefully presented -  criticisms of Conant’s accounts of both 
nonsense and of logical syntax in the Tractatus.14 In response to Hacker, I rehearse and 
build upon criticisms of Hacker’s view put forward by Cora Diamond,15 and I also try to 
extend those arguments to cover some counter-arguments to Diamond’s responses put 
forward by Genia Schonbaumsfeld.16
Chapter Three deals with Glock’s criticisms of an austere view of nonsense, both 
substantial and exegetical, in relation to the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, 
and focussing on Wittgenstein’s adaptations of Frege’s context-principle.17 Glock 
argues, among other things, that the austere view is substantially mistaken, since it relies, 
according to Glock, on a version of the context-principle that is clearly false, and since it 
lacks any independent plausibility (without the support offered by the context-principle). 
Further, he argues that in the Tractatus, while that -  false -  version o f the context- 
principle may indeed be present, it is of no avail to New readers, since it relies on a 
notion of meaning that is itself unavailable to New readers, perhaps because they are 
committed to the view that Wittgenstein did not there wish unironically to put forward 
any theory of meaning at all. And Glock argues that Wittgenstein’s later use of the 
context-principle, as Glock interprets it, positively ‘militates’ against the austere view of 
nonsense. I break Glock’s argument down into a number of different points, and try to 
show that none of them present a sound case against the austere view or its attribution to 
Wittgenstein, early or later.
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The inclusion of Moore in this grouping might seem anomalous, since Moore 
does in fact accept the austere view of nonsense as being both true and true of 
Wittgenstein, at least in relation to the Tractatus. Moore, however, draws from that view 
of nonsense certain consequences that would be anathema to most New readers. In 
Chapter Four, I outline an argument which I find in Moore’s paper and attempt to throw 
some roadblocks in the way of Moore’s apparent route to those conclusions. That 
argument is, I think, worth considering in its own right, but Moore himself seems not to 
commit to it. In the Postscript to Chapter Four, then, I present a version of the argument 
to which I think Moore does commit, and try to develop an alternative response to Moore 
here.18 Finally, in the concluding chapter, I summarise my arguments and draw out some 
of the consequences of my defence of the austere view for the debate between New and 
Standard readings of Wittgenstein’s work.
There is a sense in which New readings as it were stand or fall by the austere view 
of nonsense,19 but despite wanting to defend that view I shall not be especially concerned 
to defend New readings in general here; nor shall I be concerned to argue for a particular 
interpretation within the space mapped out by New readings. Rather, my aim is to 
conduct a defence of the idea which, I think, lies at the basis of all such readings and so in 
that way defend that general approach. My attitude towards New readings, however, in 
particular of the Tractatus, is certainly not one o f unconditional acceptance; some of the 
evidence compiled against that kind of reading, or against certain variants of it -  
particularly from sources external, but pertaining, to the Tractatus -  can seem quite 
compelling.20 But I do think that the view of nonsense that goes hand-in-hand with those
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readings both is Wittgenstein’s view and is the correct view philosophically speaking; 
and that, in the first instance, is what I shall want to defend here. That view of nonsense 
will, clearly, have consequences for how one might read the Tractatus unless, that is, one 
is prepared to attribute to Wittgenstein contradictory views. That might be done of 
course; and, for instance, P.M.S. Hacker is quite content to do so. For Hacker, 
Wittgenstein does, wrongly, and in conflict with some central lines of thought in the 
Tractatus, hold there that there are ineffable truths that can be shown and not said. ‘One 
cannot but sympathise with Diamond’, Hacker writes, for ‘nonsense is nonsense’ after 
all.21 But if, as Hacker later claims, it is not clear ‘what would count as sufficient or 
telling evidence’ against New readings, one might say exactly the same of any reading 
that attributes to Wittgenstein something obviously, centrally and quite devastatingly
99contradictory.
I want to turn now, in the remainder of this introduction, to give some account of 
the background to my defence of austerity in New readings of Wittgenstein’s work, early 
and later. One problem one faces in introducing that debate -  between New or Resolute 
and Traditional or Standard readings of Wittgenstein’s work -  is that one is forced almost 
inevitably to approach it by way of a great deal of rhetoric that can prove unhelpful if not 
plain misleading. So, for instance, it may turn out, as some have suggested, that there is 
as little difference between those two kinds of readings, in places, as there is width to a 
knife-edge;23 or it may turn out that there just is no unified set of readings that could 
count in the end as being either Traditional or Resolute. Still, avoiding that rhetoric 
entirely would be as misleading as accepting it wholesale, and I want to at least begin
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with the way that that debate has been set up, with the proviso that the understanding of 
the terrain thus gained must give way to a much more complex and contoured landscape 
than first pictured.
II
With that qualification in place, then, I turn to giving an overview of New approaches to 
Wittgenstein’s work. Those readings purport to offer, as a whole, a rethinking not only 
of each of the two commonly distinguished periods of Wittgenstein’s thought, but also, 
and through that, a reappraisal of the continuity between the early and the later 
Wittgenstein, emphasising Wittgenstein’s commitment throughout his life to the view 
that one cannot put forward doctrines or theses in philosophy, and so to a method of 
philosophising far more akin to therapy. In the Tractatus, that kind of therapeutic reading 
involves rejecting the traditional view of that work as forwarding metaphysical theories 
about language, thought and world by way of its self-confessedly nonsensical 
propositions.24 Rather than taking Wittgenstein to genuinely hold there -  as, taken at 
face-value, he might seem to -  that some truths about or features o f reality can only be 
‘shown’ and cannot be straightforwardly said -  asserted -  in ordinary, senseful sentences, 
this idea is itself taken to be as it were the final rung in the ladder-like structure of the 
Tractatus;25 it, too, is meant ultimately to be cast aside and what we are left with then is 
the realisation that such theories offer no more than the illusion of making sense.26 Thus, 
the aim of the Tractatus is to offer us remarks that have the appearance of constituting 
solid metaphysical theories on a range of topics, and so engage our desire for theorising 
here, and gradually bring us to see that very possibility of theorising as illusory; we come
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to view them -  the sentences in which they appear to be expressed -  as simply 
nonsense,27 and give up on the idea that there was anything behind them at all. Central to 
that view is a view about the form of Wittgenstein’s writing: rather than taking 
Wittgenstein to be forwarding doctrines in propositions which imply their own 
nonsensicality -  a reading which takes the style of the Tractatus to be idiosyncratic, 
certainly, but ultimately perhaps inessential -  for New readings the style of his work is 
fundamental. For, as Conant, drawing on Kierkegaard, stresses, if one is treating an 
illusion, it is essential that one does not begin by treating it as such.28 And no amount of 
telling someone that what they believe themselves to understand is an illusion will rid 
them of it. ‘The analyst’, as Derrida puts it, ‘must first speak the language of the 
patient’.29 Thus, Wittgenstein’s style -  the presentation of apparent doctrines, and 
leaving the reader to think through the consequences of those remarks for him or herself -  
is central to his aim.
On this reading, then, the Tractatus is the first expression of a conception of 
philosophy that remains constant, whatever else changes, throughout Wittgenstein’s 
work. One effect of that way of reading the Tractatus is to re-draw the space available to 
readings of Wittgenstein’s later work in this way: if  we read Wittgenstein in the Tractatus 
as putting forward one set of metaphysical theories about language, thought and the 
world, it will be open to us to then read Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the Tractatus in the 
Investigations as constituting a rejection of certain theories. That, in turn, leaves it open 
to us to read Wittgenstein then as forwarding other theories in their place and that, to a 
greater or lesser extent, is what it is suggested has typically been done. So, for instance,
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on one influential view, the Tractatus is taken as maintaining a fairly rigidly realist stance 
and then Wittgenstein is taken, in the Investigations, to reject that view in favour of 
something with many of the characteristic hallmarks of anti-realism; Wittgenstein is read 
as moving from a truth-conditional account of language to an account in terms of 
assertability-conditions. Wittgenstein’s opposition to putting forward doctrines or theses 
in philosophy then becomes a facet of his anti-realism, a facet of the stance he does take. 
But if we read the Tractatus not as self-consciously putting forward theories of any kind, 
that sort of avenue is already closed to us; for, to put it crudely, whatever Wittgenstein is 
rejecting at the start of the Philosophical Investigations, he is clearly not rejecting a 
therapeutic approach in favour of straightforward theory-generating. Rather, New 
readings see Wittgenstein as developing and refining his method of achieving an aim that 
remains fairly constant across both works.
Those New readings are undoubtedly at their most controversial in relation to the 
Tractatus. That is where they have attracted the greatest criticism and hence that, too, is 
where the main focus, both of this thesis as a whole and of this introduction, will be. In 
part, that is because it is in relation to the Tractatus that those readings have been 
developed in the greatest detail and have explicitly been presented as offering a new and 
quite radical alternative to standard ways of reading that text. But another reason for that 
bias is that one general feature of those readings lies in the stress they place upon the 
therapeutic, anti-theoretical character of Wittgenstein’s thought, early and later, and the 
continuity of Wittgenstein’s aims in those terms. And while that might seem to be both 
new and controversial to anyone familiar with much of the basic commentary that exists
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on the Tractatus, it hardly seems original to suggest that Wittgenstein’s later thought 
purports to offer not more theories, but a kind of therapy for the urge to theorise in 
philosophy, for the idea that theories are what is needed there at all. That view, on the 
contrary, might be thought to be a characteristic of all writing on the Philosophical 
Investigations that heeds even the most minimal of Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophical 
remarks. So where the sense of newness or originality here?
David Stem, in his introduction to the Philosophical Investigations, draws the 
contrast in this way, as being between Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian readings of the 
Wittgenstein.30 So, for instance, Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians, according to Stem, read 
the Investigations as a work of therapy, informed by a scepticism about all philosophy -  
including Wittgenstein’s own -  and aiming at bringing philosophy to an end. Philosophy 
is nonsense -  not because it fails to meet certain criteria for having sense -  but because it 
simply ‘falls apart’ as it were when we try to make sense of it. Properly conducted, on 
this view, philosophy results in no kind of theory at all.
Non-Pyrrhonian readings, on the other hand, see the Investigations as offering a 
critique of traditional philosophy but one which leads not to the end of all philosophy -  
for it is to be replaced with a better and radically different kind of philosophy. On this 
kind of reading, Wittgenstein criticises mistaken views only to replace them with quite 
specific philosophical positions of his own. And whereas, for Pyrrhonians, 
Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy as nonsense is motivated by no kind of theory of 
sense, here what philosophers say is measured up against a theory of sense that shows
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traditional philosophy to be misguided. Here, then, Wittgenstein’s critique of traditional 
philosophy is in the service of a new and supposedly better kind of theorising in 
philosophy. On the former, Pyrrhonian side of the debate, Stem locates Diamond, 
Conant and the later work of Gordon Baker; and on the latter, non-Pyrrhonian side, Stem 
cites as instances (and among others) Hacker, early Baker and David Pears.
But although Stem’s distinction captures something of the difference between 
those two groups of thinkers, the contrast, as Stern goes on to acknowledge, is much less 
clear than that:
What makes the contrast less clear than it seems at first is that most 
Wittgensteinians oscillate, or vacillate, between these views. ... [T]hey want both 
to be uncompromisingly opposed to philosophical doctrine, and still to make 
some sense of the non-Pyrrhonian view that giving up traditional philosophical 
theories can lead us to something better.31
For Stem, that vacillation is as much a failure to follow through on one’s own rhetoric as
anything else -  a matter of saying one thing and doing another; both sides are guilty to
some extent of wanting both to have their cake and eat it too.
That debate is presented in quite different terms, however, by Alice Crary. If 
Stem might be thought as it were to cast his net too wide in trying adequately to 
distinguish New and Standard approaches to the Investigations, Crary might be thought to 
make an opposite error. For Crary, what distinguishes New readings as such in relation 
to the Investigations is the suggestion that, despite professing to take into account 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on the therapeutic character of his thought, many readings that go 
to make up the canonical corpus of commentary on the later Wittgenstein in fact do no
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such thing. So, for instance, Crary writes, in her introduction to the collection o f essays 
The New Wittgenstein, that ‘standard interpretations of [Wittgenstein’s] later philosophy 
utterly fail to capture its therapeutic character’, and that failure, according to Crary, is to 
be traced to their continuing to hold onto the idea of an external standpoint upon 
language:
Within standard interpretations, Wittgenstein is portrayed as holding that it 
follows from the abandonment of such a standpoint that what counts as agreement 
between the use of a sign and its meaning is fixed (not by objective reality, but) 
by grammar -  and that there can therefore be no such thing as fully objective 
agreement.32
Insofar as that view takes there to be important consequences for, e.g., our notions of 
objectivity and agreement as a result of abandoning the possibility of attaining an external 
viewpoint on language, it continues to cling to the idea of just such a standpoint; 
Wittgenstein, Crary continues, ‘is understood as holding that it is possible to occupy such 
a standpoint and to detect from there that nothing external underwrites our ways of 
thinking and talking -  and that something else (say, our language-games themselves) 
must provide a standard of correctness’.33 So one key feature of New readings of the 
later work, for Crary, is that they see standard readings as surreptitiously clinging on, in 
just such ways, to the very confusions Wittgenstein was seeking to exorcise, and in 
particular to the idea of our being able to view language from a point of view external to 
language. However much we might seem to need or want such a point o f view, it is to be 
seen to offer nothing more than an illusion of a perspective.
What makes one hesitate about Crary’s chosen mode of drawing this distinction is 
the sense that what Crary calls ‘standard’ readings, Stem ‘non-Pyrrhonian’, are being said
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to be guilty of one main interpretive error. What unites those readings as ‘standard’ is 
their jointly but in different ways failing to follow through on the idea that there is no 
such thing as an external viewpoint on language. Insofar as that is being presented by 
Crary as a diagnosis of the main interpretive error of such readings, it seems to bring 
Crary, and New readings of the Investigations, into conflict with Investigations §133. 
There, Wittgenstein seems to present the idea that there is no one, single solution to the 
problems of philosophy as a major source of contrast with his earlier view.34 The danger 
is that presenting this as the one error that all standard readings fall into, leaves 
Wittgenstein himself looking as if he presents one catch-all solution to the problems of 
philosophy in the Investigations, just as he seems to in the Tractatus, and in contrast with 
Investigations §133. So if Crary is right, a certain amount of exegetical contortion may 
be required in shedding some light on how that feature of New readings is compatible 
with Wittgenstein’s own description of his method in the Investigations.
In the end perhaps none of these difficulties are insurmountable. The difference 
that Stem locates in what philosophy might do for us is I think clearly reflected in the 
distinction between the two views of what nonsense might be, even if the anti-theoretical 
sentiment of the Pyrrhonians is reneged upon elsewhere. So there is I think more to be 
said for the distinction than just, say, its being a matter of which other commentators one 
might find congenial, or whether one sees oneself as it were under the influence of 
Stanley Cavell or not, for instance. But it is to say that the distinction is in practice far 
more messy than it might at first look, and which side of it one lies might not always be 
clear. In relation to the Tractatus, things are perhaps more messy still. I want to turn
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now to say a little more about New readings there, beginning with Wittgenstein’s 
infamous claim that the propositions of that work are nonsensical, and one standard way 
of interpreting that claim.
I ll
Wittgenstein, in the penultimate remark of the Tractatus, tells us how we, as readers, are
meant to take the remarks found therein. Here is what he writes:
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way:
anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical, 
when he has used them -  as steps -  to climb up beyond them. (He must, 
so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the 
world aright.
Wittgenstein’s propositions, then, or at least those among them that serve as elucidations, 
are nonsense. We are to understand Wittgenstein and not his (elucidatory) propositions; 
at least part of which understanding will be the recognition that his propositions are 
nonsense and so are, at the end, to be unceremoniously cast aside as such. If we do all 
this, Wittgenstein promises us, if we ‘transcend’ his propositions in this way, then we will 
‘see the world aright’.
Such remarks seem to go hand-in-hand with a distinction central to the Tractatus 
between what, on the one hand, can be said (but not shown) and what, on the other, 
cannot be said but can only be shown. Thus, on a traditional reading of the Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein holds that there are various things, various features of reality, that show 
themselves in our language -  they come out, manifest themselves, in ordinary thought 
and talk -  but that we cannot use that language to directly express or describe these
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things. Instead, such features show themselves in the senseful propositions of our 
language. Wittgenstein’s propositions, on this reading, seek to convey to us somehow 
what it is that cannot be said and hence, inevitably, they result in nonsense.
One such thing that can be shown but not said, on such a reading, is ‘logical 
form’: as Wittgenstein calls it, ‘the form of reality’ (TLP 2.18). Standard commentators, 
for instance, typically attribute to Wittgenstein a theory of representation known as the 
‘picture theory’. Central to this is the idea that a picture shares a structure (the way in 
which the elements of the picture stand towards one another) with the fact it represents 
{TLP 2.15). Since a picture can always misrepresent, as well as represent, a fact, 
something more fundamental must underwrite the comparison of picture and reality. 
That something, for Wittgenstein, is ‘pictorial form’: ‘the possibility that things are 
related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture’ {TLP 2.151). 
Pictorial form, then, is simply the possibility that the represented structure might obtain in 
reality; the possibility that the things depicted might in fact stand in relation to one 
another as do the elements of the picture. As such, it is that which a picture must have in 
common with reality in order to be able to depict it at all, either correctly or incorrectly 
{TLP 2.17). Representational form, by contrast (if, indeed, Wittgenstein did intend a 
contrast between his uses of the terms Form der Abbildung and Form der Darstellung), is 
that which differs between picture and pictured {TLP 2.173); it is that which makes the 
one a picture of the other rather than simply, as Anthony Kenny puts it, a ‘reduplicated 
reality’.35
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A picture, Wittgenstein continues, can represent, or depict, any reality whose form 
it has, as a coloured picture can represent anything coloured, or a spatial picture anything 
spatial (TLP 2.171). Nevertheless, there is one thing a picture cannot represent: namely, 
its own pictorial form; that in virtue of which it is a picture at all. In order to represent 
that, a picture would -  impossibly -  have to be able to picture itself in relation to what it 
pictured and together with the lines of projection between the two. To do that, of course, 
it would have to be a completely different picture.
This seems to leave open the possibility that one picture’s pictorial form might be 
depicted by another picture of different form.36 Logical form, however, cannot be 
depicted at all since, for Wittgenstein, all pictures must have logical form in common 
with what they depict, whatever other form they may also have. ‘Every picture’, 
Wittgenstein writes, ‘is at the same time a logical one’ (TLP 2.182). Two pictures may 
have different logical forms, but they must have a logical form. Since every picture must 
have logical form in common with what it depicts, one picture could not be used to depict 
the logical form of another picture of different form; it would have to share that form in 
order first to be capable of depicting it at all. But neither can a picture depict its own 
logical form, and for the same reason that it could not depict its own pictorial form; to do 
that a picture would have to occupy a perspective outside itself, and view itself together 
with what it pictured and the lines of projection between the elements of the two. To 
represent logical form, then, we would have to adopt a viewpoint outside logic -  and so, 
for Wittgenstein, outside the world -  looking back on it as it were, with something other 
than logical form underwriting the picturing relation. Logical form, then, cannot be
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depicted by any picture, and a proposition, for Wittgenstein, is a type of picture. Thus, 
Wittgenstein writes:
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot
represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able 
to represent it -  logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be 
able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is 
to say outside the world.
That perspective, Wittgenstein is clear, is itself a nonsense, only an illusion of a
perspective. Logical form, then, cannot be represented, cannot be directly put into words;
it cannot, that is, be said.
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein continues, it can be shown:
4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of 
language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.
4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.
Logical form, on this account, will show itself in all our senseful thought and talk, as that 
which allows such everyday expression to be possible at all. This, then, on a standard 
reading, is what the Tractatus aims to teach us. Wittgenstein’s propositions aim, perhaps, 
to express what can only be shown, and in grasping what can only be shown as well as 
why it is that it can only be shown, we recognise Wittgenstein’s propositions themselves 
to be nonsense. Having climbed up them, having used them as steps, and having seen 
what it is possible to see from the perspective they afford us, we will be in a position also
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to see their limitations and so, finally, to throw them away. That, on a standard view, is 
what it is like to ‘see the world aright’.
Such a reading has, in recent years, come under increasing pressure from the kind 
of Resolute readings put forward by, among others, Cora Diamond and James Conant. 
For Diamond and Conant, standard sorts of reading that leave Wittgenstein forwarding a 
doctrine of ineffable insights in the Tractatus end up mistaking one rung of the ladder -  
something that is to be thrown away -  for the final lesson of the book. Far from throwing 
the ladder away, they see standard readings as clinging desperately to the idea that the 
book does, despite what Wittgenstein says, make a good deal of sense after all -  that 
there are substantial, if unsayable, philosophical lessons to be learnt from it. But for 
Diamond, there is in Wittgenstein almost nothing of value to be grasped once the idea 
that there is no such thing as putting forward doctrines or theses in philosophy is removed 
from his work. Instead, then, Diamond wants to take as seriously as one can the idea that 
Wittgenstein’s propositions are nonsensical, and doing that means applying it also to 
those remarks where Wittgenstein talks of what can be said, and what can only be 
shown.37
Throughout the Tractatus, Diamond writes, when Wittgenstein speaks of those 
things which ‘show’ but cannot be said, he talks of them as ‘features of reality’ and in 
doing so, Diamond notes, he uses ‘a very odd kind of figurative language’.38 That kind of 
talk -  the use of forms of words such as ‘what cannot be put into words’ -  raises, or 
ought to raise, a question for us, about how seriously we can take that kind of remark,
Introduction 2 1
Nonsense and the New Wittgenstein
which as Diamond puts it ‘refer[s], or must seem to, to features of reality that cannot be
0put in words or captured in thought’.
Diamond contrasts two ways of taking that kind of remark, two ways of applying
to that distinction Wittgenstein’s injunction to the reader of Tractatus 6.54, and she does
so by way of one such feature of reality that is said to show itself but which cannot be
expressed: what Wittgenstein calls the ‘logical form of reality’:
One thing which according to the Tractatus shows itself but cannot be said in 
language is what Wittgenstein speaks of as the logical form o f reality. So it looks 
as if there is this whatever-it-is, the logical form of reality, some essential feature 
of reality, which reality has all right, but which we cannot say or think that it has. 
What exactly is supposed to be left of that, after we have thrown away the ladder? 
Are we going to keep the idea that there is something or other in reality that we 
gesture at, however badly, when we speak of ‘the logical form of reality’, so that 
it, what we were gesturing at, is there but cannot be expressed in wordsr
That approach -  answering ‘yes’ to that final question -  Diamond uncompromisingly
labels ‘chickening out’. Doing that, chickening out, is, Diamond writes, ‘to pretend to
throw away the ladder while standing firmly, or as firmly as one can, on it’.41 If we read
Wittgenstein as chickening out, then, we will read him as genuinely holding that there are
such features of reality -  features that can neither be thought nor expressed, but which
can nevertheless be gestured at, features that show themselves in ordinary, senseful
language-use -  and that those features, and their inexpressibility, are what we grasp if we
understand Wittgenstein and not his propositions.
What about not chickening out, or really throwing the ladder away? What counts 
as doing that, what reading Wittgenstein in that way looks like, Diamond continues, is 
this:
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[RJoughly: to throw the ladder away is, among other things, to throw away in the 
end the attempt to take seriously the language of ‘features of reality’. To read 
Wittgenstein himself as not chickening out is to say that it is not, not really, his 
view that there are features of reality that cannot be put into words but show 
themselves. What is his view is that that way of talking may be useful or even for 
a time essential, but it is in the end to be let go of and honestly taken to be real 
nonsense, plain nonsense, which we are not in the end to think of as 
corresponding to an ineffable truth.42
Diamond, then, wants us to take as seriously as we can Wittgenstein’s claim that we must
recognise his elucidatory propositions -  including those apparently drawing a distinction
between what can be said and what can only be shown -  as nonsensical. That is not
necessarily to say, however, that Wittgenstein’s apparent distinction is merely the product
of a malicious or mischievously ironical spirit: rather, Diamond says, that way of talking
‘may be useful or even for a time essential’. It is, as it were, a final stepping-stone -  the
last rung of the ladder -  on the way to seeing that there really is nothing there to be
expressed at all -  nothing either sayable or unsayable.
Diamond, then, wants to contrast two approaches to Wittgenstein’s elucidatory
propositions, and with that, two ways of taking the idea -  which appears throughout
Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings -  that he is not putting forward in his work
philosophical doctrines or theses and so, for instance, that his book, the Tractatus, is ‘not
a textbook’ (TLP, preface). We can, Diamond says, take that to mean that whatever there
is in his work that looks like a doctrine or thesis and that we are to recognise to be
unsayable, does not really count as a doctrine because it cannot be said:
You can read the Tractatus as containing numerous doctrines which Wittgenstein 
holds cannot be put into words, so they do not really count as doctrines: they do 
not have what counts as sense according to the doctrines in the Tractatus about 
what has sense. If you read the Tractatus this way, you think that, after the ladder
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is thrown away, you are left holding on to some truths about reality, while at the 
same time denying that you are actually saying anything about reality.43
On the other hand, you can take it that there really is nothing that is a doctrine in the
Tractatus that is not used with a degree of self-awareness and that is not to be thrown
away at the end of the book, leaving one not in possession of something true but
ineffable.
‘Chickening out’, then, for Diamond, involves a double failure that is captured in 
the idea of ‘irresoluteness’. There is what Diamond terms an element of ‘failure of 
courage’ in that one cannot quite bring oneself to give up on the idea that Wittgenstein’s 
propositions make some kind of sense after all. And there is ‘a kind of dithering, which 
reflects not being clear about what one really wants, a desire to make inconsistent 
demands’.44 One wants both to be able to think those things that cannot be said and yet to 
recognise that if we cannot say them, we cannot think them either; so there just is no 
‘them’ to be had.
In practice, that kind of Resolute reading has often involved a distinction between
two kinds of remark within the Tractatus, between those on the one hand that belong to
the ‘frame’ of the work and those that, on the other hand, belong to its ‘body’. Thus,
Diamond, for instance, writes as follows:
In what we might call the frame of the book -  its Preface and closing sentences -  
Wittgenstein combines remarks about the aim of the book and the kind of reading 
it requires.
The frame of the book contains instructions, as it were, for us as readers of it. 
Read it in the light of what it says at the beginning about its aim and what it says 
at the end about how you are meant to take what it contains.45
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That description of the frame might suggest a very literal way of taking that metaphor, as
referring to the remarks at either end of the book (and only those remarks) which serve to
enclose the main text -  that literally frame it. But there are also other remarks, remarks
not from the Preface or closing paragraphs but from within what might seem then to be
the ‘body’ of the Tractatus, and which are also treated by many New readers of that work
as if they should be taken seriously -  as remarks with a genuine content -  and not as plain
(austerely conceived) nonsense. This, for P.M.S. Hacker, reveals a ‘methodological
inconsistency’ on behalf of New or, as Hacker calls them, ‘post-modernist’ or
‘deconstructive’ interpretations. Hacker writes:
Apart from the ‘frame’, Diamond and Conant implicitly exempt Tractatus 4.126- 
4.1272, 5.473 and 5.4733 from condemnation as nonsense, since these are the 
passages on which their argument depends.... When it is convenient for their 
purposes, proponents of the post-modernist interpretation have no qualms in 
quoting and referring to further points Wittgenstein makes in the Tractatus, which 
they take to be correct rather than plain nonsense.46
Although Hacker goes on to develop this criticism in greater detail,47 he may at first
appear to miss the mark here, for such remarks are not, as Hacker puts it, ‘apart from the
“frame”,’ but are instead a part o f  the frame, as Conant explains:
Question: what determines whether a remark belongs to the frame of the work 
(preparing the way for those remarks which do serve as elucidations) or to the 
(elucidatory) body of the work? Answer: its role within the work. The distinction 
between what is part of the frame and what is part of the body is not, as some 
commentators have thought, simply a function of where in the work a remark 
occurs.... Rather, it is a function of how it occurs.48
That remark of Conant’s, however, might be paraphrased as follows: what determines the
role of a remark in the text is its role in the text. So while it may be useful in preventing
an overly-literal interpretation of the ‘framing’ metaphor, its circularity at the same time
prevents it from getting us much further than that.
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One of the problems with the metaphor of the frame and the body of the text is 
that it does suggest at least that the remarks which open the text and those which bring it 
to a close ought to be, if not all of the frame, at least part of it, and it is those remarks 
which have -  rightly, I think -  been most often appealed to as forming part of the frame. 
What causes the trouble here is just that, as various critics have pointed out, not all of the 
remarks, in particular in the Preface of the Tractatus, are conducive to a Resolute reading 
of that work, and taking them seriously, taking them to make sense and genuinely 
(unironically) to be asserted by Wittgenstein would not fit at all well with the Resolute 
approach. So, for instance, the Preface explicitly states of the Tractatus that ‘thoughts are 
expressed in it’ and, furthermore, that the truth of those thoughts is both ‘unassailable and 
definitive’. For Diamond, of course, as for other New readers, no thoughts and no truths 
can be expressed in the Tractatus -  at least, not by its elucidatory propositions -  since its 
elucidatory propositions are plain nonsense and cannot express any thoughts at all.
Some commentators -  Juliet Floyd, for instance -  have tried to get around these 
problems by claiming that even the preface, along with everything else in the Tractatus, 
is meant ‘ironically’.49 Most plausibly, perhaps, somewhere in between, is Peter 
Sullivan’s suggestion that, if these remarks, the remarks of the Preface, are instructions 
for the reader, then that should come with the proviso that these instructions are at the 
very least difficult to follow straight-off.50 Whatever the merits of these different 
approaches, however, it is clear that both on the issue of what remarks come under the 
frame and on why they do so, greater clarity is going to be required of any New reading.
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Along with the distinction between the frame and the body of the Tractatus, there 
is another distinction which is frequently appealed to by New readings of that work. That 
distinction might be said to be one between two different kinds of metaphysical remarks 
in the Tractatus, or perhaps two different attitudes towards the metaphysical remarks of 
the Tractatus on Wittgenstein’s part. So, on the one hand, there is the kind of 
metaphysical statement that Wittgenstein intends us to come to see as lacking any 
content, as plain nonsense. That kind of remark might be characterised as ‘ironical’: it is 
there in the Tractatus, but only in order that it might be won out over, or overcome. The 
intention with which it is written is that the reader comes to see it as nonsense. On the 
other hand, at least for some Resolute readers -  Diamond and Conant among them -  there 
is also another kind of metaphysical remark in the Tractatus, which differ from the first 
kind in terms of how they are asserted.51 As Conant characterises these, they are 
‘unwitting substantive commitments’ -  metaphysical remarks which are uttered not 
ironically, but also not in full awareness of their metaphysical nature, perhaps.52 The 
kind of metaphysical remark which is not to be found in the Tractatus, according to 
Resolute readers, are metaphysical remarks put forward not ironically, and also 
knowingly, as it were, with self-awareness, in full knowledge of their metaphysical nature 
or status.
For Diamond, that contrast between what I have suggested might be thought of as 
two kinds of attitudes with which Wittgenstein puts forward metaphysical remarks in the 
Tractatus reflects a distinction in the kind of metaphysics those remarks try to express.
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There is, for Diamond, a sense in which the Tractatus is as it were unironically
metaphysical, but when it is -  in that kind of remark -  it is not concerned with ‘features
of reality underlying sense, with things that are the case although they cannot intelligibly
be said or thought to be the case’.53 Instead, the metaphysics comes in a quite different
form. Diamond writes:
What is metaphysical there [in the Tractatus] is not the content of some belief but 
the laying down o f a requirement, the requirement of logical analysis. We do 
make sense, our propositions do stand in logical relations to each other. And 
such-and-such is required for that to be so. The metaphysics there is not in 
something other than language and requiring that it be like this or like that; that 
sort of metaphysics the Tractatus uses only ironically: it uses apparently 
metaphysical sentences, but in a way which is disposed of by the sentences which 
frame the book, in the Preface and final remarks. The metaphysics of the 
Tractatus -  metaphysics not ironical and not cancelled -  is in the requirements 
which are internal to the character of language as language, in their [s/c] being a 
general form of sentence, in all sentences having this form.54
What there is not, then, for Diamond, is, as she puts it, ‘metaphysics in a straight-forward
sense’: that idea, Diamond writes, ‘yields plain nonsense or plain self-contradictions’.
But there is a metaphysical requirement lurking, as it were, in Wittgenstein’s remarks,
and which Wittgenstein had not himself uncovered as such. That requirement differs
from one Standard picture of Wittgenstein’s metaphysics in the Tractatus which sees that
metaphysics in terms of beliefs about what there is -  an ontology o f simple objects, facts,
and logical forms -  independently of language. Instead, the metaphysics comes in a
requirement about language, about sentences sharing a common form, for instance. The
kind of metaphysics Diamond does find in the Tractatus is essential to her understanding
of the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. For Diamond, the criticisms Wittgenstein
directs at his earlier self in his later work are not criticisms of some philosophical position
or other; rather, they are criticisms of the laying down of metaphysical requirements.
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Resolute readers, then, are by no means committed to the view that there is no 
metaphysics that is not ironical in the Tractatus. What they are committed to is the view 
that there is no metaphysics of a certain sort -  unironical and not cancelled out and 
crucially also self-aware or ‘witting’.55 That distinction brings with it certain difficulties 
-  crucially, perhaps, the difficulty of providing exegetical evidence for dividing up the 
metaphysics of the Tractatus, or the remarks of that work, in this way. At the same time, 
however, it may also seem more plausible as an account of the Tractatus than an extreme 
stance that would see Wittgenstein as having entirely rid himself of any metaphysical 
commitment at all at this early stage.
IV
Having given a brief overview of a couple of the ways that Resolute readings of the 
Tractatus might or do proceed in practice, I want to turn to Conant and Diamond’s 
account of the two basic features of such readings that jointly suffice in a reading for it to 
qualify as ‘Resolute’, in their sense of that word. Those two features each consist of the 
rejection of one idea central to much of the standard commentary on the Tractatus. The 
first feature is the rejection of the idea that the elucidatory propositions of the Tractatus, 
which Wittgenstein tells us we, as readers, are to come to recognise as nonsensical, are to 
be taken to convey ineffable insights of any kind -  truths or otherwise.56 The second 
feature involves the rejection of the idea that recognising the elucidatory propositions of 
the Tractatus as nonsense requires the application of a theory of meaning or sense, 
specifying when a sentence does and when it does not make sense.57
Introduction
Nonsense and the New Wittgenstein
29
As Conant and Diamond note, both of these features are rejections of ideas 
associated with Standard readings; they do not themselves lay down any kind of 
prescription about how the Tractatus ought then to be read, having rejected those ideas. 
Hence, the potential left open for different interpretations which nevertheless qualify 
equally as ‘New’ or ‘Resolute’ is vast. What these features lay out is at best a programme 
for reading the Tractatus, but no more than that.
That raises the question: where does the austere view of nonsense stand in relation
to those two features? Conant and Diamond continue:
It is a corollary of the second of these features that a resolute reading is committed 
to rejecting the idea that the Tractatus holds that there are two logically distinct 
kinds of nonsense: the garden-variety kind (cases of which we are able to identify 
prior to our initiation into the teachings of the Tractatus) and a logically more 
sophisticated kind (the nonsensicality of which is due to their logically internally 
flawed character).58
As a corollary of that second feature, then, the austere view -  the view that there is no 
kind of nonsense over and above the kind involved in our ordinary notion of words 
failing to say anything -  is central to New readings of the Tractatus. It is also central to 
New readings of Wittgenstein’s later work, since that rejection of the idea of 
Wittgenstein’s putting forward a theory of sense, or indeed any kind of philosophical 
doctrine or thesis, is equally fundamental to New readings there.
The idea that the austere view is itself a corollary of the rejection of the idea that 
Wittgenstein puts forward a theory of sense in the Tractatus is key to understanding the 
kind of view that it is. The austere view, that is, does not itself spring from some theory
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of sense that would then stand in need of justification, both exegetically and substantially. 
Someone who takes an opposite view is Meredith Williams. Williams writes: ‘Can the 
austere [Resolute] reader justify the charge of nonsense without some (implicit) theory of 
meaning or language? I do not see how.’59 For Williams, the austere view itself must be 
the upshot of some theory of meaning or other; without some philosophical standard of 
sense-making, there is nothing against which to measure sentences. For Williams, the 
austere view must be founded in some such theory in order to provide a perspective from 
or framework within which the sentences of the Tractatus can be deemed to be nonsense.
Williams might then seem simply to deny the possibility of a non-theoretical 
notion of nonsense, but that is not quite true. Williams does leave some room for our 
ordinary notion of strings of signs failing to say anything, but she also thinks that that 
notion will not do what Resolute readers want it to do. Thus, Williams thinks, Resolute 
readings face a dilemma in their treatment of nonsense. One might maintain that the 
nonsense of the Tractatus really is just plain -  austerely conceived -  nonsense; that 
option, however, according to Williams, leaves us with no way of evaluating a reading, 
nothing we could rightly call ‘a reading’. What is more, that option, Williams suggests, 
that notion of nonsense, is not sufficient to account for the nonsense of the Tractatus, 
since such sentences are in apparently ‘good standing’; so even this option must smuggle 
in a covert theory of meaning, Williams suggests, but that theory will have to be ineffably 
contained in Wittgenstein’s remarks. On the other hand, one might instead accept that 
the nonsense of the Tractatus can only be recognised as such from the vantage of some 
philosophical position, thereby radically redrawing the character of the debate:
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This relocates the debate between the austere [Resolute] reading and traditional 
readings. It becomes a debate concerning the grounds for subscribing to some 
aspects of the Frege-Russell picture while rejecting other aspects. Are the 
grounds the picture-theory and the ontology of simple objects, as the standard 
interpretation has it? Or are the grounds to be found outside the Tractatus in 
Frege’s characterisation of the context principle and its implications, as Diamond 
has it?60
Thus, for Williams, the debate is no longer one about whether or not Wittgenstein falls 
back on a technical account of language and meaning in his use o f the word ‘nonsense’, 
but rather it becomes an argument about which theory Wittgenstein is relying upon, and 
where it is to be found.
The point I want to take from Williams’ attack on the austere view of nonsense, 
and on Resolute readings, is just about the kind of view austerity is. Williams, I think, 
fails to take sufficiently seriously the possibility of a non-technical account of nonsense. 
To be fair to Williams, she has her reasons for doing so: for instance, that it is not clear to 
her how one could get anything from reading the Tractatus were it plain nonsense, or that 
there would then be no internal evaluative standard for a reading of that work and by 
which to judge its merits as a reading, or that where sentences -  such as those of the 
Tractatus -  appear to make good sense, some theory just is required in order to show that 
they are no more than ‘word salads’. These reasons, however, are not good reasons. The 
last amounts to a simple assertion that there must be more to it than the austere view 
suggests; the second ignores the possibility of any kind of distinction between the frame 
and the body of the Tractatus, and the first ignores the possibility that the lesson of the 
Tractatus might just consist in our coming to realise that the kinds of remarks it includes, 
and that we are tempted to come out with in doing philosophy, are nonsense.
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V
I have spent some time in introducing New or Resolute readings of the Tractatus and of 
Wittgenstein’s later work, as well as introducing the place of the austere view of 
nonsense within such readings. I have also wanted to suggest, before going on to 
introduce that view in more detail in Chapter One, the kind of view that the austere view 
is -  one that arises not from some theory or meaning or sense, but from the rejection of 
the very idea of such a theory, and of the idea that Wittgenstein was concerned to put 
forward some such theory. The rest of this thesis will be concerned to outline and defend 
the austere view against a range of criticisms, and within the framework provided by New 
readings. I shall want to argue primarily that the austere view is the correct view of 
Wittgenstein’s own use of the word nonsense, not only in the Tractatus but also later, and 
I shall also want to argue that the austere view is substantially (and not just exegetically) 
correct.
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Notes to Introduction
1 There are other kinds too o f  course -  (misguided) actions, (bizarre) situations, (extravagant) conduct, and 
(worthless) things might all be called ‘nonsense’ in one way or another.
2 See, for instance, Cora Diamond, ‘Frege and Nonsense’ and ‘What Nonsense Might Be’, in The Realistic 
Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1995), 
pp.73-93 & pp.95-114. Diamond herself attributes the view to G.E.M. Anscombe’s ‘illuminating 
discussion o f Wittgenstein’s later view o f nonsense’ in Anscombe’s ‘The Reality o f  the Past’, reprinted in 
Anscombe’s Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981). (See Diamond, 
‘Frege and Nonsense’, p.73.)
3 Thus, the distinction between sense and nonsense is not something we arrive at by way o f  the application 
of some theory or other o f meaning. That, I take it, is part (but only part) o f  what Wittgenstein means when 
he acknowledges an inclination o f  his in the following words: ‘I would like to say: “I must begin with the 
distinction between sense and nonsense. Nothing is possible prior to that. I can’t give it a foundation”.’
PG, pp. 126-7.
4 And these differences might be put into effect to make very different kinds o f point, too. For instance, the 
following poem might be used to make a point about a perceived need for reform o f the English language 
by exploiting its notoriously irregular rules:
I said, ‘This horse, sir, will you shoe?’
And soon the horse was shod.
I said, ‘This deed, sir, will you do?’
And soon the deed was dod!
Quoted in Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense: The Intuitions of Victorian Nonsense Literature 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p.48. Nothing about the austere view would stop one from 
recognising the various purposes -  such as this -  with which a piece o f nonsense might be uttered.
5 This raises the question: what exactly would constitute a logical difference between nonsense-sentences?
I discuss this briefly in Chapter 4 in relation to Hans-Johann Glock and P.M.S. Hacker, who seemingly 
want to give very different answers to it. In short, for Glock all that is required for the difference to be a 
logical one is a difference in what causes the remarks to be nonsense; for Hacker, the difference must 
instead be a difference in the end product as it were -  for him nonsense-sentences can arise from different 
causes without this constituting a logical difference. This difference between Glock and Hacker allows the 
former to assert that there are logically distinct kinds o f nonsense and the latter to deny that there either are 
or can be, whilst the two nevertheless hold largely similar views on many related substantial points. See 
below, pp. 104-106. Since for Diamond and Conant all nonsense is plain nonsense and plain nonsense 
results only from a failure to give the words in a nonsense-sentence a meaning, it would seem that there are 
no logically distinct kinds o f  nonsense on either way o f counting.
6 See, for instance, Tractatus 4.461 & 4.4611. Both sinnlos and unsinn sentences fail to say anything, but 
tautologies and contradictions (which are sinnlos) are nevertheless part o f  the symbolism (4.4611): they are 
perfectly legitimate constructions or moves in the language.
7 PI §500, for instance, might be an example o f  this.
8 That, for instance, is Duncan Richter’s view. Thus, on the question ‘what is nonsense?’, Richter writes: 
‘Wittgenstein, I think, has no view on this in his later work’. See Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein At His 
Word (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p.68 and p.81. Nevertheless, I think Richter would 
agree that Wittgenstein, early and later, has a view on what nonsense is not, as expressed for instance in PI 
§500 (quoted below, p.60).
9 So, for instance, Wittgenstein is claimed to have said:
Most o f us think that there is nonsense which makes sense and nonsense which does not -  that it is 
nonsense in a different way to say ‘This is green and yellow at the same time’ from saying ‘ Ab
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sur ah’. But these are nonsense in the same sense, the only difference being in the jingle o f the 
words.
‘Most o f us’ think this, though few, surely, would say it. Wittgenstein’s claim here seems to be that one 
seemingly very natural thing to say about the difference between these two nonsense-sentences is 
equivalent to saying that there is nonsense which does make sense and nonsense which doesn’t. (The 
implication here, too, given Wittgenstein’s choice o f example, is that this, absurd, view o f  nonsense, is a 
consequence o f a particular, widespread view o f contradiction.) A WL, p.64. Interestingly, on this note, the 
Oxford English Dictionary includes under ‘nonsense’ the definition ‘a meaning that makes no sense’. And 
one recent introduction to the Tractatus has Wittgenstein exploring the possibility o f  a category o f  
expressions that ‘are literally nonsensical and yet make sense’, whatever that might mean. See Alfred 
Nordmann, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.9.
10 Cora Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might Be’, p. 106 and p. 107. Cf. James Conant, ‘Two Conceptions o f  
Die Uberwindung der Metaphysik: Carnap and Early Wittgenstein’, in Wittgenstein in America, ed.
Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 13-61 (p.38, note 42).
11 These last two terms are due to P.M.S. Hacker. See P.M.S. Hacker, ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’, in 
The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 
pp.353-388 (p.359 & p.360 and note 22). All o f these terms are to some degree loaded; I will by and large 
stick to ‘New’ and ‘Resolute’ in the following and refer to those readings to which they are opposed as 
‘Standard’ or ‘Traditional’. Again, there are other, more loaded terms, such as ‘Irresolute’, and, as with 
New readings, only perhaps even more so, there is no such thing as the Standard reading. Rather, there is a 
cluster o f readings which are standard perhaps only insofar as they do not meet one or other o f  the two 
criteria which suffice to make a reading Resolute (see below, pp.28-29). It is worth noting here that some 
elements o f New readings were pre-empted or prefigured in the works of, for instance, Peter Winch and 
Hide Ishiguro.
12 So, for instance, in the following quotation, Conant describes the difference between his and Hacker’s 
views o f Wittgenstein’s views o f nonsense as o f central importance -  more important even than their 
differences over the existence o f  ineffable truths:
It would be a mistake to think that the crucial difference between my interpretation o f  Wittgenstein 
and that o f Baker and Hacker is that whereas they, on the one hand, think that when Wittgenstein 
wrote his early work he thought that there were ineffable truths that cannot be stated in language 
and later came to see that this is misconceived, I, on the other hand, think that already in his early 
work he thought this misconceived. The more important difference between their reading and 
mine is that I think that Wittgenstein (early and late) thinks that the view that they attribute to later 
Wittgenstein is a disguised version o f the view that they attribute to early Wittgenstein. I take the 
continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought to lie in his espousal o f the austere conception o f nonsense; 
they take it to lie in his espousal o f the substantial conception.
James Conant, ‘Two Conceptions o f Die Uberwindung der Metaphysik: Carnap and Early Wittgenstein’, in 
Wittgenstein in America, ed. Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 13- 
61 (p.38; note 42).
13 In fact, the latter accepts the austere view o f nonsense (see especially Moore’s Points of View (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), especially Chapter Nine, and his ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LXXVII (2003), 169-193, (p. 186)), but draws very 
different consequences from it, which New readers would find hard to accept.
14 The papers o f Hacker’s on which I focus are his ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’ (op. cit) and his 
‘Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American Wittgensteinians’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 53:210 
(January, 2001), 1-23. Conant’s account can be found in his ‘Two Conceptions o f  Die Uberwindung’ (op. 
cit).
15 In her paper, ‘Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.55; No.218 
(January, 2005), 78-89.
16 In her ‘Is Wittgenstein’s Ladder Real?’, unpublished manuscript, presented at ‘The Tractatus and Its 
History’ conference, Stirling, 11.09.2005.
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17 d o c k ’s criticisms can be found in his ‘All Kinds o f Nonsense’, in Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the 
Philosophical Investigations, ed. Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (London and New York: Routledge, 
2004), pp.221-245.
18 Both in Chapter Four and the Postscript to it, the paper o f Moore’s I focus on is his ‘InefTability and 
Nonsense’ (op. cit).
19 In fact, one o f the lessons o f Moore’s argument (in his paper ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’) might be that, 
though New readings may still fall if  austerity does, they do not necessarily stand if  austerity stands. For 
one conclusion o f Moore’s paper is that austerity is not incompatible with the existence o f some kind o f  
ineffable insight.
20 For instance, Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus paper, ‘Some Remarks on Logical Form’ (in Philosophical 
Occasions 1912-1951, ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Hackett: Indainapolis, 1993), pp.29-35), 
contains views, or seems to, which would, from a Resolute perspective, represent a severely retrograde step 
from the Tractatus, and is written in a spirit that seems not to be ‘ironical’ as the Tractatus might well be 
taken to be.
21 Hacker, ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’, p.364. ‘It is a mistake o f Diamond’, Hacker goes on to write,
‘to suppose that the Tractatus is a self-consistent work’. (Ibid, p.370.) Does Diamond suppose this? 
Arguably not, but the contradiction she does find is located much deeper down, between the anti­
metaphysical bent o f the book, and its nevertheless laying down some kind o f a metaphysical requirement. 
See below, pp.26-28.
22 Hacker, ‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’, p.381.
23 Moore suggests this, at least given his descriptions o f the two different kinds o f readings ( ‘Ineffability 
and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LXXVII (2003), 169-193 
(pp. 179-181)). I do agree with Moore’s sentiment that the two kinds o f  readings are not always quite as 
absurd as they are often rhetorically characterised as being (by adherents o f  the opposing view), but I do 
not agree with his characterisation o f the two kinds o f  readings. I also think that there is a significant 
difference between the two kinds o f  readings -  marked at least in part by the austere view o f  nonsense.
24 That does not mean, however, that the Tractatus is necessarily to be read as being entirely free from 
having any metaphysical commitments o f its own. Diamond, for one, clearly sees Wittgenstein as having 
some metaphysical commitments in that work that are not thrown away. See, for instance, Cora Diamond, 
‘Introduction II: Wittgenstein and Metaphysics’, in The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the 
Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 13-3 8 (p. 18). And Conant, too, in 
what might be thought to be a quite radical departure from the position he takes in some o f  his earlier work, 
has talked recently o f there being some ‘unwitting substantive commitments’ in the Tractatus which 
Wittgenstein at the time would not have taken to be metaphysical, or theoretical, or even in some sense 
peculiarly ‘his’. James Conant, ‘Moses and Mono-Wittgensteinians’, unpublished manuscript, presented at 
‘The Tractatus and Its History’ conference, Stirling, 9.09.2005. I return to this below, pp.26-28.
25 In fact, there is a prevarication in the ‘Resolute’ literature, between taking this idea to be the ‘final rung’
-  and so an adequate interpretation o f  the say/show distinction as it appears in the Tractatus -  and taking it 
simply to be a mispresentation o f Wittgenstein’s distinction.
26 Conant uses the metaphor o f peeling off the layers o f an onion -  what we are left with is not some 
substantial core; the most we are left with is perhaps the realisation that nothing lay at its core. James 
Conant, ‘The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege, and the Tractatus’,
Philosophical Topics, Vol.20:No.l (Fall, 1991), 115-180 (pp.157-160).
27 Not, to be sure, however, as unconditionally nonsense -  for one facet o f the austere view is that any 
string o f words could be given a sense by appropriate assignments o f  meaning. See below, e.g., pp.42-44.
28 See James Conant, ‘Putting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point o f View for 
Their Work as Authors’, in Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, eds. T. Tessin and M. von der 
Ruhr (New York: St. Martin’s Press; London: Macmillan, 1995), pp.248-331.
29 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), pp.32-3.
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Introduction
Nonsense and the New Wittgenstein
36
32 Alice Crary, ‘Introduction’, in The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London and New  
York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1-18 (p.3).
33 Crary, ‘Introduction’, p.3.
34 Although see Diamond’s, ‘Criss-Cross Philosophy’ (in Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the 
Philosophical Investigations, ed. Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (London and New York: Routledge, 
2004), pp.201-220) for a qualification to that picture o f the difference.
35 Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein (London: Penguin, 1973), p.56.
36 This, if  correct, might seem to be problematic for Wittgenstein since he elsewhere notes both that a 
picture ‘displays’ its pictorial form (TLP 2.172) -  it ‘shows it forth’ (weist sie auf) -  and yet, o f  course, that 
‘what can be shown, cannot be said’ (TLP 4.1212). Instead, this implies that some things that can be 
shown can also be said. On the other hand, however, it is not wholly implausible to read Wittgenstein at 
4.1212 as suggesting not that there are two categories o f things; one o f  things that can only be said, and 
another of things that can only be shown, and never the twain shall meet, but rather that what something 
shows, that thing cannot also say. On this view logical form could still not be put into words, for the 
reasons mentioned in the text (below, p. 18).
37 That is the suggestion o f  Diamond’s ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, but it might be thought (and I think 
Diamond later thinks) that it is not the saying/showing distinction that must be discarded, but rather a 
certain interpretation o f that distinction -  one that seems to go hand-in-hand with the idea that the Tractatus 
aims to communicate ineffable truths. See Diamond’s ‘Saying and Showing: An Example from 
Anscombe’, in Post-Analytic Tractatus, ed. Barry Stocker (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 151-166.
38 Diamond, ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, p. 182.
39 Diamond, ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, p. 181. It is not, I think, that such formations as -  to use two 
other o f Diamond’s examples -  ‘das Unsagbare’ and ‘das Undenkbare’ must succeed in putting such 
features into words if  they are to make sense: clearly there is a difference to be exploited here between
saying what cannot be said and saying something about what cannot be said (for instance, that it cannot be
said, whatever ‘it’ is). But such forms o f  words do at least play on the appearance o f  having an impossible, 
unfullfillable reference in order to raise a question more generally about how seriously that kind o f talk can 
be taken.
40 Diamond, ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, p. 181.
41 Diamond, ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, p. 194.
42 Diamond, ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, p .l81.
43 Diamond, ‘Throwing Away the Ladder’, p. 182.
44 Cora Diamond, ‘Realism and Resolution: Reply to Warren Goldfarb and Sabina Lovibond’, Journal of 
Philosophical Research, Vol.XXII (1997), 75-86 (p.78).
45 Cora Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the method o f Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, in The New 
Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 149-173 
(p.149 & p.151).
46 Hacker, ‘Was he Trying to Whistle it?’, p.360.
47 One point that Hacker goes on to make is this: that these other remarks make appeals to formal concepts 
which, Hacker thinks, Resolute readers ought to eschew, such as ‘proposition’ and ‘variable’. Hacker,
‘Was He Trying to Whistle It?’, p.362.
48 James Conant, ‘Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein’, in The New Wittgenstein, ed. 
Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 174-217 (p.216, note 102).
49 Rupert Read and Rob Deans distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions o f Resolute readings, with 
one o f the features o f strong readings being that they discard even this attempt to hold on to certain remarks 
of the Tractatus through the notion o f a frame. See Read and Deans, ‘ “Nothing is Shown”: A “Resolute” 
Response to Mounce, Emiliani, Koethe, and Vilhauer’, Philosophical Investigations 26:3 (July, 2003), 239- 
270.
50 Sullivan writes that, as instructions, they might be said to ‘share the perversity o f  instructions for 
assembling flat-pack furniture: that you can only work out how they’re to be read by comparing them with 
the finished article’. Peter Sullivan, ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume LXXVII, (2203) 195-223, (p.211, note 31).
51 As Diamond draws the distinction, the difference is between in the first instance the content o f a belief, 
and in the second instance the laying down o f a requirement (see below). The (unironical, not cancelled 
out) metaphysics o f the Tractatus does not consist in some belief o f Wittgenstein’s, but in metaphysical
Introduction
Nonsense and the New Wittgenstein
37
requirements he lays down; and that requirement is not about how the world must be, external to language, 
but about the character o f language itself. Given this contrast, Diamond might not wish to accept my way 
of expressing the difference here, as between two kinds o f metaphysical remark; the suggestion seems to be 
that the requirement is in the background, but is not the content o f some belief or some remark exactly.
52 Conant used in this phrase in his paper ‘Moses and Mono-Wittgensteinians’, presented at ‘The Tractatus 
and Its History’ conference, Stirling, 9.09.2005.
53 Diamond, ‘Introduction II’, p.18.
54 Diamond, ‘Introduction II’, p.19.
55 This suggests another way o f characterising ‘Standard’ readings in opposition to New readings, as any 
reading which is prepared to ascribe to Wittgenstein a witting commitment to metaphysical doctrines or 
theses o f any kind.
56 It is a feature o f much o f  the (at least earlier) literature on New and Standard readings o f  the Tractatus, 
that the Standard position is taken to involve a commitment to the existence o f ineffable truths as the lesson 
of the Tractatus. That idea is explicitly held by some -  most notably, P.M.S. Hacker -  and I think also 
implicitly by others - 1 would include here Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe (but others, Peter 
Sullivan, for instance, would not, certainly in the case o f Anscombe). However, it is a matter o f  contention 
whether, or how many, or which o f these Standard readers really do commit to the idea o f  ineffable truths, 
especially since the idea (notwithstanding Hacker’s vehement defence o f it) seems to be something o f  a 
straw man.
57 Conant and Diamond write: ‘The second feature is a rejection o f the idea that what such recognition 
requires on the part o f a reader o f  the Tractatus is the application o f a theory o f meaning that has been 
advanced in the body o f  the work -  a theory that specifies the conditions under which a sentence makes 
sense and the conditions under which it does not’ ( ‘On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely: Reply to 
Meredith Williams and Peter Sullivan’, in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, ed. Max Kolbel and 
Bernhard Weiss (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.46-99 (p.47)). I want to quibble with their 
inclusion o f the words: ‘that has been advanced in the body o f the work’. I think the rejection is stronger 
than that, and that it would apply to a theory o f meaning advanced in the body, the frame, or elsewhere and 
imposed from outside the Tractatus.
58 Conant and Diamond, ‘On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely’, p.48.
59 Meredith Williams, ‘Nonsense and Cosmic Exile: The Austere Reading o f  the Tractatus’, in 
Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, ed. Max Kolbel and Bernhard Weiss (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), pp.6-31 (p. 18).
60 Williams, ‘Nonsense and Cosmic Exile’, p. 18.
38
Chapter One
The Austere View of Nonsense
/
The idea of nonsense plays a central role in Wittgenstein’s thought throughout his life,
from the Tractatus through to some of his last writings gathered in On Certainty. It is a
guiding theme of his work that much of what we say and write when we practice
philosophy is, in spite both of appearances and of our best intentions, nothing more than
nonsense. In the Tractatus, we are told, apparently without irony, that ‘[m]ost of the
propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but
nonsensical’ and that, as a consequence, ‘we cannot give any answer to questions of this
kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical’ (TLP 4.003). Accordingly, the
‘correct method in philosophy’, as the Tractatus characterises it, would then be this:
[T]o say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science -  i.e. 
something that has nothing to do with philosophy -  and then, whenever someone 
else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had 
failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. {TLP 6.53)
That work, furthermore, ends by drawing attention to the nonsensicality of its own
propositions -  they serve as elucidations only insofar as we come to recognise them as
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nonsensical; we are to understand Wittgenstein, and not his propositions. In
Wittgenstein’s later work, the idea of philosophy as consisting mostly of nonsense
remains; his aim, as characterised in the Philosophical Investigations, is to help the reader
pass from a piece of disguised, or latent, nonsense to something that is patent nonsense
(PI §464). And the use of the exclamation ‘Nonsense!’ (Unsinn!) as a term of criticism
in response to philosophical impulses can be found, for instance, in the following striking
instance from On Certainty:
I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am 
looking attentively into his face. -  So I don’t know, then, that there is a sick man 
lying here? Neither the question nor the answer makes sense. Any more than the 
assertion ‘I am here’, which I might yet use at any moment, if suitable occasion 
presented itself. (OC § 10)
What kind of thing nonsense can be, then, is a question that raises itself insistently in
Wittgenstein’s work. And the answer we end up giving to this question will have serious
and widespread consequences for how we read his work. Thus, when the Tractatus tells
us we are to recognise its own propositions as nonsense, to use them as a ladder and then
throw them away, it will make a great deal of difference to the kind of thing we imagine
we can grasp by way of its nonsensical propositions just what nonsense is, and so what it
might be thought to be capable of doing, too. What the lesson of the Tractatus might be,
the kind of thing we can climb up to, may well depend on what the ladder is made up of.1
So too, when Wittgenstein again and again writes that much of what we want to come out
with in philosophy is nonsense, what we think nonsense is for Wittgenstein will not only
characterise the kind of criticism he is making of traditional philosophy, but also at a
much more fundamental level will colour our conception of the kind of solution or
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dissolution of philosophical problems we see him as trying to effect -  the very conception 
of philosophy as Wittgenstein practises it that we are left with.
We might, for instance, read Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘nonsense’ as 
reflecting a quite general theory of sense of his own -  nonsense for Wittgenstein we 
might think arises when we violate certain rules, the rules of logical syntax, say, or of 
grammar. In that case, we are already taking Wittgenstein to be forwarding quite 
explicitly certain philosophical doctrines; his means of dissolving traditional philosophy 
is to replace it with other kinds of doctrine which may end up looking for all the world 
like a continuation of that very tradition, of that mode of practicing philosophy. Or we 
might privilege instead Wittgenstein’s anti-theoretical remarks where he again and again 
returns to the idea, in Diamond’s words, that ‘he is not putting forward philosophical 
doctrines or theses; or ... that it cannot be done, that it is only through some confusion 
one is in about what one is doing that one could take oneself to be putting forward 
philosophical doctrines or theses at all’.2 In that case, Wittgenstein’s conception of 
nonsense would have to be based not on his own philosophical account of sense, not on 
its failure to meet certain criteria, but on a much more basic failure to make any sense at 
all, on its as it were simply ‘falling apart’ when we do try to make sense of it.3
The question of what nonsense might be for Wittgenstein is, then, one with wide- 
ranging consequences for reading his work. What answer we give will it seems 
determine the whole shape of his work for us, the very nature of the solution or 
dissolution of traditional philosophical problems that he is trying to achieve and, perhaps,
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one might add -  with a nod to the preface of the Tractatus -  how much is achieved in so 
doing. In this chapter, I shall want to outline the austere view of nonsense in detail, and 
offer some of the evidence that exists for its being Wittgenstein’s view, early and later, as 
well as drawing some of the consequences of that view for how we might read 
Wittgenstein’s work.
II
That austere view of nonsense was first outlined by Cora Diamond in a number of essays 
primarily on Frege.4 Diamond begins with an account of a view of nonsense that is 
opposed to the austere view, and that she calls the ‘natural’ view.
The natural view of nonsense makes a distinction between at least two different 
logical types of nonsense. There is, on the one hand, the type of nonsense you get if you 
take a perfectly respectable, senseful sentence, and replace one or more words with 
nonsense-words. So, for instance, the example Diamond gives is this: ‘Scott kept a 
runcible at Abbottsford’. What makes this kind of sentence nonsense is our failure, to 
date at least, to give a meaning to some or other of the words involved. Call this type (1), 
or ‘mere’, nonsense.
On the other hand, the natural view would have it, there is another type of 
nonsense: type (2), or ‘substantial’, nonsense. This type of nonsense is nonsense that 
results from a category-error of some kind -  a putting of a word of one logical category in 
a place for a word of entirely another category. Thus, this kind of nonsense-sentence
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combines only meaningful words, but does so in such a way that their individual 
meanings, the meanings that the words do have, clash. An example of this sort might be 
the following: ‘Caesar is a prime number’.5 ‘Caesar’, we might say, following the natural 
view, is the proper name or title of a person -  and yet the predicate ‘x is a prime number’ 
is only assertable of numbers. Asserted of a person, however, it is neither true nor false -  
what would it be like, we might ask, for Caesar to be or not be divisible only by the 
number one and by himself? -  it is, rather, nonsense.6
On the natural view, then, as Diamond presents it, there is a straightforward 
contrast between two logically distinct types of nonsense: nonsense that is nonsense 
because of a lack, an absence, of meaning, because a specification has not hitherto been 
made -  type (1), or mere, nonsense; and nonsense that is not the result of an absence of 
meaning, but of the meanings of the words so combined -  type (2), or substantial, 
nonsense.
On the austere view, by contrast, the entire class of supposed examples of type (2) 
nonsense is reduced into that of type (1). There is on the austere view simply no such 
thing as positive or substantial nonsense. Instead, what we have in a nonsense-sentence 
like ‘Caesar is a prime number’ (if indeed that is nonsense on some occasion of
7  • •utterance ) is not a combination of incompatible meanings, but no meaning at all; words 
whose meanings have not yet been specified in that context. This does not mean that we 
could not give them a meaning -  for the austere view, a sentence’s being nonsense means 
only that so far, to date, we have failed to give the signs a meaning -  and, of course, if we
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do decide to do so, some meanings may occur to us as possible substitutions more readily
than others will. It seems natural, for instance, in the case of ‘Caesar is a prime number’,
to give ‘Caesar’ the meaning, say, that ‘fifty-three’ has in the sentence ‘Fifty-three is a
prime number’; just as it seems natural to give ‘runcible’, in ‘Scott kept a runcible at
Abbottsford’, the meaning that, say, ‘cow’ has in the sentence ‘Scott kept a cow at
Abbottsford’.8 In doing so, however, on the austere view, we are not according with
some meaning already present in the signs. If the sentence is nonsense, on the austere
view, it is simply mere nonsense, and no part of it can be said to mean what the same
combination of letters might mean elsewhere, in some other, senseful sentence. So we do
not have, in ‘Caesar is a prime number’, two logical elements, ‘Caesar’ and ‘is a prime
number’, one of which we then alter the meaning of in order that it fit the other. Nor in
‘Scott kept a runcible at Abbottsford’ do we have the same logical element that we have
in ‘Scott kept a cow at Abbottsford’. Nevertheless, certain ways of giving a sense to such
sentences as these do occur naturally to us. So, for instance, Diamond writes:
It is natural to do it with [‘Caesar is a prime number’], if we do it at all, either in 
such a way that the meaning of ‘Caesar’ is what it is in ‘Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon’ or in such a way that the rest of the sentence means what it does in 
sentences about numbers; it is natural to do it with [‘Scott kept a runcible at 
Abbottsford’], if we do it at all, so that the whole sentence will say of whatever 
runcibles are what ‘Scott kept a cow at Abbottsford’ says of cows.9
What makes these alternatives seem natural is, for Diamond, simply ‘some superficial
resemblance to sentences of two distinct logical patterns’. For Conant, it is a matter of ‘a
feature of the “external form” ... of certain sentences -  a grammatical surface pattern -  of
ordinary language (a certain sort of configuration of signs). [It is] a feature of the surface
grammar (the sign-structure) of ordinary language -  not a proper logical category’.10 We
need not take any of these natural options, however, if we do decide to give the sentence
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a meaning; ‘we might perfectly well’, Diamond notes, ‘have “Caesar is a prime number” 
express the sense, by appropriate assignments of meaning, that clematis is a fast 
grower’.11
What we cannot do, on the austere as opposed to the natural view, is give a word 
the wrong kind of meaning, a meaning that clashes somehow with the meaning that the 
rest of the sentence does have. The difference between what the natural view sees as two 
logically distinct types of nonsense is, for the austere view then, largely a matter of 
psychology: we are prone to take the one for sense, to be taken in by the illusion of 
having understood it, by the appearance of sense where there is none. But whatever 
psychological images the nonsense-sentence may call to mind, logically it is pure 
gibberish.
I ll
Both of those views of what nonsense might be can be contrasted with a third kind of 
view, which might be called ‘falsidicaT and which has been forwarded by Arthur Prior 
among others. I noted above that the sentence ‘Caesar is a prime number’ was a bad 
example of category-clash nonsense, or of nonsense full-stop, since Frege for one would 
have viewed it not as nonsense at all, but as plain false. One way of characterising a 
‘falsidicaT account would be to say that where the substantial view sees such examples as 
involving a kind of logical error resulting in a special category of nonsense, and where 
the austere view sees them as lacking any meaning at all, as being mere gibberish, on a 
falsidical view (and as the name suggests) they involve instead a trivial kind of falsehood,
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and hence are not nonsense at all. The sentence ‘Caesar is a prime number’ is a good 
example here, not simply because of Frege’s view of it, but because one’s own intuitions 
may leave one undecided about what to say of this case -  whether to think it false or 
nonsense. On a falsidical view, all examples of so-called category-clash nonsense come 
out intelligible but false.
A version of that kind of view can be found in the following passage from
Quine’s Word and Object. Quine writes:
[T]here has been a concern among philosophers to declare meaningless, rather 
than trivially false, such predications as ‘This stone is thinking about Vienna’ 
(Carnap) and ‘Quadruplicity drinks procrastination’ (Russell). Here we witness 
sometimes just a spontaneous revulsion against silly sentences and sometimes a 
remote project of cutting down meaningful language to something like empirical 
size. But since the philosophers who would build such categorial fences are not 
generally resolved to banish from language all falsehoods of mathematics and like 
absurdities, I fail to see much benefit in the partial exclusions that they do 
undertake; for the forms concerned would remain still quite under control if 
admitted rather, like self-contradictions, as false (and false by meaning, if one 
likes).12
The view that Quine is opposing here is clearly something like the substantial view -  the 
building of ‘categorial fences’ which exclude, or are meant to exclude, certain 
combinations of words as involving nonsensical category-clash. But what view it is 
exactly that Quine is putting forward in its place is not so clear: that is, it is not clear 
whether Quine would endorse what I am going to call a ‘strong’ falsidical view, or a 
‘weak’ falsidical view. The former holds that these sentences and their negations are all 
trivially false; the latter that while such sentences as ‘This stone is thinking about Vienna’ 
are false, their negations, e.g. ‘This stone is not thinking about Vienna’, are true.13 
Nothing Quine writes in the above passage commits him to either view over the other.
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What as it were speaks in favour of that broad falsidical view -  whether strong or 
weak -  and as set against the substantial conception, is the feeling that, if we can 
understand what it is that these nonsense-sentences do say, then, well, we just can 
understand what they say, and hence it makes very little sense indeed to go on to call 
them nonsensical. If we can understand them at all, then they must make some kind of 
sense, even if whatever sense they do make will be, as Quine puts it, ‘trivially false’. 
What clearly it makes no sense to say (and as PI §500 suggests14), is that the kind of 
sense they do make makes no sense. Since both on Quine’s view and on the substantial 
view we can recognise, in Quine’s words, ‘the forms concerned’, it is surely more honest 
to own up to that and label them not nonsense but false, albeit trivially so.
What Quine’s broad position has going for it, then, is simply its unwillingness to 
follow the substantial view into incoherence. So while neither version of the falsidical 
view has ever been -  at least, so far as I know -  attributed to Wittgenstein, one might be 
tempted to prefer some kind of falsidical view to a substantial one.15 Why, though, 
should one prefer an austere view (not simply exegetically) to a version of the falsidical? 
Either version of the falsidical view, I think, and in particular its strong version, faces a 
number of difficulties, but rather than trying to outline those problems here, I want to 
deflect the question and suggest instead why I do not need to answer it. The reason stems 
from the nature of the dispute between the austere and the falsidical. The question I am 
concerned with here is that of what nonsense might be; that, for instance, is clearly what 
is at stake between the austere and the substantial views. But the austere and the
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falsidical views can and I think probably largely do agree on the answer to that question: 
both recognise only a category of ‘mere’ nonsense, of gibberish, of words lacking any 
meaning at all, and both deny the existence of as it were ‘substantial’ nonsense. Thus, 
Quine can elsewhere, and without it signifying any change of heart on his part, make the 
following, rather austere-sounding, comment: ‘Nonsense is indeed mere absence of sense, 
and can always be remedied by arbitrarily assigning some sense’.16 That is quite 
compatible with his earlier falsidical remark, since he may here be referring only to those 
nonsense-sentences recognised as such on the falsidical view. Instead, then, what the 
austere and the falsidical views differ over is not what nonsense might be, but rather (one 
might put it) over what might be nonsense: they disagree over which sentences properly 
count as nonsensical, with the falsidical view drawing the bounds of sense far wider than 
someone holding an austere view might. That question, at any rate, of which sentences 
are nonsense, is not my question here, and I shall say no more about it.
IV
Having outlined the austere and the substantial views of nonsense, I want to turn now to 
look at some of the evidence for attributing to Wittgenstein an austere view of nonsense, 
early and later, and beginning with his view in the Tractatus. There, in the Tractatus, 
that view of what Wittgenstein himself thought nonsense might be gains credence from a 
number of remarks. Most notably, the Tractatus 5.473s appear to contain a 
straightforward statement of such a view. Before turning to that passage, however, I want 
to begin with another piece of evidence, from earlier in the Tractatus: Wittgenstein’s 
reformulation, at Tractatus 3.3, of Frege’s context-principle.
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Frege, in the introduction to his Grundlagen der Arithmetik, lays down the 
following three ‘fundamental’ methodological principles guiding his enquiry:
[1] always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the 
subjective from the objective;
[2] never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context
of a proposition;
[3] never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object.17
Diamond explains the link between the first two of these principles as follows:
[I]f we disobey the second principle and ask for the meaning of a word in 
isolation, we shall almost certainly look for an answer in the realm of the 
psychological -  we shall explain what it is for a term to have a meaning in terms 
of mental images or mental acts, and that will be a violation of the first 
principle.18
What is available to us, when we take a word in isolation from any particular proposition, 
primarily, are the images we associate with the word -  for Frege, the stuff of psychology, 
not of logic. So violating the second of Frege’s principles -  the context-principle -  may 
well lead us to violate the first, to confuse the logical and the psychological by looking 
for the meaning of a word in terms of mental images. Likewise, failing to separate 
sharply the psychological and the logical may lead us to think that we can ask for the 
meaning of a word in isolation, not as it appears in some proposition or other -  it may 
lead us to think that looking for an answer there can give us what we want. Those two 
principles are linked to the third in this way: asking for the meaning of a word in isolation 
may lead us to look for its meaning in terms of mental associations and images and that 
may in turn lead us to lose sight of Frege’s distinction between concept and object. Thus, 
take for instance the following two sentences:
1. Vienna is the capital of Austria.
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2. Trieste is no Vienna.
Though in both sentences we have the same sign -  ‘Vienna’ -  in the first it stands for an 
object, namely, the capital of Austria, and in the second it functions rather as a concept- 
word. If we ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, we may think that ‘Vienna’ has 
one meaning wherever, and however, it occurs, and so we will lose sight of the difference 
between, for instance, the two occurrences of the word above. Again, something similar 
might be said in reverse, too: that losing sight of Frege’s distinction between concept and 
object may encourage us to think that there is something shared -  over and above the 
mere sign -  between those two instances of the word ‘Vienna’, and so lead us into 
transgressing against Frege’s first and second principles too.
In the Tractatus, Frege’s second principle -  the context-principle -  is 
reformulated to read as follows:
3.3 Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition
does a name have meaning.
And that point gets reiterated a few remarks later, at Tractatus 3.314, which begins: ‘An
expression has meaning only in a proposition’. That idea, then, that words only have a
meaning in the context of a proposition, bears on the question of what nonsense might be
in this way. If an expression only has meaning in a proposition, then there will be no
such thing as an expression having a meaning in a nonsense-sentence, and no such thing
as our being able to identify its meaning there, for a nonsense-sentence is not a
proposition at all. In a nonsense-sentence, we lack the kind of context in which a word
can mean anything at all. Thus, nonsense-sentences cannot be constituted -  as they can
on the substantial view -  of meaningful words which, so combined, yield nonsense.
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Wittgenstein’s contextualism appears to rule out the idea that words in nonsense-
19sentences can so much as have a meaning.
Wittgenstein’s reformulation of Frege’s context-principle at Tractatus 3.3 is 
immediately followed in the text by his drawing of a distinction between signs and 
symbols, and that distinction is instrumental in how Wittgenstein’s contextualism gets 
applied to the question of what nonsense might be. So, beginning at Tractatus 3.31, 
Wittgenstein writes:
3.31 I call any part of a proposition that characterises its sense an 
expression (or a symbol).
(A proposition is itself an expression.)
Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in 
common with one another is an expression.
An expression is a mark of a form and a content.
3.311 An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in
which it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of 
propositions.
A symbol, or an ‘expression’, then, is a proposition, or a contributing part of one. It is as 
it were a logical unit, something that goes towards determining the sense o f a proposition, 
and so something that propositions can have in common, or otherwise the proposition 
itself. The symbol, in Conant’s words, is ‘something which only has life in language’.20 
As such, the notion of a symbol stands in contrast to that of a (mere) sign:
3.32 A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol.
3.321 So one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common 
to two different symbols -  in which case they will signify in different 
ways.
3.322 Our use of the same sign to signify two different objects can never 
indicate a common characteristic of the two, if we use it with two different 
modes o f signification. For the sign, of course, is arbitrary. So we could 
choose two different signs instead, and then what would be left in 
common on the signifying side?
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3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same
word has different modes of signification -  and so belongs to different 
symbols -  or that two words that have different modes of signification are 
employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
Thus the word ‘is’ figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and 
as an expression for existence; ‘exist’ figures as an intransitive verb like 
‘go’, and ‘identical’ as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of 
something's happening.
(In the proposition, ‘Green is green’ -  where the first word is the 
proper name of a person and the last an adjective -  these words do not 
merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)
The sign, by contrast to the idea of a symbol, then, is not a logical unit at all, but is ‘what
can be perceived of a symbol’ -  the mere mark on paper, or noise. So, for instance, in the
example presented by the two sentences above, we have one sign in common between the
two sentences -  that of ‘Vienna’ -  but that sign nevertheless symbolises in two quite
distinct ways on each of the two occasions of use: in the first instance, the symbol has the
logical role of a proper name, standing for the capital city of Austria; but in the second
the sign symbolises a concept, one that the city of Vienna is typically taken to represent a
paradigm instantiation of. And, again, in Wittgenstein’s example ‘Green is green’ we
have one sign but two symbols -  one a proper name and one an adjective. That the two
symbols share the same sign is, for Wittgenstein, entirely arbitrary.
That basic distinction between sign and symbol is assumed in much of the above, 
and it allows us to re-caste part of the import of the Tractarian context-principle for the 
question of what nonsense might be in the following way: in a nonsense-sentence -  i.e. 
not in the context of a proposition -  we have only signs and not symbols, things which 
have no logical significance despite their perhaps bearing a superficial resemblance to 
other signs which do symbolise.
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The contextualism of the Tractatus, then, together with its application by way of 
the sign/symbol distinction, provides some evidence for Wittgenstein having held in the 
Tractatus to an austere view of nonsense. Wittgenstein’s drawing of that distinction, in 
Tractatus 3.31 through to 3.323, is followed immediately by the following comment -  ‘In 
this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy 
is full of them)’ (3.324); to avoid such confusions, Wittgenstein writes, we must make 
use of ‘a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar -  by logical syntax’ (3.325). 
What kind of confusions those confusions are, as well as just what logical syntax is, and 
how the appeal to a sign-language that is governed by it -  or that obeys its rules -  can 
help, is a scene of crucial difference between those who find in the Tractatus an austere 
view of nonsense and those -  like P.M.S. Hacker -  who find there instead a conception of 
nonsense based on the violation of rules of logical syntax.21 I want to postpone 
discussion of this central issue until Chapter Two and turn instead to a second key piece 
of evidence for Wittgenstein’s having held to an austere view of nonsense in the 
Tractatus.
That passage consists of Tractatus 5.473 through to 5.4733 where, as I said above, 
Wittgenstein appears straightforwardly to state an austere view of nonsense. I shall want 
to draw out briefly how those remarks might be taken to support the attribution to 
Wittgenstein of an austere view, before dealing with some objections to that way of 
reading the passage, made by Genia Schonbaumsfeld. Wittgenstein writes:
5.473 Logic must look after itself.
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If a sign is possible, then it is also capable of signifying. Whatever 
is possible in logic is also permitted. (The reason why ‘Socrates is 
identical’ means nothing is that there is no property called ‘identical’. The 
proposition is nonsensical because we have failed to make an arbitrary 
determination, and not because the symbol, in itself, would be 
illegitimate.)
In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.
5.4731 Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can become 
dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents every logical 
mistake. -  What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical 
thought.
5.4732 We cannot give a sign the wrong sense.
5.4733 Frege says that any legitimately constructed proposition must have 
a sense. And I say that any possible proposition is legitimately 
constructed, and, if it has no sense, that can only be because we have 
failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents.
(Even if we think that we have done so.)
Thus the reason why ‘Socrates is identical’ says nothing is that we 
have not given any adjectival meaning to the word ‘identical’. For when it 
appears as a sign for identity, it symbolises in an entirely different way -  
the signifying relation is a different one -  therefore the symbols also are 
entirely different in the two cases: the two symbols have only the sign in 
common, and that is an accident.
One idea that gets reiterated throughout this passage is stated particularly forcefully at
5.4732: ‘We cannot give a sign the wrong sense’. That remark directly contradicts the
substantial conception of nonsense that requires we can do just that. Only if we can give
a sign the wrong sense does it make sense to talk of nonsense consisting of signs whose
meanings clash. That we cannot do that comes across, too, in the idea that ‘if a sign is
possible, then it is also capable of signifying’, that ‘whatever is possible in logic in also
permitted’. Thus, there is nothing both possible and yet impermissible; there are no
combinations of signs that are logically prohibited. Hence, if some combination of signs
says nothing, that will not be down to any illegitimacy on its part, but to our failure to
date to give the signs a meaning. And that idea is reinforced later in the passage by way
of a contrast between Wittgenstein’s view and that of Frege. Where Frege says that ‘any
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legitimately constructed proposition must have a sense’, Wittgenstein says instead that 
any possible proposition is already legitimately constructed; if it then has no sense that 
will not be because of any illegitimacy on its part, but simply because we have not yet 
given some of its signs a meaning. And Wittgenstein adds that that is the case ‘even if 
we think that we have done so’, even if the signs do get used with a meaning elsewhere. 
So there is a repeated attack in this passage on the idea of illegitimate propositions, of 
propositions whose senses are somehow logically excluded. Against such an idea, 
Wittgenstein holds that there are no illegitimate combinations of signs -  that any possible 
combination of signs could be given a meaning. Hence, too, if any such construct lacks a 
sense that will not be because, as Wittgenstein puts it, ‘the symbol, in itself, would be 
illegitimate’, but merely that we have failed to give a meaning to the signs.
That rejection of a substantial conception of nonsense in favour of an austere view 
gets illustrated twice by Wittgenstein by means of an analysis of the example ‘Socrates is 
identical’. So, Wittgenstein writes, the reason why that string of signs says or means 
nothing is that ‘there is no property called “identical”,’ or, again, that we have as yet ‘not 
given any adjectival meaning to the word “identical”.’ It is not that two meanings clash 
here, that the meaning of the word ‘identical’ does not “fit” with the rest of the sentence. 
Lest we think that, Wittgenstein adds, in the first instance of the example, that its 
nonsensicality is due to the fact that ‘we have failed to make an arbitrary determination’: 
we could have given the sign a meaning, but we have not. Instead, Wittgenstein proceeds 
to point out, on both occasions, one way in which we could have given the sign a 
meaning -  a way which might seem natural to us, given the similarity of what might be
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called the surface grammar of the string to a familiar pattern of ordinary language. So, in 
order to illustrate his point that if a sign is possible, it is also capable of signifying, 
Wittgenstein draws our attention to one way in which the signs might yet be seen to 
symbolise, one way of seeing a symbol in the sign. But the problem in each case is just 
that we have not given the sign a meaning -  for instance along the lines of Wittgenstein’s 
suggestion -  and not that what we have is a somehow illegitimate symbol, or an 
impermissible combination of signs.
In the first case, then, Wittgenstein is, as Conant puts it, ‘talking about a method 
of symbolising’'?1 one way in which we might come to see a symbol in the sign is to take 
the word ‘identical’ here to refer to a property. But we have not given the sign such a 
meaning -  there is as yet no property called ‘identical’ -  and so assimilating the sentence 
to that kind of grammatical pattern, in which the word ‘identical’ would then function to 
pick out a property, will not give us anything that the sentence says, will not give the 
sentence a sense. Taking that route in trying to find some sense in the sentence will get 
us only so far then, but no further, at least for the time being. There are no obstacles in 
the way of giving the sign such a meaning, but we have not as yet availed ourselves of 
this option. And neither have we made any other such arbitrary determination which 
might give a sense to the whole. The point, then, is this: that the symbol in itself is not 
somehow illegitimate or impermissible, for we do not have symbols here yet at all; rather, 
we have failed to make ‘an arbitrary determination’, and one such determination which 
would give a sense to the whole is suggested by Wittgenstein -  to make ‘identical’ the 
name of some property.
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In the second case, we get much the same -  a suggestion of one way of giving the 
signs a meaning based on the resemblance the string bears to what Conant calls ‘a feature 
of the “external form” ... of certain sentences -  a grammatical surface pattern -  of 
ordinary language (a certain sort of configuration of signs)’.23 But again, the reason the 
string is nonsense is just that so far we have failed to give the signs just such a meaning 
as that suggested, and not that that combination of symbols or signs is logically 
prohibited or flawed.
The sense in which we cannot make mistakes in logic, then, the sense in which 
language itself prevents every logical mistake, is this: that we cannot even frame in 
language an illogical thought -  if we try to, we end up only with signs that have no 
meaning at all, through our failure to give them a meaning, or else which mean something 
else entirely, but not at any rate something that will satisfy our original desire to say 
something illogical. So logic, we might say, not only must look after itself, but does so.
That reading just presented is pretty much of a piece with that of James Conant. 
For Genia Schonbaumsfeld, however, such a reading is deeply unappetising, for it 
involves a degree of ‘interpretative contortion’ that she finds wholly implausible -  not 
least because, for Schonbaumsfeld, there is a perfectly acceptable ‘straight’ reading of the 
remarks available, a reading that Conant misses, according to Schonbaumsfeld, because 
he misidentifies the target of the passage as a whole. Where for Conant the target of the 
passage is a conception of nonsense that he finds Frege at times committed to (and at
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other times committed to rejecting), Schonbaumsfeld sees that view -  ‘a Carnap-type 
conception of “substantial nonsense’” -  as being ‘the view that Wittgenstein is actually 
endorsing\ 24 For Schonbaumsfeld, the target of the remarks is instead what she calls ‘the 
Frege-Russell conception of logic as a kind of “super-science”.’ Thus, Schonbaumsfeld 
writes:
Frege and Russell conceived of logic as a set of a priori general truths about 
logical entities -  as laws, in other words, of a kind of super-physics. This is the 
notion that Wittgenstein is criticising. On Wittgenstein’s new conception, 
language prevents every logical mistake, not because, as Russell thought, when 
we think in accordance with the laws of logic, we think correctly, but rather 
because the logical syntax of language determines what is correct, once the 
relevant meanings have been assigned to words. Hence, pace Russell, logic can’t 
be justified by appeal to self-evidence, for the ‘laws of logic’ are a precondition 
for making sense in the first place. Logic therefore neither stands in need nor 
admits of further justification and the idea that we could so much as have a false 
or incorrect logic falls by the wayside. The logic of our language (logical syntax) 
is not a theory but a set of rules constitutive of what it is to say something. This 
disposes of Frege-Russell’s mythological ‘third realm’ populated by logical 
entities whose antics make our logical propositions true or false: if a sign is 
possible, it is also capable of signifying. Consequently, we cannot make mistakes 
in logic. Naturally, this doesn’t imply that we can’t talk nonsense by producing 
meaningless strings like ‘Socrates is identical’. But the reason why this is 
nonsensical is because an arbitrary determination has not been made -  we have 
not given an adjectival meaning to the word ‘identical’ (although we could have 
done so). Once this determination has been made, however, the consequences 
that follow from it are not arbitrary, and hence there is such a thing as employing 
a sign incorrectly, i.e. contrary to the rules for its use (and of course the sign does 
not then symbolise, for a symbol just is a sign used according to the rules for its 
correct use).25
For Schonbaumsfeld, then, logical syntax is a set of rules which determine the correct use 
of a sign. If we do not follow those rules, if we misuse the signs, then we end up with 
signs which do not symbolise at all. Hence, when Wittgenstein says that the reason that 
‘Socrates is identical’ says nothing is that we have not given an adjectival meaning to the 
word ‘identical’, he means that, since we have not given it an adjectival meaning, using it 
as if it were an adjective involves a violation of the rules for its correct use, which is as a
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sign for identity between two things. The sense in which, on Schonbaumsfeld’s reading, 
logic must -  and does -  look after itself, then, is that those rules for the correct use of 
signs themselves constitute what is correct, thus they cannot be mistaken, and that 
breaking those rules leaves us saying nothing at all.
Schonbaumsfeld’s view of Tractarian nonsense is essentially the same as P.M.S. 
Hacker’s view. Since I discuss Hacker’s stance in Chapter Two, I do not wish to say very 
much about it here. But I do want to indicate where I think Schonbaumsfeld goes wrong 
in reading this passage. The first thing to note perhaps is that, while Schonbaumsfeld 
accuses Conant’s reading of involving ‘interpretative contortion’, her reading requires 
some gymnastics of its own. In particular, a deal of contortion is necessary to square 
what Wittgenstein says about our having failed to make an arbitrary determination and 
that being the reason for the nonsensicality of ‘Socrates is identical’, with the idea that 
what is involved in that string is in fact a violation of logical syntax, when no mention of 
rules and their violation is made at all in the passage, and when the very idea of their 
being illegitimate combinations of signs -  which Schonbaumsfeld’s view entails -  is 
given such short shrift throughout. And it becomes more than a little unclear just what 
the idea -  central to the Tractatus 5.473s -  that we cannot give a sign the wrong sense, is 
meant to be ruling out on Schonbaumsfeld’s view -  just what force it has exactly to say 
that. Moreover, Schonbaumsfeld attributes what she thinks of as Conant’s misreading of 
the passage as a whole to his misidentifying the target of the passage -  not ‘a Carnap-type 
conception of “substantial nonsense’” at all, for this, Schonbaumsfeld writes, is in fact the 
view that ‘Wittgenstein is endorsing’,26 but rather the ‘Frege-Russell view of logic as a
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kind of super-science’. But Schonbaumsfeld’s claim about Conant’s having misidentified
the target of the Tractatus 5.473s relies on that Frege-Russell view not equally being a (or
the) target of the passage on an austere reading of the 5.473s -  and yet the austere reading
does give one good reason to abandon the Russellian position. In fact, on that kind of
reading of the Tractatus 5.473s, the passage presents as it were a two-pronged attack on
the Russell view: first, on the substantial view of nonsense that it gives rise to; second, by
rendering redundant the appeal Russell makes to self-evidence. If the austere view is
right, there just is no work for self-evidence to do. So I am not convinced that
Schonbaumsfeld’s reading of the target of the remarks in question adds anything that
could not already be adequately explained on Conant’s view. But it does, however, bring
with it an extra difficulty; namely, in reconciling the Tractatus 5.473s with what
Wittgenstein later on has to say about what he calls the ‘correct method’ in philosophy
(Tractatus 6.53), which, Wittgenstein writes, would be this:
[T]o say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science -  i.e. 
something that has nothing to do with philosophy -  and then, whenever someone 
else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had 
failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would 
not be satisfying to the other person -  he would not have the feeling that we were 
teaching him philosophy -  this method would be the only strictly correct one.
If, as for Schonbaumsfeld, the lesson of the Tractatus 5.473s is that metaphysical
nonsense arises for Wittgenstein out of the violation of the rules of logical syntax, out of
the misuse of signs, then further gymnastics will be required to reconcile that set of
remarks with this one. For it would seem that Wittgenstein ought then rather to have
written that we should point out to the would-be engager in metaphysics that he or she
had used certain signs in violation of the rules for their correct use and hence that they
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fail to have the meaning that he or she intended them to have, and not that he or she had
2 7simply failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his or her propositions.
V
There is, then, a good deal of evidence for the austere view of nonsense having been 
Wittgenstein’s view in the Tractatus -  from his reformulation of Frege’s context- 
principle and its application through the sign/symbol distinction, to his apparent 
statement of such a view in the 5.473s and the reinforcing of that view made in the 
‘correct method in philosophy’ that Wittgenstein puts forward in Tractatus 6.53. I want 
to turn now to some of the evidence in favour of ascribing such a view of nonsense to 
Wittgenstein in his later work also. There, that view undergoes certain changes, tied to 
changes in Wittgenstein’s conception of language -  most obviously, and as Lars 
Hertzberg points out,28 Wittgenstein’s contextualism is broadened out so that the stricture 
placed upon our asking for the meaning of a word in isolation is extended also to our 
asking for the meaning of a sentence in isolation from some context of use. Nevertheless, 
despite such changes, the core rejection of a ‘positive’ or substantial account of nonsense 
remains constant: for the later Wittgenstein as for the earlier, as Diamond puts it, 
‘Anything that is nonsense is so merely because some determination of meaning has not 
been made; it is not nonsense as a logical result of determinations that have been made’.29
That view comes across most obviously in three examples quoted by Diamond.30 
So, for instance, in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein writes that ‘When a 
sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless’ (§500). That
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remark is itself a reformulation of a longer passage from Philosophical Grammar (also
quoted by Diamond), which runs as follows:
How strange that one should be able to say that such and such a state of affairs is 
inconceivable! If we regard thought as essentially an accompaniment going with 
an expression, the words in the statement that specify the inconceivable state of 
affairs must be unaccompanied. So what sort of sense is it to have? Unless it 
says these words are senseless. But it isn’t as it were their sense that is senseless; 
they are excluded from our language like some arbitrary noise, and the reason for 
their explicit exclusion can only be that we are tempted to confuse them with a 
sentence of our language. (.PG p. 130)
Here, Wittgenstein makes essentially the same point as in the remark (just quoted) from
the Investigations and illustrates it by way of the idea of an inconceivable state of affairs.
When we call a state of affairs inconceivable, we do not at first conceive of that state of
affairs and then call it inconceivable (except, for instance, for rhetorical purposes when
making, say, a moral point, as with the sentence: ‘it is inconceivable that people do
nothing about global warming’) since the one thing that state of affairs would then not be
would be inconceivable. So it cannot be that the sentence has a sense which is
inconceivable. And the same goes more generally, when we call a sentence nonsense or
senseless, we do not first think of its sense and then call that senseless. And when we call
the sentence senseless -  and so as it were exclude it from the language -  we are not then
excluding a certain combination of (to fall back on a piece of Tractarian jargon) symbols.
Rather that which is excluded is no different from an arbitrary noise except in that, say
because it employs only words which do have a meaning in the English language, we are
tempted to take it for sense and so are liable to be confused by it. So it is not, then,
because the words do not fit together to give a sense to the sentence that it is nonsense,
but because like an arbitrary noise, we have failed to give the words a meaning, and yet
unlike an arbitrary noise, that fact is not always so clear to us.
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Diamond’s third quotation is this:
Though it is nonsense to say ‘I feel his pain’, this is different from inserting into 
an English sentence a meaningless word, say ‘abracadabra’ ... and from saying a 
string of nonsense words. Every word in this sentence is English, and we shall be 
inclined to say that the sentence has a meaning. The sentence with the nonsense 
word or the string of nonsense words can be discarded from our language, but if 
we discard from our language ‘I feel Smith’s toothache’ that is quite different. 
The second seems nonsense, we are tempted to say, because of some truth about 
the nature of things or the nature of the world. We have discovered in some way 
that pains and personality do not fit together in such a way that I can feel his pain. 
The task then will be to show that there is in fact no difference between these two 
cases of nonsense, though there is a psychological distinction in that we are 
inclined to say the one and be puzzled by it and not the other. We constantly 
hover between regarding it as sense and nonsense, and hence the trouble arises.31
Wittgenstein begins by saying that, though the utterance in question -  ‘I feel his pain’ -  is
nonsense, ‘this is different from inserting into an English sentence a meaningless word’.
Since, on the austere view, all nonsense is sheer lack of sense, resulting from our failure
to give to the words a meaning, what is the difference Wittgenstein signals here? The
difference is this: that ‘we shall be inclined to say that the sentence has a meaning’, where
we would not be so inclined were it composed not of familiar words o f English, but of
words -  like ‘abracadabra’, say, or ‘zlllg’ -  which we know to be meaningless. The
temptation is to think that ‘I feel his pain’ is nonsense for a deeper reason than its merely
lacking a sense, that the nonsensicality of this particular string reflects some important
fact about the world. So the temptation is to think that the string does make a kind of
sense -  that we do understand what it says -  but that that sense is rendered nonsense by
the way the world is; that ‘pains and personality’ just don’t go together in that way.
Against that temptation, then, the task as Wittgenstein characterises it is to show that the
difference here is one of psychology. The string lacks a meaning in just the way sheer
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gibberish does -  no meaning has been given to the words involved. The difference 
between the two cases lies, as Wittgenstein puts it elsewhere, ‘in the jingle of the words’ 
(AWLpM).
Across these three remarks, then, and as in the Tractatus, we find a repeated 
rejection of the idea that nonsense-sentences have illegitimate or impermissible senses, or 
consist of anything more than words to which we have failed to assign a meaning. What 
they suggest, taken together, is that Wittgenstein’s commitment to an austere view of 
nonsense remained constant throughout his later work. And that idea is reinforced, I
'XOthink, by Wittgenstein’s many meta-philosophical remarks too; the idea, opposed to the 
austere view, that Wittgenstein is concerned to put forward his own theory of sense, 
against which certain sentences, such as ‘I feel his pain’, which combine only English 
words, fail to measure up, is markedly at odds with Wittgenstein’s insistence that he is 
not putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses. If a ‘substantial’ reading of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on nonsense -  or any reading that sees nonsense as the outcome 
of violating certain bounds on sense set by Wittgenstein — were correct, we would have to 
say that Wittgenstein was quite radically mistaken about the kind of enterprise he was 
engaged in, that he spectacularly failed to meet his own demands here.
VI
As well as offering an account of the austere view and some reasons for thinking that 
view favourable to a substantial conception of nonsense, I hope to have offered in the 
above enough evidence to suggest that the austere view is at least a plausible account of
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Wittgenstein’s own view of what nonsense might be throughout his philosophical work. 
In the following chapters, I shall want to address a number of criticisms of that view and 
the ascription of it to Wittgenstein and, in so doing, go some way to establishing that it is 
the correct view -  both of Wittgenstein and of nonsense. Before turning to those 
criticisms, however, I want very briefly to say in concluding something about the 
consequences of that view, and in particular of the attribution of it to Wittgenstein.
One such consequence, as I suggested above, is in the overall shape we find in 
Wittgenstein’s work, the kind of solution to the problems of philosophy that we see him 
as attempting to make. That is, if we see Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense not as the 
outcome of some theory or other of sense put forward by Wittgenstein, in either the 
Tractatus or the Investigations, then we will not be obliged to view Wittgenstein’s 
criticisms of traditional philosophy as springing from his own philosophical theories: the 
way will be open to us to see his work very differently from that, and, as he suggests, as 
offering instead some kind of therapy for the need to philosophise. Here, however, I 
want to turn to two potentially negative consequences of that view, which have this much 
in common: that both focus on the use of the term ‘nonsense’ as a term of philosophical 
criticism.
The first of these might be captured in the following question: if nonsense is only 
ever plain, or ‘mere’, nonsense, as it is on the austere view, how can it do the kinds of 
things Wittgenstein wants it to be able to do? That is, if nonsense consists only of words 
lacking any meaning at all, how can it play a role, as Wittgenstein wants it to, in valid
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arguments, for instance of the form of a reductio ad absurdum, and why should it matter, 
as it clearly does, what Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus if, logically, what he wrote is 
no different from, say, ‘piggly wiggle tiggle’? It would seem, so the suggestion goes, that 
if nonsense really were for Wittgenstein what the austere view says it is, then there could 
be no reason why Wittgenstein chose the forms of expression he did choose in the 
Tractatus, nor could there be any explanation of how nonsense functions within valid 
arguments as it seems to do in the Investigations. So that is one kind of negative 
consequence that might get drawn from the austere view and its attribution to 
Wittgenstein.
Let me begin with the point about the Tractatus: the suggestion that it would not 
matter, were the austere view correct, what Wittgenstein actually wrote there. That 
criticism makes two errors. First, there is an error about what a Resolute reading33 must 
be saying. For the criticism suggests that all of the propositions of the Tractatus must be 
taken to be nonsense, and that is not what is implied at Tractatus 6.54 unless we also take 
it that all the propositions of the Tractatus are intended to function as elucidations; nor 
must a Resolute reading claim that, although it might. Second, and more importantly, 
such an objection would overlook the simple fact that, though all nonsense is logically 
equivalent, nonsense-sentences can nevertheless have all manner of other sorts of 
differences on the austere view -  and that those myriad differences may themselves make 
a great deal of difference to the success one has if what one is trying to capture is not the 
content of a thought but rather an illusion on someone’s part of making sense at all.34 So 
it is not the case that what Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus becomes unimportant
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given an austere view of nonsense, though the feeling that it might may arise from the 
rhetorical stress placed upon nonsense-sentences being no more than ‘gibberish’ by 
proponents of that view.
There are other, related objections in the vicinity of this. For instance, one might 
ask whether it is plausible to hold that the Tractatus is really plain -  austerely conceived 
-  nonsense, given that the sentences within it do seem to make good sense, and given too 
that one seems to be able to reason between them. A species of that objection is 
contained in Meredith Williams’ claim35 that some theory of sense just must be assumed 
in calling the sentences of the Tractatus nonsense, given the appearance they have of 
making good sense. One reply might simply be that unless they did have the appearance 
of making good sense, unless we were attracted to them, or prone to take them for sense, 
there would be no need to debunk them in the way that the Tractatus aims to. The 
appearance of sense, however, does not guarantee that they do make sense; nor does it 
require that a theory of sense be in place in order to show them to be nonsensical. 
Furthermore, that we can apparently reason between nonsense-sentences does nothing to 
show that they do make sense, though it may help to compound the illusion that they do. 
To take Adrian Moore’s example: it seems to follow from the sentence ‘All borogroves 
are mimsy’, that ‘Nothing non-mimsy is a borogrove’.36 But if  it turns out that no 
meaning attaches to either ‘borogrove’ or ‘mimsy’ then this reasoning might seem itself 
to have been merely a pretence. The related objection -  put forward by, for instance, 
Marie McGinn -  that it is unclear how austerely-conceived nonsense could elucidate any 
kind of point at all, might be thought to rest on construing the point of the Tractatus to be
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something more substantial than the uncovering of nonsense as such, and also on not 
seeing the potential for this kind of operation upon and between nonsense-sentences.37
Not withstanding those responses, however, there is still a question-mark hanging 
over the later Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘nonsense’, given the role nonsense plays in 
the Investigations. Hans-Johann Glock makes the point this way: ‘Monism’, Glock 
writes, that is, the view that there is only one logical kind of nonsense, ‘is incompatible 
with reductio ad absurdum arguments, including Wittgenstein’s own’.38 That is, I think, 
a good objection, and it surely tells us something about Wittgenstein’s use of the word 
‘nonsense’, but it does not do quite what Glock wants it to do. Glock wants it to be an 
objection about the kind of thing that nonsense could be: whether something can be 
nonsense only by way of lacking any meaning at all, or whether something can be 
nonsense, say, because the signs for certain expressions are there being misused, used in 
violation of the rules for their correct use, and so end up expressing nothing. So the 
suggestion Glock makes is that if nonsense were as the austere view says, we could make 
no sense of the idea that we uncover bits of latent nonsense (i.e. come to see them as 
patent nonsense) by pursuing a reductio of them (deriving a piece of patent nonsense 
from them). We could only do that if the nonsense-sentences did involve (misuses of) 
specifiable and determinate (signs for certain) expressions. But the problem encountered 
in employing some piece of nonsense within the structure of a reductio ad absurdum is 
surely not what kind of nonsense it is, but that it is nonsense at all; in other words, the 
problem is that it lacks a truth-value, and that applies whether we think that it is nonsense 
because it lacks a meaning, or because it has the wrong kind of meaning, or for any other
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any other reason.39 What that suggests is not that when Wittgenstein does offer reductio 
arguments and talks in relation to them of nonsense, he must there mean substantial 
nonsense, but rather that his use of the term is far more colloquial in that instance -  that it 
is the ordinary English use of the word to mean ‘absurd’ or ‘plain false’ that is being 
invoked.
The second consequence of an austere view that I want to consider here is due to
Warren Goldfarb. Goldfarb asks, in relation to a Resolute program for reading the
Tractatus, ‘whether there is already irresoluteness, chickening out, in Wittgenstein’s use
of “nonsense” as a term of criticism’.40 Goldfarb continues:
The lesson is that ‘nonsense’ cannot really be a general term of criticism. As a 
general term of criticism, it would have to be legitimised by a theory of language, 
and Wittgenstein is insistent that there is no such thing (‘Logic must look after 
itself). ... The way out of this morass has already been canvassed. 
Wittgenstein’s talk of nonsense is just shorthand for a process of coming to see 
how the words fall apart when worked out from the inside. What Wittgenstein is 
urging is a case-by-case approach. The general rubric is nothing but synoptic for 
what emerges in each case.
This objection, I agree with Goldfarb, is ‘a good one’ 41 I take it that the lesson Goldfarb
draws here is one genuine consequence of adopting an austere view, and that at times the
use of that term ‘nonsense’ by Resolute readers and by Wittgenstein himself42 appears to
contravene this in appearing to present itself as a general term of criticism. But no
utterance is irredeemably nonsense, and no area of discourse can simply and generally be
labelled ‘nonsense’. Thus, when Wittgenstein declares, in the penultimate remark of the
Tractatus, that his propositions are nonsense, that remark too will need to be treated with
caution. As a term of criticism, then, ‘nonsense’ is limited to a case-by-case application;
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there will be no telling in advance of our attempts to find a sense in some remark whether 
it is nonsense or not.43
One way in which Goldfarb’s objection might be developed, however, and in such 
a way as to link it to the first objection noted above, is this: that given what we have said 
nonsense is for Wittgenstein, it would seem that the discovery that the (pseudo-) 
propositions of the Tractatus collapse into meaninglessness could not have the kind of 
consequences for us that it might be thought that Wittgenstein intended it to have, or 
indeed that would make the process of coming to realise that they are merely nonsense a 
worthwhile endeavour. That is, if  Goldfarb is right, and he surely is, then our coming to 
the conclusion that these propositions fail to make sense should have no consequences 
whatsoever for the nonsensicality or otherwise of any other proposition or set of 
propositions that we might wish to come out with. And while that may accord with the 
piecemeal approach advocated in Tractatus 6.53 -  that we should wait for someone else 
to say something metaphysical, and then demonstrate to them that they have failed to give 
certain signs in their propositions a meaning -  it does not sit at all well with the labelling 
there of an entire region (or regions) of discourse -  metaphysics, everything that is not a 
proposition of natural science -  as nonsense. At best, what can be said here is that this 
realisation that our attempts to put together words in such a way as to make sense 
sometimes fall short of that aim, though it will not entail the nonsensicality of any other 
bit of discourse, may yet lead us to question whether there was anything coherent in the 
desire that led us to think there was something we needed to say there. And, it might be
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said that even in these closing remarks of the Tractatus there is still material that needs to 
be overcome in some sense.
In sum, then, in this chapter, I have outlined the austere view of nonsense and 
some of the evidence for that view being Wittgenstein’s view throughout his life, and I 
have drawn a couple of the consequences of that view. My defence of an austere view 
here has largely been set against a ‘substantial’ view of nonsense; I want to turn now , in 
the following chapter, to an alternative account of nonsense put forward by P.M.S. 
Hacker, and with it, to two views of what logical syntax in the Tractatus might be.
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Chapter Two
Nonsense and Logical Syntax in the
Tractatus
I
The previous chapter outlined, and made the beginnings of a case for, an austere view of 
nonsense, and presented some of the evidence for finding such a view in Wittgenstein’s 
work. In this chapter, I shall want to focus on two things: first, on an alternative account 
of nonsense in the Tractatus, one which purports as it were to cut between the austere and 
the substantial views; second, on two different accounts of logical syntax in the 
Tractatus. The first of those two accounts is James Conant’s. Conant holds that, on the 
Tractatus conception of logical syntax, there is no room for the idea that we might 
combine signs or symbols in ways that contravene the rules of logical syntax.1 The 
second conception of Tractarian logical syntax, and the alternative account of nonsense 
there, are both due to P.M.S. Hacker.2 Although Hacker is often seen as attributing to 
Wittgenstein (early and later) a substantial conception of nonsense, Hacker is himself 
adamant in his rejection of that view. Instead, and in opposition to Conant’s view,
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Hacker holds that there is such a thing as using signs in ways that violate the rules of 
logical syntax, and that nonsense is the outcome of misusing signs in such ways. Such 
violations do not, however, for Hacker, leave us with a case of substantial nonsense, but 
with strings of signs which, in that context and in Hacker’s words, ''do not stand for their 
customary meanings'\ they do not mean there what they usually do.3 I shall want to 
outline Hacker’s view in more detail below, and then subject it to some criticisms. In 
doing so, I shall rehearse and build upon some objections to Hacker’s view made by Cora 
Diamond.4 Before turning to Hacker’s view, however, I shall need first to give a 
summary of Conant’s account of Tractarian logical syntax, against which Hacker’s view 
is set out.
II
Conant outlines his account in opposition to a view of Wittgenstein that Conant thinks is 
unduly indebted to Carnap.5 For Conant, ‘most commentators’6 have attributed to the 
Tractatus a conception of logical syntax that is largely ‘Camapian’, and that bears little 
resemblance to the view that Wittgenstein himself actually held there.7 That Camapian 
conception is one in which certain combinations of signs or symbols are ruled out, 
excluded, by the principles of logical syntax; logical syntax provides us with a set of rules 
for combining expressions such that these combinations are prohibited -  they violate the 
principles of logical syntax. On that kind of conception, Conant thinks, what we end up 
with is a case of fu lly determinate nonsense’: a sentence whose sense, that is, is logically 
flawed, and flawed, moreover, in a ''determinately specifiable respect'.* Such a 
conception of logical syntax and its violation, then, for Conant, yields a substantial
Chapter Two 7 6
Nonsense and Logical Syntax in the Tractatus
conception of nonsense: one in which some nonsense-sentences combine only 
meaningful words, but in ways that are logically improper. Hence, the sense they do 
make is as it were outlawed, as logically defective, despite our being able on that account 
in some sense to grasp it in thought and frame it (albeit improperly) in language.
Conant then wants to contrast that account of Tractarian logical syntax with his 
own account. For Conant, far from being concerned to prohibit certain combinations of 
signs or symbols, logical syntax in the Tractatus is not a combinatorial theory at all; 
Tractarian logical syntax, Conant writes, ‘is concerned neither with the proscription of 
combinations of signs nor with the proscription of combinations of symbols’.9 It is not 
concerned to proscribe combinations of signs, Conant writes, because ‘it does not treat of 
(mere) signs’. The sign is simply what can be perceived of a symbol (Tractatus 3.32): 
the mark on paper, or noise. Whatever Tractarian logical syntax is concerned with, it is 
not concerned with signs merely as signs. Instead, Tractarian logical syntax ‘treats of 
symbols’; that which, as Conant puts it, ‘only has life in the context of a significant 
proposition’. But, Conant continues, logical syntax in the Tractatus is not concerned to 
proscribe combinations of symbols, for here, according to Wittgenstein, there just is 
nothing that it could sensefully proscribe; there are no illegitimate, or logically flawed, 
combinations of symbols since, as Wittgenstein writes (at Tractatus 5.4733), ‘any 
possible proposition is legitimately constructed’.
So Conant denies that Tractarian logical syntax is concerned to proscribe 
combinations of signs, on the grounds that it doesn’t concern itself with mere signs at all,
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and he denies that it is concerned to proscribe combinations of symbols on the grounds 
that there is nothing there for it to proscribe. Instead, for Conant, Tractarian logical 
syntax treats of the ways that signs symbolise, o f their methods of symbolising,10 and, far 
from seeking to demarcate ‘legitimate from illegitimate sequences of signs or symbols’, it 
functions rather as, in Conant’s words, ‘a tool of elucidation’: that is, logical syntax 
‘allows us to recognise the logical contributions of the constituent parts of a Satz [a 
propositional symbol], and the absence of such a contribution on the part of the 
constituents of a Scheinsatz [a pseudo-proposition]’.11 Logical syntax, then, does not in 
the Tractatus function to exclude combinations of signs or symbols that are not excluded 
by the (on that view, logically inadequate) rules of ordinary language grammar; instead, it 
serves as it were to lay bare to view the logical structure already present in the ordinary 
sentences of everyday language (or, where there is no such structure, through our failure 
to give the signs a meaning, to lay that fact bare to view instead).
That view of Tractarian logical syntax is motivated by the following remarks, in 
which Wittgenstein first draws our attention to certain features of ordinary language, and 
then makes an appeal to a sign-language governed by or obeying logical syntax as a 
means of avoiding the errors those features may lead us into. Here is what Wittgenstein 
writes:
3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same
word has different modes of signification -  and so belongs to different 
symbols -  or that two words that have different modes of signification are 
employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
Thus the word ‘is’ figures as a copula, as a sign for identity, and as 
an expression for existence; ‘exist’ figures as an intransitive verb like ‘go’, 
and ‘identical’ as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of 
something’s happening.
Chapter Two 7 8
Nonsense and Logical Syntax in the Tractatus
(In the proposition, ‘Green is green’ -  where the first word is the 
proper name of a person and the last an adjective -  these words do not 
merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)
3.324 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced
(the whole of philosophy is full of them).
3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language
that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by 
not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of 
signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical 
grammar -  by logical syntax.
(The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, 
though, it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes.)
The kind of errors at stake here are clearly not those imagined by a substantial conception
of nonsense. What is at issue is not a category of nonsense-sentences well-formed by the
lights of ordinary grammar, but ill-formed by those of a truly logical grammar. Rather, as
Conant emphasises, what is excluded when one adopts a sign-language governed by
logical grammar are simply two kinds of equivocation that occur in the sentences of
everyday language and that serve to obscure from view the logical structure present in
those sentences. The ‘most fundamental confusions’ are produced not by inadvertently
using expressions contrary to the rules for their correct use, but simply by two misleading
features of our everyday use of signs: that we sometimes use one sign for two different
symbols, or employ two very different symbols in ways that make them appear similar.
What is involved here, then, is, as Conant puts it, simply ‘cross-category equivocation’.12
What a sign-language governed by logical syntax can do for us, then, is not make 
up for logical inadequacies present in ordinary grammar, but exclude ambiguities present 
in our use of signs and that may serve to confuse us, by making our use of signs instead 
track logical differences. In a logical syntax, the use of one sign for two different 
symbols will presumably be disallowed, or at any rate will not occur, and so the
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ambiguities which obscured our view will not arise. The idea that logical syntax is not
required to correct certain deficiencies present in ordinary grammar also sits well with
another remark of Wittgenstein’s that otherwise is hard to square with the appeal to
logical syntax. Thus, at Tractatus 5.5563, Wittgenstein writes, ‘[i]n fact, all the
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order’.
Needless to say, but that remark does not sit at all well with a conception of Tractarian
logical syntax as a corrective to ordinary grammar, and does square with one in which
logical syntax simply helps us to get clear on, makes perspicuous, the structure already
present in the propositions of our everyday language. And, as Conant notes, his
interpretation is reinforced too by Wittgenstein’s exchange with C.K. Ogden on the best
way in which to translate Tractatus 4.112. Rather than philosophy resulting in ‘the
clarification of propositions’ (as D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness have it), Wittgenstein
suggests instead (and after several exchanges on the subject) the following: ‘the
propositions now have become clear that they ARE clear’.13 The point which, Conant
writes, ‘the young Wittgenstein’s horrendous English seeks to bring out’ is this:
[T]he transition from unclarity to clarity ... that is at issue here is not one that is 
effected through a transformation in the logical character of the propositions of 
ordinary language, but rather through a transformation in the view that we 
command of their logical character. What is cloudy and indistinct -  and is 
rendered transparent with the assistance of a logical syntax -  is our view of the 
logical structure that is present in the propositions all along.14
Though Ogden ignores Wittgenstein’s suggestion, it nevertheless makes clear just what
the appeal to logical syntax is meant to achieve for us, and so too the nature of the error it
is intended to remedy: one of equivocation or ambiguity.
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III
For Conant, then, there is no such thing, on the Tractatus conception, as a violation of 
logical syntax. Instead, in a sign-language that is governed by logical syntax, the 
difference between the signs will track more closely and clearly logical differences 
among symbols than is the case in ordinary language, thereby making clearer what 
structure our everyday propositions have, or, if they lack a structure, making clear that 
they do lack one, that they have at most the appearance o f such a structure. I want to turn 
now to Hacker’s alternative conception of Tractarian logical syntax and, with it, his 
alternative account of what nonsense is there too. Then I shall want to consider Hacker’s 
objections to Conant’s view, and develop and build upon Diamond’s response to those 
criticisms. I shall start with Hacker on nonsense.
Hacker, as I noted above, is often accused of ascribing to Wittgenstein a 
substantial view of nonsense, of attributing to Wittgenstein the view that some nonsense- 
sentences, such as ‘A is an object’, say, are nonsense because the meanings of the 
expressions contained therein cannot be combined in such a way, because the 
combination has a sense that is logically flawed. That conception, however, is one that 
Hacker explicitly and forcefully disavows. Instead, Hacker writes, ‘A is an object’, like 
‘A is a frabble’, is simply nonsense, and he writes that the two are nonsense, moreover, 
‘in exactly the same sense’.15 Furthermore, Hacker adds, ‘there are no different senses of 
the word “nonsense”. Nor are there different kinds of nonsense -  nonsense no more 
comes in kinds than it comes in degrees’.16 Nonsense, then, for Hacker as on the austere 
view, just is nonsense, and there are no two ways about it.
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Nevertheless, Hacker does claim that ‘A is an object’ and other Tractarian 
pseudo-propositions differ from ‘A is a frabble’, and he claims that they do so in four 
different ways: (1) ‘they involve the use of expressions which do indeed have a use in our 
language’; (2) ‘they involve misuses of these expressions, incorrect uses -  uses which do 
not accord with the rules of logical syntax or grammar’; (3) ‘they are ... attempts to state 
necessary truths which are not tautologies’; and (4) ‘they are attempts to say what can 
only be shown’.17 For Hacker, then, though the outcome is in each case the same (i.e. 
plain, unadorned nonsense), what that nonsense arises from -  what misuse of which 
expressions, what violation of which rules (and in the service of an attempt to state what 
ineffable content) -  may in each case differ. Thus, while Hacker ‘adamantly repudiate^] 
any conception of nonsense understood as a sequence o f words that expresses a 
proposition that lacks a sense’18 and, furthermore, ‘emphatically reject[s]’ the idea that 
‘the illegitimacy of the sentential combination [should be attributed] to the fact that the 
meanings of the expressions cannot be so combined’,19 Hacker nonetheless does hold 
‘that philosophical nonsense results from the illicit combination of meaningful words’.20 
Hence, ‘the correct point’, as Hacker sees it, at which to locate the disagreement between 
his view and an austere view is not over whether or not a nonsense-sentence such as, say, 
‘Caesar is a prime number’ presents a sense which is nonsense -  since on that point 
Hacker would agree with the follower of the austere view in thinking the idea absurd -  
but it is rather whether or not, as Hacker puts it, ‘the constituent words of [for instance] 
“Julius Caesar is a prime number” are meaningless’.21
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For Hacker, the constituent words themselves are very much meaningful, in this 
sense: they have a use in the language. But here, the constituent words are being
misused, put to an incorrect use, and what that misuse consists of, Hacker writes, is their
22being used in ways that ‘do not accord with the rules of logical syntax or grammar’. 
Instead of that producing a sense-that-is-nonsense, however, or describing an impossible- 
possibility, what violating the laws of logical syntax results in, for Hacker, is merely plain 
nonsense:
[T]he rules of logical syntax are constitutive rules. Failure to follow them does 
not result in a form of words that describes a logical impossibility, for logical 
impossibilities are expressed by logical contradictions -  which describe nothing 
since they are senseless. ... [F]ailure to comply with the rules of logical syntax 
does not result in a form of words that describes a logical or metaphysical 
necessity either -  for the only expressible necessities are logical necessities, 
which are expressed by tautologies that describe nothing since they are senseless. 
... Failure to comply with the rules of logical syntax results in nonsense.
Since the rules of logical syntax are constitutive of what it is to make sense, violating
those rules results not in an impermissible sense, but no sense at all: nonsense. Thus, the
rules of logical syntax are analogous in some ways to the rules for drawing up contracts:
failure to follow those rules results in an invalid contract, and that, Hacker notes, is not
itself a kind of contract at all.24
Where Conant, then, denies that there is any room within the Tractarian 
conception of logical syntax for the violation or transgression of its rules, Hacker’s 
conception of Tractarian nonsense is one in which philosophical nonsense is produced 
when we do exactly that: transgress the laws of logical syntax. Such violations result in 
nonsense, but not, for Hacker, in nonsense substantially-conceived: his view is not that 
the words add up to a nonsensical proposition, or that they express an illogical thought.
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The result, as it were, is the same as if we had simply failed to give the words a meaning:
the utterance is just plain nonsense. Nevertheless, the individual words themselves are
not, as followers of austerity would have it, simply or straightforwardly meaningless
either. Thus, Hacker writes:
That the sentence ‘Julius Caesar is a prime number’ is nonsensical is not due to 
the meaninglessness of its constituent words, but to its failure to conform to the 
requisite combinatorial rules. But of course that they are not meaningless does 
not imply that they stand fo r  a meaning (a Bedeutung). ‘Julius Caesar’ is the 
name of the author of The Gallic Wars, but the author of The Gallic Wars is not 
the meaning of his name. ‘Is a prime number’ is a meaningful phrase, it has a use, 
and in ‘Caesar is a prime number’ it is being misused, used contrary to the rules 
for its use. But its meaning (which is given by the explanation ‘is a number 
divisible only by 1 and by itself) is not an entity for which it stands (such as a 
Fregean concept).25
The sense in which these words are meaningful is that they do have a rule-governed use 
in the language; though here the words are being misused, they do elsewhere have a 
correct use. Here, as constituents o f nonsense-sentences, the words are being used in 
ways that (borrowing from Wittgenstein’s later discussion of rule-following) are simply 
not provided for by the rules for their correct use. Hacker’s point is not that a nonsense- 
sentence can after all contain symbols -  that is not what he wants to say, for a symbol 
‘just is a sign used according to the rules for its correct use’ and, of course, in a nonsense- 
sentence the signs are being misused.26 To say on the other hand, however, that 
nonsense-sentences consist only of ‘a meaningless combination of meaningless signs’, 
would, Hacker writes, be ‘exceedingly misleading’, since the signs do elsewhere have a 
use. Instead, one should say that the expressions are being ‘misused -  used contrary to 
the rules of logical syntax’.27
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The conception here, then, is one in which philosophical nonsense is produced 
when we violate the rules of logical syntax. Like gibberish, philosophical nonsense just 
is nonsense, but unlike gibberish, it involves the misuse of certain expressions, the 
violation of certain rules. The signs in a piece of philosophical nonsense are not exactly 
meaningful -  we are not dealing with genuine symbols, for a symbol just is a sign used 
according to the rules for its correct use, and the signs are not used correctly here. But 
nor would it be quite right to say that the signs are meaningless either -  for they do have a 
use in the language, and their use here involves a transgression against the rules which 
give their correct use.
IV
In support of his account, Hacker deploys a number of quotations from Wittgenstein, and 
offers an array of criticisms of Conant’s view. Before turning to some of that material, 
however, I want to examine more closely the plausibility of Hacker’s own view of 
Tractarian nonsense. Although Hacker claims that the important difference between his 
account and Conant’s is over whether or not the constituent expressions in a nonsense- 
sentence are meaningless, that difference might itself be thought to rest on a more basic 
difference between the two accounts. For the sense in which the words of a nonsense- 
sentence can be said to be meaningful, for Hacker, is that they involve a specific violation 
of specific rules for the use of an expression. And what is at issue here, in part at least, is 
whether it could ever be a sufficient condition for some utterance’s being nonsense that 
the use of a sign within it does not follow some particular set of rules governing that 
sign’s use. Diamond expresses the point this way:
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We need to bear in mind that what is at issue in the debate about logical syntax in 
the Tractatus is whether logical syntax fixes rules for the use of a sign as its 
correct use, so that a sufficient condition for a sign’s being used incorrectly, a 
sufficient condition for the use to be a proscribed use, is that the sign is not, in 
some combination, being used in accordance with those rules. What is also at 
issue is whether departing from some set of rules for the use of a sign can ever be 
a sufficient condition for the nonsensicality of the would-be proposition of which 
the sign, so used, is part.28
For Diamond, then, there are two quite distinct parts to the debate with Hacker: (a) a
question about the sufficiency conditions for a use of a sign to count as ‘proscribed’, and
the notion of logical syntax appealed to or invoked there; and (b) a question about the
sufficiency conditions for a sentence to be nonsense. I want to begin by focussing on
Diamond’s second point here, point (b), about what the sufficiency-conditions might be
for a sentence to be nonsense, and postpone for the moment discussion of point (a), and
syntactically correct or incorrect uses of signs. The question corresponding to Diamond’s
second point here is something like this: is it ever enough, is it ever sufficient for the
resulting sentence to be nonsense, that some sign used within it deviates from the rules
for its use? To this, Hacker, I think, would be inclined to reply ‘Yes’, and Conant ‘No’.
One way of taking that idea, o f fleshing out the stance of someone like Hacker, 
might then be this. There is presumably some set of rules applying, for instance, to the 
use of the sign ‘bank’ as in the phrase ‘the river bank’. Then we might say that any use 
of that sign deviating from that set of rules will render the resultant sentence of which it is 
a part nonsensical. That, however, is clearly not the case, at least in ordinary language, 
since that sign also has other uses, say, as in ‘piggy bank’ or ‘national bank’, which 
presumably follow different sets of rules. And that point is borne out by Wittgenstein’s 
own example, too, of ‘Green is green’ (at Tractatus 3.323) where the two occurrences of
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the sign ‘green’ nevertheless symbolise in quite different ways. Still, however, there are 
two points we might make in reply: (i), that one of the features of a sign-language that is 
governed by logical syntax, one of its differences from ordinary language, is that such 
multiple uses of signs will not occur within it, and (ii) that even within ordinary language 
many signs do not have multiple uses and hence it may sometimes, we might reply, be 
enough that a sign deviates from a set of rules for its use there to be nonsensical.
Let me put aside for the moment the first of those points (point (i)), about what 
might be the case in a sign-language governed by logical syntax, and focus instead on the 
second criticism, that (point (ii)) some signs do not have multiple uses. (What I shall 
want to say in relation to that first case is that even there, in a sign-language obeying 
logical syntax, a deviant use of a sign would not alone be sufficient cause for us to think 
the use of the sign a nonsensical one). That second point might be supplemented, too, by 
insisting instead, in those cases, such as ‘bank’, where a sign does have multiple uses, 
that any use that departs from all the established sets of rules will be nonsensical. But in 
neither the case where we depart from the only set of rules governing the use of a sign, or 
all the many sets of rules governing the use of a sign, do we thereby and without further 
ado end up with nonsense. Conant’s example -  of Lloyd Bentson’s utterance of the 
sentence ‘Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy’ to Dan Quayle in the 1988 vice-presidential 
debate -  is an obvious instance.29 We can safely assume that this use of the words ‘Jack 
Kennedy’ deviated from all previous uses and all established rules for their use, and yet 
we would not want to say that the utterance was therefore nonsensical for all that. Nor 
was it necessary for Bentson in advance, prior to his use of the words, to lay down rules
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governing this kind of use. And this, though it is a famous instance of a sign’s being 
given a new use, is surely nothing out of the ordinary either. What this suggests is that 
ultimately our uttering nonsense is due not to our violating certain rules, but to our failure 
in the end to give a new use to signs used in hitherto unaccounted for ways. Even where 
we deviate from all the established rules, and without stipulating in advance new sets of 
rules, our words are not necessarily nonsense; if they were, we would not then be able to 
account for innovative uses of language.
I want to turn back now to Diamond’s point (a), about the sufficiency conditions
relating to a sign’s being used ‘incorrectly’. Hacker seems to claim in two places that
giving a sign more than one use would be syntactically incorrect. Thus, he writes:
[Logical syntax] does not permit substituting certain signs for others, in particular, 
it prohibits using the same sign for different symbols or using in a superficially 
similar way signs that have different modes of signification {Tractatus 3.325).
Once we have assigned a use to the sign ‘object’ as a variable, it will be incorrect 
to go on to use it in a form of words such as ‘A is an object’ (or ‘A is not an 
object’), for there it does not occur as a variable but as a genuine name -  and no 
such use has been assigned to the term ‘object’, nor should it be, since the term 
already has a use.30
Although Wittgenstein says nothing to suggest that giving a sign more than one use -  as 
in his example ‘Green is green’ -  would be syntactically incorrect, it is also clear (from 
Tractatus 3.325) that in a sign-language governed by logical syntax signs will 
nonetheless not be given multiple uses. So, for instance, such a sign-language might 
include a rule stating that signs should not be given more than one use; and giving a sign 
multiple uses might then be called a ‘violation of logical syntax’. But two things need to
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be noted here. First, and as Diamond points out, such a rule would not be a ‘rule of
logical syntax’ in the sense in which Wittgenstein might use that phrase:
When Wittgenstein speaks of ‘rules of logical syntax’, at 3.334, he specifies that 
all we need in order to be given such rules is knowledge of how the individual 
signs signify. A rule belonging to the notation as a whole, specifying that it was 
not to be mucked about by introduction of new uses, is not something ‘given’ with 
the use of the particular signs, and is quite different from what Wittgenstein meant 
by ‘rules of logical syntax’.31
Hence, calling a transgression of that rule a ‘violation of logical syntax’ would be
misleading at least. Second (and to return to point (i) above (p. 86)), such a violation
would not guarantee that the resultant string were nonsensical. If we did give a sign more
than one use, our sign-language, and our use of the sign, would then perhaps no longer be
said properly to be governed by logical syntax, but it would not thereby be nonsensical.
V
Hacker’s account of nonsense, then, seems to me inadequate. If Diamond is right in 
casting the issue in terms of a debate about sufficiency conditions, Hacker’s view seems 
not properly to be a view of nonsense at all; not following some set or sets of rules for the 
use of a sign just does not give us sufficient cause for thinking that sign’s (deviant) 
application nonsensical. That realisation might well be what motivates the suspicion, 
among some Resolute readers o f the Tractatus, that Hacker must be relying on a more 
substantial picture of nonsense than he is prepared explicitly to invoke in writing. 
Whatever the truth of that suggestion, I do not wish to pursue it here. Rather, I want to 
turn now to address some o f Hacker’s criticisms of Conant’s account of Tractarian logical 
syntax. Conant denies that there is any such thing, on the Tractatus conception, as using 
words in ways that contravene logical syntax. On that conception of these rules, then,
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although we can follow them, there is nothing we might call violating or contravening or 
transgressing against them. I want to look at two objections Hacker raises (one exegetical 
and one substantial) to that notion of a rule.
The first of those criticisms is based on Hacker’s reading of Tractatus 3.325 and
the appeal Wittgenstein makes there to the notion of a sign-language ‘governed by logical
grammar -  by logical syntax’.32 What Hacker writes is this:
I agree with Conant that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus never speaks of ‘violations 
of logical syntax’. He says only that in a logically correct notation, expressions 
will be used in accordance with logical syntax (TLP 3.325). But obviously there 
can be no such thing as using a sign in accordance with logical syntax if there is 
no such thing as using it in contravention of logical syntax.3
For Hacker, then, Wittgenstein does not talk directly of violations of logical syntax, but
he nevertheless does talk of using expressions in accordance with logical syntax, thereby
implying that we might also use them not in accordance with it.34 I want to begin by
noting, with Diamond, a lack of fit between Hacker’s description of Tractatus 3.325 and
what is actually going on in that passage. Here is how Diamond describes the difference:
Hacker writes as if we had in 3.325 a reference to expressions used in accordance 
with logical syntax, and hence an implicit reference to the possibility of using a 
sign in contravention of logical syntax. What we actually have is a reference to a 
sign-language’s being in accordance with logical syntax, and an implicit reference 
to sign-languages which are not in accordance with logical syntax, in that they use 
the same signs for different symbols, or in that they use in superficially similar 
ways signs that signify quite differently (or in that they have both sorts of use).35
Instead of some sign on some particular occasion of use being in accordance or otherwise 
with logical syntax, Wittgenstein’s remark concerns rather the accordance or non­
accordance of a sign-language as a whole with logical syntax. That difference is quite 
crucial for the debate. What Wittgenstein does not say there, and what Hacker suggests
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he does, is that, ‘in a logically correct notation, expressions will be used in accordance 
with logical syntax’, thereby introducing some notion of expressions used not in 
accordance with logical syntax too, Hacker thinks, in a notation that is not logically 
correct. What Wittgenstein rather suggests is that a sign-language which is governed by 
logical syntax will not be one in which we employ signs in ways that obscure their logical 
role. A sign-language not so governed will then be one in which it will not be possible so 
confidently to read off straight from the sign what logical role it fulfils, and that may be 
confusing, but it will not be anything more than that.
Here, then, is how Diamond conceives of what it is for a sign-language to be
governed by logical syntax:
The idea in 3.325 appears to be that a language can attend to, or hearken to or be 
governed by logical syntax, in the sense that linguistic distinctions run parallel to 
logical ones. There is a pattern of logical distinctions internal to logical syntax, 
and the pattern can be reflected clearly in a language or less obviously (as 
similarities and differences of sound in the spoken language may be reflected 
clearly in the pattern of spelling in the written language, which might in that case 
be said to be ‘governed by’ the sound pattern, or the similarities and differences 
may be reflected in a much less clear way).36
That idea, of a language ‘hearkening to’ or ‘attending to’ logical syntax, might seem, as
Genia Schonbaumsfeld remarks, somewhat weaker than the sense implied by
Wittgenstein’s original German at 3.325, and his use there of (the third person singular
form of) the term ‘gehorcherf: ‘to obey’.37 But even then, there is still a clear sense in
which a sign-language might be said to obey logical syntax if the employment of signs
within that notation follows logical differences among symbols, or marks individual sets
of rules, without entailing a corresponding sense of disobeying logical syntax that would
amount to anything more than a lack of clarity in a symbolism. Ordinary language
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clearly does not obey logical syntax if that means employing signs in ways that reflect 
clearly differences among the corresponding symbols; but nor does it therefore violate 
logical syntax if that means employing signs in ways that are prohibited by the rules for 
their correct use and are therefore nonsensical.
Still, though, while Wittgenstein does not talk of violations of logical syntax or
using signs in syntactically incorrect or correct ways in the Tractatus, he does
nevertheless talk of ‘rules of logical syntax’ there (Tractatus 3.334) and, in a letter to
Ogden, introduces talk of ‘syntactically correct’ use of signs. Commenting on Tractatus
3.326, Wittgenstein writes:
[I]n order to recognise the symbol in a sign we must look at how this sign is used 
significantly in propositions. I.e., we must observe how the sign is used in 
accordance with the laws of logical syntax. Thus ‘significant’ here means as 
much as ‘syntactically correct’.
Does this mean, then, that one can after all, for Wittgenstein, use signs syntactically
incorrectly, in ways that violate logical syntax? Diamond distinguishes two senses of
correct and incorrect use: a weak sense and a strong sense. We might call any use of a
sign departing from its established use ‘incorrect’, or we might only say a use was
incorrect if it departed from all established uses and if as well there were no other use
being given to it there. There would then, Diamond says, be nothing wrong in using the
latter (weak) sense of ‘incorrect’ in outlining Wittgenstein’s views, even though he does
not himself anywhere talk of incorrect uses. In that sense, however, there can be no
inference from a sign’s not being used correctly in accord with some one set, or all
established sets, of rules for its use, to its therefore being used incorrectly, or its therefore
being nonsensical.39
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The second criticism Hacker makes of Conant’s conception of logical syntax and
of the notion of a rule assumed there is this. Hacker writes:
Conant’s view is akin to claiming that the pawn in chess cannot be moved three 
squares at a time, since if one were to move a piece thus, it would not be a pawn -  
a transcendental argument to prove that one cannot cheat in chess. One could 
speak thus, but would it make any difference? Is it any clearer than the way we 
ordinarily speak?40
I want to push aside, at least for the time being, the suggestion here that the difference 
between the two views might be more linguistic than substantial and focus instead on the 
analogy Hacker presents.
That analogy, Diamond thinks, is problematic, because ‘question-begging’.41
That is, in order for the analogy to apply, to work, it must be the case that the rules of
language are like the rules of chess in the relevant sense, i.e. in that by fixing what moves
can be made by a ‘piece’ the rules must thereby exclude that piece being moved in any
other ways (and ignoring that some pieces can have multiple uses in chess, as a pawn is
given the powers of a queen in certain circumstances). Where Hacker wants any
departure from the established rules for using some sign to result in one’s doing
something outlawed, as it might be thought to in chess, Conant is arguing that such a
departure may result in one’s doing something else, or else in one’s not doing anything at
all, but will not itself constitute a ‘violation’ of a rule (and so will not for that reason issue
in nonsense), and thus is arguing that the rules of language are precisely unlike the rules
of chess in this regard. Hence, Diamond writes:
The idea that we should take Hacker’s analogy to be a helpful one presupposes 
what is at stake, namely whether it is a sufficient condition for a would-be move
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in language to be illegitimate that one’s use of a sign departs from the established
rules fixing the use of that sign.42
Insisting on the applicability of that analogy may manifest one’s disagreement with 
Conant’s view of what kind of rules the rules of logical syntax are, but it does not amount 
to any kind of argument against it.
Still, what that might also suggest is, as Schonbaumsfeld argues, that if insisting 
on the applicability of the analogy is merely question-begging, then equally so will be 
insisting on its inapplicability 43 That is surely true, but what it ignores is just that there 
are some very good reasons for thinking the analogy not to apply, not least of which is 
the fact that one can, in ordinary language at least, use signs in innovative ways, or even 
in ways that depart entirely from the ways of good grammar 44 and yet still not end up 
talking nonsense. That fact is clearly manifested in the Lloyd Bentson case, and we can 
conjure up as many other examples as we care to of words being used in new but senseful 
ways. Against that, the first person to pick up the ball during a game of football and run 
with it clearly would have been violating the rules of that game (at least as now 
understood) even if creating at the same time (and as legend has it) an entirely new one 
too.45
VI
I have outlined two conceptions of logical syntax in the Tractatus, and the account of 
what nonsense might be there that Hacker puts forward in conjunction with his account of 
Tractarian logical syntax. And I have offered some arguments against Hacker’s account 
of nonsense, and deflected two of his criticisms of Conant on logical syntax. There are
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other points that could be made against Hacker too; for instance, the difficulty he faces 
(as noted in Chapter One) in squaring his account not only with what appears to be an 
explicit statement of an austere view of nonsense in the Tractatus 5.473s, but also with 
the ‘correct method’ in philosophy espoused by Wittgenstein at Tractatus 6.53. There 
are, however, also further points Hacker makes against Conanf s account of both 
nonsense and logical syntax in the Tractatus, and I want to consider some more of those 
briefly here.
The first of those criticisms, culminating in the analogy just described, focuses on 
Tractatus 4.1272.46 That passage, Hacker thinks, implies a notion of incorrect use that is 
stronger than that which Diamond would countenance, and that would license the 
inference from a sign’s being used not in accordance with some one set of rules for its 
correct use to its therefore being nonsense. So, Hacker writes that ‘Wittgenstein explains 
that formal concepts have a correct use\ namely as bound variables, and also 'an 
incorrect use\ as pseudo-concept-words, and the latter use results in ‘nonsensical 
pseudo-propositions’.47 To be sure, Wittgenstein does talk of ‘correct use’ here; he writes 
that ‘[wjherever the word “object” (“thing”, etc.) is correctly used, it is expressed in 
conceptual notation by a variable name’. And, Wittgenstein continues, ‘[wjherever it is 
used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions 
are the results’; and Wittgenstein illustrates the point with instances of what ‘one cannot 
say’, what it is ‘impossible to say’, and what it ‘is nonsensical to speak o f . Finally, 
Wittgenstein applies the point to other formal concepts, such as ‘number’: ‘It is just as
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nonsensical to say, “There is only one 1”, as it would be to say, “2+2 at 3 o’clock equals 
4”.’
These remarks can be read as making trouble for an austere view of nonsense, and 
for Conant’s account of logical syntax, but they need not be read so. There is no 
reference here to incorrect uses or violations of syntax. What there is in the passage is 
reference to a correct use, and to the use of signs in a logical role other than their correct 
use (as ‘proper concept-words’), resulting in nonsense. Nothing in the passage suggests 
that that is due to anything other than their not having been given a meaning in that kind 
of use, as ‘identical’ has as yet not been given a meaning as adjective. So, for instance, 
though ‘2+2 equals 4 ’ surely has a sense (or at any rate is not nonsense), it does not have 
a sense such that what time it is is relevant to what it says; hence, we simply have not 
given a meaning to the combination of signs ‘2+2 at 3 o’clock equals 4’. Where 
Wittgenstein does at one point in the Tractatus talk of ‘arguments of the wrong kind 
[making] the proposition itself nonsensical’ (5.5351), the point again is not necessarily 
that the nonsense is due to anything other than their being arguments to which no 
meaning has been assigned in that context.48
Even disregarding Hacker’s criticisms of Conant’s interpretation of Carnap on 
nonsense and logical syntax, I have not considered all of the criticisms of Conant’s view 
that Hacker puts forward. Those criticisms which I have not addressed consist primarily 
of two lists: first, o f a series of ten quotations, from a variety of sources (LWL, RLF, 
WWK, PR, BB, and PI),49 which purport to show that Wittgenstein’s conception, first of
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logical syntax, then of grammar, was one of rules determining the bounds of sense, 
licensing some combinations of words and excluding others as nonsensical; and, second, 
of a further series of five quotations (again from a variety of sources) in support of the 
view that Wittgenstein thought that there could be ‘transgressions’ of rules of grammar.50 
There is also a further quotation, from LWL (p.3), which seems to suggest that nonsense 
arises if we substitute for one another in a sentence words of different kinds, and another 
quotation, this time from PG , which Hacker claims Conant misinterprets the import of.51 
Many of these remarks need to be treated with caution,52 and not all of them appear
C l
straightforwardly or obviously to be doing what Hacker suggests they are, but I cannot 
hope to address all of them individually here.
Finally, nor have I addressed the conception of grammar which supersedes the 
early Wittgenstein’s notion of logical syntax (and which is the subject of some of the 
quotations Hacker marshals against Conant just referred to). The conception of those 
rules often attributed to Wittgenstein is one which, for all its differences, nevertheless 
inherits certain flaws from its earlier counterpart. In particular, it shares with the related 
conception of logical syntax the idea that nonsense is produced when we deviate from 
certain rules or sets of rules in our use of expressions. Though rules of grammar are 
autonomous, in the sense that, unlike the laws of logical syntax, they are not conceived as 
tracking or mirroring some structure set deep in the nature of things, they do nonetheless 
play the same role in the production of nonsense as their predecessor. Different 
arguments will be of course required than those given here to counter the suggestion that
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that was Wittgenstein’s later conception of these rules, though it may be that some of the 
same objections apply substantially.54
VII
Conant’s conception of the laws of logical syntax is one in which failing to follow those 
rules may result in one’s doing something quite different, or else it may result in one’s 
doing nothing at all, but it will not result in one’s doing something that is outlawed, and 
nor will it result in nonsense. We might introduce a new rule, and we might even call it a 
rule of logical syntax, such that a sign can only have one use, but then our violating this 
rule, and in that sense violating logical syntax, will have no immediate relevance to the 
question of whether or not our use of words is nonsensical; nor would such a rule be a 
‘rule of logical syntax’ in Wittgenstein’s sense. That conception of rules might seem 
odd, perhaps in that it is unlike the notion at play in the rules of chess, which are 
constitutive in that they determine what is and what is not a valid move in that game, but 
it is not either incoherent or wrong for all that.
I have tried to defend that view from some of the criticisms Hacker makes of it, 
and at the same time I have tried to argue that there are a number of problems in Hacker’s 
own account, both of nonsense and of logical syntax, and both as applied to ordinary 
language and as attributed to Wittgenstein. ‘Violations of logical syntax’ as Hacker uses 
that phrase are not enough to make an utterance nonsense; what makes an utterance 
nonsense is our failure to assign some sense to those signs in that context of use. In the 
following chapter, I shall want to turn to a number of criticisms of the austere view of
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nonsense put forward by Hans-Johann Glock, from a similar perspective to Hacker’s, but 
focussing on Wittgenstein’s interpretation and use of the context-principle, early and 
later, and its relation to Wittgenstein’s view of what nonsense might be.
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much an idea o f a difference o f emphasis as anything), however, and though it might be suggested by this 
remark o f Diamond’s, I am not at all sure is the correct one. Rather than diverging from the substance o f  
Conant’s account here, I take it that Diamond is agreeing with Conant’s account o f  logical syntax, but also 
supplementing it with a story o f  what it is for a sign-language to be ‘governed by’ logical syntax.
37 So, Wittgenstein’s remark ends: ‘eine Zeichensprache also, die der logischen Grammatik- der logischen 
Syntax -  gehorcht’. See Genia Schonbaumsfeld, ‘Is Wittgenstein’s Ladder Real?’, unpublished manuscript 
presented at ‘The Tractatus and Its History’ conference, Stirling, 11.09.2005, p. 15.
38 Wittgenstein, Letters to Ogden, p.59; quoted in Diamond, ‘Logical Syntax’, p.83, note 9.
39 See Diamond, ‘Logical Syntax’, pp.82-83.
40 Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Camap and the New American Wittgensteinians’, p. 16.
41 Diamond, ‘Logical Syntax’, p.86.
42 Diamond, ‘Logical Syntax’, p.86.
43 Schonbaumsfeld, ‘Is Wittgenstein’s Ladder Real?’, p. 16, note 68.
44 See, for instance, the example Diamond gives in her ‘Logical Syntax’, pp.87-88.
45 One place where Wittgenstein himself explicitly discusses the analogy or otherwise between certain rules 
of chess and certain rules o f language is the following passage from Philosophical Grammar:
81 Are the rules that say that such and such a combination o f  words yields no sense 
comparable to the stipulations in chess that the game does not allow two pieces to stand on the 
same square, for instance, or a piece to stand on a line between two squares? Those propositions 
in their turn are like certain actions; like e.g. cutting a chess board out o f  a larger sheet o f  squared 
paper. They draw a boundary.
So what does it mean to say “this combination o f  words has no sense”? One can say o f  a 
name (of a succession o f  sounds): “I haven’t given anyone this name”; and name-giving is a 
definite action (attaching a label). Think o f  the representation o f  an explorer’s route by a line 
drawn in each o f the two hemispheres projected on the page: we may say that a bit o f  line going 
outside the circles on the page makes no sense in this projection. We might also express it thus: 
no stipulation has been made about it. (PG, p. 125.)
Wittgenstein does not exactly reject the comparison mooted in the first sentence, but neither does he accept 
it; instead, he begins by clarifying what those rules o f chess which he wants to talk about are doing, as i f  to 
suggest we have not quite got clear on that point yet, such as to give sense to the comparison at all. Having 
clarified it, however, he might be taken to confirm the analogy. Does Wittgenstein, then, side with Hacker, 
and against Diamond on this? I think that the kind o f  analogy Wittgenstein is postulating here is quite 
different from the one that Hacker wants.
The analogy Hacker wants to draw, against Conant, is brought out by his characterising Conant’s 
view in the following way:
Conant’s view is akin to claiming that the pawn in chess cannot be moved three squares at a time, 
since if  one were to move a piece thus, it would not be a pawn -  a transcendental argument to 
prove that one cannot cheat in chess? (Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Camap and the N ew  American 
Wittgensteinians’, p. 16.)
That point, about cheating, brings out very clearly the kind o f rule o f chess that Hacker has in mind here, 
and the point I want to make is this: that that kind o f  rule is very different from the kind that Wittgenstein 
has in mind here. It might be cheating in chess, or it might just be an error, to move one’s pawn three 
squares at a time (or that pawn may quite legitimately be moved thus, if  it has acquired the powers o f  a 
queen). But rules o f that kind are not what Wittgenstein has in mind. Putting one’s piece between two 
squares, or putting two pieces on the same square, would not rightly be called ‘cheating’; the kind o f  rules 
Wittgenstein is talking about here are such that, without them, we could not make sense o f  cheating at all.
So I take it that Wittgenstein’s comparison goes somewhat deeper than Hacker’s; cheating is still 
understandable within chess, but Wittgenstein’s comparison suggests that, for him, nonsense is not like 
cheating, but more like putting one’s piece between squares. For that kind o f move, we simply have not 
made any stipulations; we cannot make sense o f it in that context at all.
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46 TLP 4.1272 runs as follows:
Thus the variable name lx ’ is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object.
Wherever the word ‘object’ ( ‘thing’, etc.) is correctly used, it is expressed in conceptual 
notation by a variable name.
Wherever it is used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical 
pseudo-propositions are the result.
So one cannot say, for example, ‘There are objects’, as one might say, ‘There are books’. 
And it is just as impossible to say, ‘There are 100 objects’, or, ‘There are N 0 objects’.
And it is nonsensical to speak o f  the total number of objects.
The same applies to the words ‘complex’, ‘fact’, ‘function’, ‘number’, etc.
They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by variables, 
not by functions or classes (as Frege and Russell believed).
‘1 is a number’, ‘There is only one zero’, and all similar expressions are nonsensical.
(It is just as nonsensical to say, ‘There is only one 1 ’, as it would be to say, ‘2+2 at 3 
o’clock equals 4 ’.)
47 Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Camap and the New American Wittgensteinians’, p.15.
48 See Diamond, ‘Logical Syntax’, p.88. TLP 5.5351 runs as follows:
There are certain cases in which one is tempted to use expressions o f  the form la = a’ or 
—* p ’ and the like. In fact, this happens when one wants to talk about proto-types, e.g. about 
proposition, thing, etc. Thus in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics ‘p  is a proposition’ — which is 
nonsense -  was given the symbolic rendering ‘p  —* p ’ and placed as an hypothesis in front o f  
certain propositions in order to exclude from their argument-places everything but propositions.
(It is nonsense to place the hypothesis ‘p  —► p ’ in front o f  a proposition, in order to ensure 
that its arguments shall have the right form, if  only because with a non-proposition as argument 
the hypothesis becomes not false but nonsensical, and because arguments o f  the wrong kind make 
the proposition itself nonsensical, so that it preserves itself from wrong arguments just as well, or 
as badly, as the hypothesis without sense that was appended for that purpose.)
Diamond, building on Kremer, argues something like this: that nonsense is only ever a matter o f  our failing 
to have assigned a meaning to the words -  but Russell’s symbolism requires that we exclude giving new  
uses to signs, and hence that option is already foreclosed to us. Hence, an argument o f  the ‘wrong kind’ 
cannot, given that requirement, be assigned a new meaning, since it already has one, and so the whole fails 
to have a sense.
49 Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Camap and the New American Wittgensteinians’, pp.12-13.
50 Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Camap and the New American Wittgensteinians’, pp.13-14.
51 Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Camap and the New American Wittgensteinians’, p.16 and p .14 (respectively).
52 For instance, because o f  their progeny, as compilations o f  notes taken by others on Wittgenstein’s 
lectures (see, here, e.g. the editor’s introduction to LWL), or because they were not as it were groomed for 
publication by Wittgenstein. So, as an example o f  the former, Wittgenstein’s saying what he is claimed to 
have said at LWL p.3 contradicts what he is there claimed to have said moments earlier (p.2), where he 
outlines a version o f contextualism.
53 For instance, numbers 9 and 10 from the first list, and numbers 1 and 5 from the second.
54 On this topic, see Witherspoon, ‘Conceptions o f Nonsense in Carnap and Wittgenstein’.
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Chapter Three
Contextualism and Nonsense
A Reply to Hans-Johann Glock
/
Contextualism, broadly speaking, is the view that the whole -  be it judgement, thought, 
proposition, or sentence -  has priority in some sense over the individual parts -  be they 
words or concepts -  when it comes to giving an account of meaning, or of understanding. 
Some version of that view lies behind Frege’s context-principle, which is reformulated by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and quoted approvingly in his Philosophical Investigations 
(as well as appearing in various formats and at several places in between1). In this 
chapter, I shall want to consider a number of objections levelled at the austere view of 
nonsense by Hans-Johann Glock in his paper ‘All Kinds of Nonsense’, and which focus 
in large part on Wittgenstein’s contextualism.2
Glock, like P.M.S. Hacker, rejects the austere view of nonsense both substantially, 
as offering the correct account of nonsense, and exegetically too, as offering the correct
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account of Wittgenstein’s view of nonsense, either in the Tractatus or in the later work. 
In short, for Glock, Wittgenstein’s contextualism neither in the Tractatus nor in the 
Investigations will serve to justify the attribution to Wittgenstein o f an austere view of 
nonsense. Wittgenstein’s later ‘non-restrictive’ contextualism is, Glock suggests, 
substantially plausible but ‘militates’ against the austere view; and his earlier version, 
Glock argues, though it could be used to provide an argument in support of austerity, not 
only relies on a notion of meaning unavailable to Resolute readers (i.e., unavailable to 
those very readers who would most want to attribute to Wittgenstein there an austere 
view), but is also plain wrong. And these points are supplemented, too, by a number of 
others that Glock makes, and that are aimed at undermining any independent plausibility 
that the austere view might be thought to have, exegetically or otherwise. I shall want to 
dispute much of what Glock writes, but before turning to his criticisms I want first to note 
one key difference between Glock’s view and a view which is in many respects very 
similar to Glock’s, that of P.M.S. Hacker.
Glock identifies the following two strands to the austere view o f nonsense:
(1) the privation view: for austerity, nonsense only ever arises from privation, 
from our failure to assign to the words (in that context and to date) a 
meaning; there is no such thing as ‘positive’ or ‘substantial’ nonsense, 
consisting of words which do in such contexts have meanings;
(2) nonsense monism', all nonsense is logically equivalent; there is only one 
logical kind or there are no logically different kinds of nonsense.3
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Against austerity, both Glock and Hacker maintain that there can be such a thing as what 
Glock terms ‘combinatorial nonsense’ -  nonsense, that is, that results from the logico- 
syntactically illegitimate combination of otherwise meaningful words.4 Hence, both 
reject (1), the privation view. Some nonsense results not from a simple failure to assign 
meanings to the words, but from using words in ways that are prohibited by or that 
violate the logico-syntactical rules for their correct use. Since in a nonsense-sentence, so 
the story goes, the words are being misused, they do not there stand for a meaning, but 
they are meaningful nonetheless in that they do have a rule-governed use in the 
language.5
But whereas Hacker nevertheless maintains, along with followers of an austere 
view, that nonsense ‘no more comes in kinds than it comes in degrees’,6 and so affirms
(2), Glock on the contrary (and as the title o f his paper suggests) takes their shared stand 
on the existence of combinatorial nonsense to constitute grounds for rejecting (2), or 
nonsense monism. Thus, Glock writes: ‘There are many kinds o f nonsense, and one of 
them results from the illicit combination of meaningful words’.7 For Glock, 
combinatorial nonsense does amount to something logically distinct from mere privation, 
whereas for Hacker it does not.
The reason for this difference is, I think, quite simple, and is not to be traced (say) 
to Glock’s holding a stronger, more robust (or, some would say, more honest) 
understanding of what combinatorial nonsense consists in than does Hacker. Rather, the 
difference is over what would constitute a logical difference between nonsense-sentences.
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For Hacker, such a difference would have to be one in the end-product as it were, in the 
sense of the resultant whole, and for there to be differences in that sense one would first 
have to hold a genuinely substantial view o f nonsense (in which the individual words of a 
nonsense-sentence do have their ordinary meanings and together express a logically 
incoherent thought), which Hacker, of course, does not. For Glock, on the other hand, a 
logical difference here is rather one in the cause, in what makes the string of signs 
nonsense. Hence, on that way of counting, strings of signs which are nonsense because 
we have failed to give them a meaning are a logically distinct kind of nonsense from 
strings of signs which violate logical syntax, say. Thus, for Glock, points (1) and (2) are 
much more closely related than they are for Hacker; where for Hacker, one can 
consistently maintain (2) whilst rejecting (1), for Glock, rejecting (1) would require one 
also to reject (2). The difference, then, between Glock and Hacker here is largely 
terminological, and it is that difference that allows them to say such seemingly 
contrasting things about the idea of there being different kinds of nonsense, whilst 
nevertheless saying such similar things on many related substantial points. Although 
much of their discussion is aimed at the idea of substantial nonsense (and so logically 
distinct kinds of nonsense primarily in Hacker’s sense), I take it that followers of the 
austere view would reject the notion that there can be logical differences between 
nonsense-sentences in either sense (since giving up on (2) in either Glock or Hacker’s 
sense would require one to give up on (1) also).
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That is all that I want to say about the differences between Glock’s view and Hacker’s. I 
want to turn instead now to Glock’s criticisms of austerity, especially in relation to the 
Tractatus, and beginning with his focus on the appeal, among Resolute readers, to 
Wittgenstein’s reformulation there (at TLP 3.3 and 3.314) of Frege’s context-principle.
That principle appears in different guises four times in Frege’s Foundations o f  
Arithmetic: in the introduction, as one of three guiding principles -  ‘never to ask for the 
meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition’; at §60 -  ‘we 
ought always to keep before our eyes a complete proposition. Only in a proposition have 
the words really a meaning. ... It is enough if the proposition taken as a whole has a 
sense; it is this that confers on its parts also their content’; at §62 -  ‘it is only in the 
context of a proposition that words have any meaning’; and in conclusion at §106 -  ‘we 
must never try to define the meaning of a word in isolation, but only as it is used in the 
context of a proposition’.8 In the Tractatus, the principle becomes ‘Only propositions 
have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning’ (TLP 3.3) and 
‘An expression has meaning only in a proposition’ {TLP 3.314).9
Although Wittgenstein himself, as Glock emphasises, does not actually use the 
context-principle to justify an austere view of nonsense, it has nevertheless been used that 
way by New, or Resolute, readers of the Tractatus}0 But there are many different 
interpretations of the context-principle, and of what Frege and Wittgenstein might have 
meant by it at different points in their writings; Glock distinguishes between a strong,
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‘restrictive’ version of it, and a weaker, ‘non-restrictive’ version. Whatever exactly 
Glock means by each of these terms, it is clear that, for him, the former, strong version 
requires at least that words only have a meaning when actually used in a proposition, 
while the latter version ‘is compatible with the idea that individual words can mean 
something without actually occurring in a proposition’ -  rather, they must only be 
capable of occurring in a proposition; they must have been given a (rule-governed) use in 
the language.11 With these two versions of contextualism come two different notions of 
what it is for a word to ‘occur in the context of a proposition’ -  a narrower and a broader 
interpretation of what that context must be exactly: in the former, strong sense, the 
context is that of an actual proposition of which the word must be part; in the latter, weak 
sense, the context is rather that of propositions more generally -  a word must only have a 
role in them, and need not actually be employed in that role at any one time for it to be 
said to have a meaning.
Then Glock’s argument is this: if the Tractarian formulation o f the context- 
principle is to be taken to offer support for the austere view o f nonsense, or evidence that 
Wittgenstein held such a view in the Tractatus, then it must be taken in the strong sense -  
since if it is only by virtue of a general possibility o f occurrence in propositions that a 
word has a meaning, as the weaker version would have it, then words occurring in a 
nonsense-sentence may still have a meaning even though they do not there actually occur 
within a genuine proposition; in one sense, the stronger sense, of the phrase, we would 
then be able to ask after the meaning of a word taken in isolation, outside the (immediate) 
context of a proposition, and so too therefore in the context of a nonsense-sentence.
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Taken in the strong sense required by austerity, however, Glock maintains, the principle 
is plain wrong: words can and do have meaning outside the context o f a proposition -  for 
instance, numbers on pages, names used in greeting or as labels on jars, entries in 
dictionaries, and so on. Thus, if Wittgenstein did hold this view in the Tractatus, then, 
Glock thinks, Wittgenstein was simply mistaken. And while that mistake might, at least 
in part, be accounted for, such an account will o f necessity have to go by way of an 
appeal to certain technical, picture-theoretic commitments on Wittgenstein’s behalf, such 
as his extraordinary notion of ‘meaning’, and which are simply not open to Resolute 
readers or readings to appeal to. So while there is some evidence that Wittgenstein did 
hold a restrictive version of the context-principle in the Tractatus, that evidence itself, 
Glock argues, counts against his having held an austere view o f nonsense there.
On the other hand, however, Glock continues, there is good reason perhaps not to 
attribute such a (restrictive) view to Wittgenstein at all, or at least good reason to see 
Wittgenstein as already, in the Tractatus, moving away from that restrictive view towards 
the weaker version Glock thinks is to be found in the Investigations, since the restrictive 
principle is at odds with certain other elements o f the Tractatus: namely, its 
compositionality -  the idea, expressed for instance at Tractatus 4.024-4.03,12 that the 
sense of a sentence is in some sense dependent upon, or built up out of, or arrived at by 
reflection upon the meanings of its constituent parts, the individual words (together with 
the structure of their arrangement).13 Much better perhaps, then, Glock suggests, to 
attribute to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus a weaker, non-restrictive understanding of the
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context-principle,14 thus dissolving any sense o f inconsistency but, with it, too, anything 
that could constitute a contextual justification for the austere view of nonsense.
Glock, then, presents those, primarily Resolute readers, who either favour an 
austere view of nonsense substantially or who find such a view in Wittgenstein (or, worse 
still, both), with something of a Scylla and Charybdis between which to navigate. On the 
one hand, a strong context-principle would provide evidence for Wittgenstein having held 
an austere view of nonsense, but at the expense of both plausibility and internal (to the 
Tractatus) consistency -  with the only reasonable explanation of either the latter 
incoherence or the former error going by way of notions unavailable to Resolute 
readings. On the other hand, a weaker version of the context-principle would restore both 
plausibility and consistency to the Tractatus view, but at the expense of any justification 
for an austere view of nonsense.
So far, the argument, if  correct, would entitle Glock to conclude only that 
(exegetically or otherwise) austerity receives no support from the contextualism of the 
Tractatus, not that the austere view is either wrong or not Wittgenstein’s. But Glock goes 
further: for Glock, this argument serves also to undermine the preferred reading of 
Tractatus 5.473 and 5.4733 as explicitly stating an austere view of nonsense, as well as 
diminishing any independent appeal austerity might have had. And, Glock continues, the 
case only gets worse for austerity when we turn to Wittgenstein’s later work, where 
Wittgenstein’s uncompromisingly non-technical use of the word ‘meaning’ renders the
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restrictive principle untenable, and whose philosophic procedure anyway assumes the 
existence of combinatorial nonsense.15
I ll
Glock, then, argues for two overarching conclusions: first, that the austere view is not 
Wittgenstein’s view of nonsense, early or later; second, that, substantially speaking, the 
austere view is mistaken. Glock’s arguments to those conclusions can be broken down 
into the following steps. First, Glock’s exegetical case proceeds by way o f the following 
four steps:
(1) The attribution to Wittgenstein (early and later) of an austere view of nonsense relies 
on two kinds of evidence:
a. Apparent statements of the view -  e.g. TLP 5.473-5.4733 and PI §500;
b. Wittgenstein’s contextualism -  e.g. TLP 3.3 and PI §49.
(2) Wittgenstein’s contextualism, (l)b, will not support the attribution to him o f an 
austere view of nonsense.
(3) The austere view lacks independent (and substantial) plausibility.
(4) Hence, without the support offered by Wittgenstein’s contextualism (l)b, the evidence 
of (l)a is more plausibly read as in support of a different conception o f nonsense.
Glock’s claim, then, is that the evidence of (l)b  will not justify the attribution to
Wittgenstein of an austere view of nonsense, and that the evidence of (l)a  alone will not
then suffice either. Why won’t Wittgenstein’s contextualism provide an argument for his
having held an austere view? Glock’s argument for (2) consists of the following points:
(i) Wittgenstein’s contextualism must be either such that a word can only be said to have 
a meaning when it is actually being used in a proposition (strong, or restrictive 
contextualism) or such that a word can have a meaning outside the context of a 
proposition (weak, or non-restrictive contextualism).16
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(ii) Only strong, restrictive contextualism can provide an argument for the austere view 
(since if a word can have a meaning outside a genuine proposition, as the weak version 
allows, it can also have a meaning in a nonsense-sentence).
(iii) Later Wittgenstein’s contextualism is non-restrictive.
(iv) Therefore, later Wittgenstein’s contextualism will not support the attribution to him 
of an austere view of nonsense.
(v) If the contextualism of the Tractatus is non-restrictive, then it will not support the 
attribution of an austere view of nonsense to Wittgenstein there.
(vi) If the contextualism of the Tractatus is restrictive, then it requires (for substantial 
plausibility) a theoretical notion of meaning.
(p -*0
(vii) A theoretical notion of meaning is incompatible with the austere view of nonsense 
(since austerely-conceived nonsense ‘cannot constitute a theory’).17
(q—»~r)
(viii) Restrictive contextualism is incompatible with the austere view o f nonsense.
(p-*~r)
(ix) If the contextualism of the Tractatus is restrictive, then it will not support the 
attribution of an austere view of nonsense to Wittgenstein there. (From (viii).)
(x) Therefore, early Wittgenstein’s contextualism will not support the attribution to him 
of an austere view of nonsense. (From (v) and (ix).)
(xi) Neither early nor later Wittgenstein’s contextualism will provide support for 
attributing to him an austere view of nonsense. (From (iv) and (x).)1
Point (3) is then established by the argument that, unless restrictive contextualism is
correct, the prohibition on words having a meaning in nonsense-sentences will violate the
‘privation’19 element of austerity: that is, Glock suggests, if a word can have a meaning
outside the (immediate) context of a proposition, but not in a nonsense-sentence, their
lack of meaning in the nonsense-sentence will then in part be a result o f their context, and
not simply of our failure to give them a meaning. And Glock’s case for point (4) then
proceeds by noting other passages (and from a variety of sources) which Glock claims
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allow for ‘combinatorial nonsense’ -  nonsense, that is, which combines meaningful 
words20 in illegitimate ways -  and by way of the additional point, that the austere view 
(specifically, its ‘monism’21) is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s later philosophical 
method, and his use there of reductio ad absurdum arguments.22
Finally, Glock’s exegetical case is supplemented by the following substantial 
objections, which largely rehearse features of the former (exegetical) argument:
(A) The austere view must be either independently plausible or receive support from 
(either strong or weak) contextualism.
(B) Weak contextualism will not support the austere view.
(C) Strong contextualism is wrong (since it relies on an incorrect notion o f meaning and 
since it conflicts with compositionalism23), so will not support the austere view.
(D) The austere view lacks independent plausibility.
(E) The austere view neither receives support from contextualism nor is independently 
plausible, and therefore is incorrect.
IV
In the following pages, I will want to dispute a number of Glock’s claims, focussing 
especially on Glock’s arguments for point (2), his discussion of the context-principle, and 
its interpretation by Wittgenstein. I want to begin with Glock’s claim, repeated both in 
his exegetical and in his substantial arguments against the austere view, that only the 
strong, restrictive version of the context-principle could secure the case for the austere 
view of nonsense. That claim is made in step (ii), as I have numbered them, but before I 
turn to that step, I want to say something about Glock’s interpretation of the austere view 
itself, and to the assumptions that might seem to underlie his criticisms of austerity.
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The suspicion here is that Glock treats the austere view, throughout his paper, as a 
very different kind of view to the kind that it is, that Glock mistakes what sort of view it 
is. Glock, that is, treats the austere view of nonsense not as the primarily negative view 
that it is, a view of what nonsense is not, but as involving a positive thesis about 
nonsense. That, in large part, comes from his not taking sufficiently seriously how that 
view arises: namely, out of the rejection of the very idea of a theory o f sense, and out of 
the rejection of the idea that Wittgenstein was himself genuinely concerned at any period 
to put forward a theory of sense, or of meaning. By ignoring or not taking seriously the 
possibility of austerity’s arising out of that rejection, Glock ends up treating the austere 
view as itself a positive philosophical theory about what nonsense is, and not as a simple 
affirmation of the commonsense notion of nonsense arising when our words fail to say 
anything, coupled with the rejection of the idea that there is any other, more sophisticated 
and philosophical kind of nonsense over and above the kind involved in that ordinary 
notion.
That suspicion is, I think, borne out by Glock’s treating the austere view as 
consisting of two basic premises or assumptions -  as Glock calls them, the privation view 
and nonsense monism -  and then treating those two premises as themselves standing in 
need of positive philosophical justification and argument. Glock excludes from that 
picture the possibility that the austere view might be the outcome of the kind of rejection 
that it is in fact an outcome of, at least in the sense in which Conant and Diamond talk of
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an austere view of nonsense; instead, those premises, and the arguments in favour of 
them, must themselves be part of a theory of sense or of meaning.
What I want to suggest here, then, is that at the very beginning of his paper, in his 
setting-up of the issues at stake, Glock mispresents the kind o f view that the austere view 
is and, in so doing, closes off from consideration certain arguments in favour of the view 
and lays down a demand for an altogether different kind of argument, justifying austerity 
as part of a theory of sense or meaning and not as standing outside such theories.24 
Instead, against Glock, the conception of nonsense at work in the austere view, and 
invoked by Wittgenstein in his use of that word, is just our ordinary notion of having 
failed to say anything by our words, of not having given to our words a meaning, in that 
context and to date. That notion brings with it the idea that we could give those words a 
meaning -  that there is nothing as it were internal or essential to that combination that 
renders it nonsensical. We could, for any combination of signs, assign to them a meaning 
such that the whole would make sense, and so, ultimately at least, if  such a combination 
does not make sense it will be down to our failure to make just such an assignment. That 
idea, Glock (slightly grudgingly) acknowledges is at least trivially true,25 but he assumes 
that the austere view must be meant in some other, stronger sense than that trivial one, 
and not that it simply denies the existence of any further kind of nonsense over and above 
this trivial kind.
Glock’s claim, then, that the austere requires the restrictive version o f the context- 
principle seems to rest on an error about the kind of view the austere view is, and so also
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about the kind of justification it requires. I shall want to argue, however, that even were 
we to follow Glock in his characterisation of the issues at hand, still his arguments do not 
present a sound case against the austere view, exegetically or otherwise.
I want to turn back, then, to the claim of (ii), that only the strong, restrictive 
version of the context-principle could possibly provide an argument for the austere view. 
Thus, it is the restrictive principle, Glock writes, that ‘provides the crucial premise for the 
following argument’:
Pi A word (name) has meaning only in the context of a proposition.
P2 A proposition is a sentence with a sense.
C No component of a sequence of signs that lacks a sense can have a 
meaning.26
But whether or not the restrictive version of the context-principle is the version that is 
required depends, in part at least, also on what other versions there are available, and 
whether they too are capable of ruling out enough for the austere view. Hence, Glock’s 
claim in (ii) in turn depends on the claim of step (i), that Wittgenstein’s contextualism 
must either be strong (restrictive) or else it must be weak, and so must maintain instead 
that words can have a meaning outside the immediate context of a proposition. I want to 
raise a question about the distinction Glock draws here between the strong and the weak 
versions of the context-principle, and about his claim that the former strong version is 
what is required if Wittgenstein’s contextualism is to provide evidence o f his having held 
an austere view of nonsense, or in order for a substantial case for the austere view to be 
built upon the context-principle.
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Those last claims, about what is required of contextualism (whether exegetically 
or substantially) by an austere view of nonsense, depend upon the weak, non-restrictive 
view being taken in a particular way, like this: a word has a meaning if it can be used in a 
proposition -  if, that is, it has a role in propositions generally. That version or 
interpretation would leave open the possibility of Glock’s combinatorial nonsense 
(resulting from prohibited combinations), and also of substantial nonsense (resulting from 
illegitimate or prohibited combinations, and expressing an incoherent sense). Hence, if 
that view is the only alternative to the restrictive view, then it looks very much as if the 
strong, restrictive view is what is required in order to make the case for austerity. But the 
contrast that Glock presents between strong, restrictive contextualism and the weaker, 
non-restrictive variety is actually this: on the strong view, no word has a meaning except 
when it is actually being used in a proposition; on the weak view, words can mean 
something ‘without actually occurring in propositions’. Although Glock clearly 
associates the latter position with the view that he attributes to the later Wittgenstein, and 
which Glock himself endorses, that a word must only be capable o f occurring in a 
proposition -  in the sense that it has been given some rule-governed use in the language -  
in order for it to have a meaning, that is not the only way of denying the restrictive view.
There are, in effect, two ways of describing the terrain here. Either the weak view 
is just the view that words can at least sometimes mean something without actually 
occurring at that moment as a component of a proposition; and in that case, there will be 
many different ways in which one might hold such a view, many different views which 
might all nevertheless count equally as ‘weak’ in that sense. On this way of counting, for
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instance, simply acknowledging the existence of exceptions to the restrictive principle
on(as, e.g., Rupert Read might be taken to suggest ) would be sufficient for one’s view to 
count as weak. If we describe the terrain in this way, the restrictive version of the 
context-principle is not required to secure the case for austerity because there may be 
versions of the weak view, which are not yet as weak as Glock’s version o f that view, but 
which would still provide support to austerity. Or we might describe the weak view as 
Glock’s favoured view, that to have a meaning a word must only be capable o f occurring 
in a proposition. In that case, however, the strong and the weak versions no longer 
between them cover all the ground there is to be had: there will be scope for a variety of 
positions in between those two, and neither strong nor weak. Hence, again, the strong 
view would not -  not clearly at any rate -  be required to make the case for austerity. 
What Glock wants is something from each of these descriptions: from the first, he wants 
the idea that the two positions between them take up all the territory available, so that if 
one’s version of the context-principle is not one then it must be the other; and he wants 
from the second the association of the weak view with the version of contextualism that 
Glock favours, which effectively closes off that position to the austere view and its 
followers. Needless to say, but he cannot actually have it both ways. The point here, 
though, is just this: that if rejecting the strong view does not as it were automatically lead 
to one’s adopting Glock’s own view, then it is not at all clear that the strong view is, as 
Glock says that it is, what is required in order for contextualism to provide support for 
austerity. Nor, crucially, would it then be clear that Glock’s objections to the strong view
are so much as relevant to the exegetical or substantial plausibility of the austere view of
28nonsense.
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Clearly, the restrictive view would support austerity (even if, as Glock notes,
Wittgenstein himself does not actually use it explicitly to provide an argument for
austerity); and it is a view that, for instance, Diamond ascribes to the Frege of the
Foundations o f Arithmetic?9 Frege’s view there, Diamond notes, does not allow for the
meaningful use of, e.g., proper names in isolation, as in greetings.30 But Diamond also
adapts that contextualism to Frege’s later treatment of sentences as complete names, and
that view would, Diamond says, allow for the meaningful use of proper names in such
cases.31 So Diamond clearly does not take herself, or Frege, to whom she also ascribes an
austere view of nonsense, to be committed to Glock’s strong view. Rather, what
contextualism must rule out, if it is to be taken as providing support for an austere view
of nonsense, is simply this much: as Diamond puts it, ‘senseless whole and parts with
content’.32 Thus, Diamond writes o f Frege:
[H]e does not merely mean that a word has meaning if it contributes to the sense 
of any sentence in which it occurs, in accordance with general rules; that is, he is 
not saying that it is the general possibility a word has o f contributing to sense that 
confers meaning on it. That would allow for the possibility of a senseless 
sentence composed of words which had had content conferred on them by general 
rules. But what he actually says ... is that it is through the sense of the whole that 
the parts get their content, and if this means anything at all, it must rule out the 
combination: senseless whole and parts with content.3
That combination is the bare minimum that contextualism must exclude if it is to provide
a case for austerity. And ruling out that much requires, according to Diamond, ruling out
one way of taking Frege’s principle -  the way favoured by Glock. But that need not
(though it might actually) result in one’s taking the strong view as Glock describes it.
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There is, then, a question-mark over whether the contrast Glock presents between 
the strong and weak views is quite as straightforward as he seems to suggest that it is and, 
given that, there is then a further question-mark too over whether what would be required 
by austerity is that strong view at all. Although the restrictive view might be used to 
provide an argument for austerity, there is a deal of scope for less restrictive 
interpretations of the context-principle (such as that involved in Diamond’s discussion 
above), and which are not yet as weak as Glock’s non-restrictive version, but which 
would still be capable of excluding the possibility of, e.g., Glock’s combinatorial 
nonsense. That scope for different varieties of contextualism which would nevertheless 
still be potent enough to provide an argument for the austere view of nonsense may also 
serve to undermine the import of Glock’s objections to strong contextualism, if those 
objections hinge on features of that view absent from those less restrictive versions.
My claim, then, is that Glock misrepresents the contrast between the strong and 
weak versions of the context-principle, and that in doing so, he exaggerates how much 
must be excluded by the context-principle for it to be compatible with, or provide a case 
for, the austere view of nonsense. Despite that, however, the version of the context- 
principle to be found in the Tractatus does indeed look very much like the restrictive 
principle, that words only have meaning when actually used in a proposition, in much the 
same way that its ontological counterpart in the Tractatus seems to rule out the idea of a 
simple object (‘thing’) occurring not in some state of affairs. Wittgenstein asserts the 
parallel as follows:
2.0122 Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible
situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with
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states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to 
appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions.)
If that were the case, and the version of the context-principle at work in the Tractatus is
indeed the restrictive version as this remark suggests, then notwithstanding the objections
to Glock already posted, his criticisms of the austere view, at least in relation to the
Tractatus, might seem to hold good (by combining steps (vi) to (ix) in the above
argument with the claim that Wittgenstein’s Tractarian contextualism is indeed
restrictive). I shall want to argue now that even if the version of the context-principle to
be found in the Tractatus is, as it seems to be, restrictive, still Glock’s arguments do not
amount to a sound objection to attributing the austere view of nonsense to Wittgenstein
there.
V
Glock’s argument here, then, begins with the claim that the restrictive principle, at least 
in relation to our ordinary use of the word ‘meaning’, is plain wrong. Hence, in order to 
have any substantial plausibility at all as a view, this version of the context-principle 
requires a theoretical notion of meaning. And that, Glock claims, is at odds with austerity 
and the Resolute programme.
Glock’s argument here goes by way of the simple fact that, in ordinary thought 
and talk, words can and do very often have a meaning outside the context (in the strict 
sense at least) of a proposition. So, for instance, Glock gives two examples. First, the 
following list of words:
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to be 
to have 
to do
to abide 
to arise 
to awake
Second, a dictionary entry:
nonsense n 1 a: words or language having no meaning or conveying no 
intelligible ideas b( 1): language, conduct, or an idea that is absurd or contrary to 
good sense (2): an instance or absurd action 2 a: things of no importance or value: 
trifles b: affected or impudent conduct.34
In the first example, Glock notes, the words are not part of a proposition, but nor are they
simply meaningless: rather, the left-hand column lists the auxiliary verbs, and the right-
hand column the first o f the irregular verbs of the English language. O f the second case,
Glock writes: ‘It would be absurd to maintain that the words printed in bold at the
beginning of dictionary entries are meaningless, all the more so since the text that follows
specifies what they mean’.35
Glock may well be right that, in one sense o f the word ‘meaning’, that claim 
would be absurd, i.e. obviously false. But that point, one might reply, fails to engage 
with the restrictive principle (as invoked by Frege and the early Wittgenstein), precisely 
because the sense of ‘meaning’ appealed to or assumed there is a quite different one. So, 
as Diamond writes:
You may use the word ‘meaning’ in any way you like, but nothing that logically 
can be a characteristic of a word in isolation can help to explain its meaning in the 
sense of ‘meaning’ in which what a sentence says depends on the meanings of its 
working parts.36
In that sense of the word ‘meaning’ -  described broadly enough to encapsulate Frege’s 
different conceptions as well as that of the Tractatus -  it clearly would not be absurd to 
say of ‘nonsense’ as it appears in bold in the dictionary entry cited above that it is
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meaningless; though the text of the definition does indeed specify the various roles that 
word can play as a working part o f a proposition, it does not there actually fulfil any one 
of those roles. And similar things might be said of Glock’s first example, too. For 
instance, some of these ‘verbs’ can have very different propositional roles (we talk of a 
‘to do’ list, for example, or exclaim ‘What a to do!’) and they each could be given others, 
but they do not play any such role at all in Glock’s list.
That response, however, plays nicely into Glock’s hands. For Glock argues that 
such an objection is not open to New or Resolute readers of the Tractatus -  i.e. those who 
would most want to find an austere view of nonsense there -  since it relies on adopting a 
theoretical notion of meaning as against Glock’s ordinary use of the term (step (vi)) and 
since such a notion is itself incompatible with the austere view of nonsense (step (vii)).
Glock’s claim here is just this: that if one thinks of the Tractatus as consisting -  in 
whole or in large part -  o f ‘plain’ (i.e., austerely conceived) nonsense, then one cannot 
also claim to find at work there a theoretical notion of meaning since, as Glock writes, 
‘such nonsense cannot constitute a theory’.37 That much, at least, is surely true: 
nonsense, however conceived, cannot constitute a theory, but it is less clear why it should 
follow from this that Resolute readers cannot find in the Tractatus a technical notion of 
meaning.38 That, on the contrary, seems to be part of the backdrop against which any 
reading of the Tractatus must situate itself. What is clear is that if  Resolute readers wish 
to discard the Tractarian statement o f the context-principle as elucidatory nonsense at the 
climax of the book (and not all will wish to do so), then they will not then also be able to
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rely on it as substantial evidence for the austere view. If they do that, they might still 
want to rely on it as exegetical evidence, as forming part of the Tractarian ladder which 
one climbs up but must kick away afterwards, and if so some story will be needed of how 
that is so much as possible. Still, such a story may not be as hard to find as might at first 
be thought, since the austere view does allow for all kinds of other differences between 
nonsense-sentences -  differences not logical, but, say, psychological or aesthetic, for 
instance -  and which may suffice to provide such a story. It would, however, be fair to 
say that the burden here would lie with those Resolute readers who followed this route 
(even if alternative -  standard -  readings are likely to themselves require a parallel story 
of their own). Nevertheless, it simply is not clear that no such story is possible, and 
Glock provides no reason for thinking it to be. Hence, even if we grant that the restrictive 
principle is required, and if we grant too that that relies on a technical notion of meaning, 
that provides no clear-cut case against attributing to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus an 
austere view of nonsense.
VI
Glock’s exegetical case against the austere view in relation to the Tractatus is 
supplemented by the point that the restrictive version of the context-principle is at odds 
with, or conflicts with, another view there: namely, the Tractatus"s compositionalism. 
Glock’s suggestion here is that that conflict undermines the attribution to Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus o f such a restrictive principle, and that it suggests that a substantial case for 
the austere view could not be built upon the restrictive principle, since, for Glock, the 
compositional view is clearly correct. Thus, Glock concludes that the conflict suggests
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that ‘the early Wittgenstein did not take TLP 3.3 [the Tractarian reformulation of Frege’s 
context-principle] as literally as proponents of the austere view suppose’, and that the 
restrictive version of the principle must be wrong.39
Roughly, compositionalism is the view that the sense of a sentence is in some 
sense determined by the meanings of its constituent parts, and the way that those parts are 
put together. In the Tractatus, that view gets expressed in the following remarks:
4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is 
true.
(One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is
true.)
It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents.
4.025 When translating one language into another, we do not proceed by 
translating each proposition of the one into a proposition of the other, but 
merely by translating the constituents of propositions.
(And the dictionary translates not only substantives, but also verbs, 
adjectives, and conjunctions, etc.; and it treats them all in the same way.)
4.026 The meanings of simple signs (words) must be explained to us if
we are to understand them.
With propositions, however, we make ourselves understood.
4.027 It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to
communicate a new sense to us.
4.03 A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new
sense.
The merit of that view, as Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest, is that it seems to be the only 
way of explaining our ability to understand new sentences: we do, that is, understand 
sentences we have not previously encountered, and the most plausible -  perhaps the only 
plausible -  way of explaining that fact seems to be that we are familiar with the 
constituent words and with certain patterns of combining them.
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Though Glock does not expand further on the sense of contradiction between that 
view and restrictive contextualism, reasons for thinking them in conflict are not hard to 
find. For where contextualism (of any stripe) asserts the ‘primacy of the proposition’, as 
it were, over its constituent parts, compositionalism on the contrary stresses (or seems to) 
the primacy of the individual words over the proposition.
One way of seeing how those two views might not conflict after all is to ask what 
follows from compositionalism; that is, compositionalism itself might be held to be 
trivially true, but what is a matter of contention is what that view then entails. On 
Glock’s interpretation of it, compositionalism has the consequence that a word has a 
meaning independently o f any sentence in which it occurs. On another reading, however, 
it might be taken to entail instead only that when a component of one sentence occurs 
again as a component of another sentence it must have the same meaning in both 
occurrences. That second reading would then clearly be compatible with the restrictive 
view, but it might seem to leave mysterious the very feature of natural languages that 
compositionalism intuitively seems to be required in order to explain: namely, the fact 
that we can understand sentences which we have not previously encountered. Does 
restrictive contextualism -  and the latter view of the consequences of compositionalism -  
then leave that fact a matter of mystery? One explanation of why it does not is given 
(again) by Diamond in her discussion of Frege.
Diamond reads Frege as maintaining not only a strong form of contextualism, but 
also the compositional view that ‘we understand a sentence only because we know the
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language -  know, that is, the general rules fixing the content of expressions in the
language’. Thus, Diamond writes:
We need to see how Frege can do both: can mean what he says about the parts 
getting their content through the sentence’s having sense, and can recognise that 
we grasp what a sentence says via our grasp of general rules determining the 
meaning of expressions in the language.40
Diamond’s answer, in short, is that we do arrive at the sense of a sentence by means of
attributing content to the parts, but that we proceed to an understanding of the sense of a
sentence by attributing that content only provisionally, conditionally upon the whole
sentence expressing a thought o f such-and-such a form. Thus, only i f  the sentence as a
whole expresses a thought of such-and-such a form will the parts have the content
provisionally assigned to them.
So, for instance, Diamond takes as an example the sentence ‘Venus is more 
massive than Mercury’, and she begins by assuming that there are two kinds of general 
linguistic rule. The first enables us ‘to break down whole sentences into elements with a 
syntactic characterisation’; the second fixes ‘the meanings of proper names, concept 
expressions and relational expressions of various sorts’ 41 And both kinds of rule apply 
only conditionally. Now, faced with an utterance that we have not previously come 
across, we can apply each kind o f rule in turn. Supposing that ‘Venus is more massive 
than Mercury’ is such an example, we might apply the first kind of rule in order to give 
us a characterisation o f what the syntactic structure of the sentence might be -  what 
combination of what kinds o f expressions. So we might take certain pointers -  the 
presence of capital letters for instance -  to signal that what we have here is a proper 
name, followed by a relational term, followed by another proper name. But, crucially, we
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apply these rules only conditionally -  we are, as it were, offering a prognosis, and not a
diagnosis. Diamond writes:
[T]he sentence may be taken to be a two-term relational expression completed by 
the proper name ‘Venus’ in the left-hand place and the proper name ‘Mercury’ in 
the right-hand place, but only i f  the thought expressed by the whole sentence is 
that the object ‘Venus’ stands for, whatever that is, has whatever relation it is the 
relational expression stands for to whatever object it is ‘Mercury’ stands for.42
The sentence will have such a syntactic structure only if the thought it expresses does
actually have a form of this kind. And the same is true of the second kind of rule: we
might know, for instance, that ‘Venus’ is sometimes used as a proper name to stand for
the particular object Venus; but again, that will be borne out only if the thought expressed
by the sentence as a whole is a thought asserting of Venus whatever the rest of the
sentence says.
On Diamond’s account, then, we do arrive at the meaning of a sentence 
compositionally, but crucially also conditionally, and because our hypotheses as to what 
the parts of the sentence mean are conditional on what the overall thought expressed by 
the sentence actually is, that process is perfectly compatible with even strong 
contextualism.
Diamond’s account here, then, suggests one way in which Glock’s objection 
might be countered on both an exegetical and a substantial level. I do not want to 
endorse Diamond’s account unconditionally; it seems to me that more needs to be said 
about exactly what these rules look like, how exactly a conditional application of a rule 
differs from an application of a conditional rule, and perhaps too in expressing the
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process in a way that does not beg any questions. That said, however, something like this 
account, one which explains our arriving at the meaning of the whole by way of 
hypotheses about the meanings of the parts, seems to me at least plausible, and also not to 
conflict with the restrictive principle.
Moreover, the force of Glock’s exegetical conclusion here -  that Wittgenstein’s 
compositionalism suggests he did not hold such a restrictive version of contextualism -  is 
further undermined by Glock’s apparent acceptance elsewhere in the same paper that 
Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus hold a restrictive understanding of the context-principle; 
a stance which Glock explains by way of certain features of Wittgenstein’s picture-theory 
of propositions and by Wittgenstein’s extraordinary notion of meaning.43 Thus, Glock 
might be taken to acknowledge that there are, after all, good reasons to attribute to the 
early Wittgenstein a restrictive form of contextualism. Furthermore, and on the same 
kind of ad hominem note, it might be thought to be undermined, too, by Glock’s 
discussion elsewhere o f the Tractatus's compositionalism as forming the ‘implicit 
rationale’ for Wittgenstein’s early restrictive contextualism (even if Glock goes on to say 
that, as a rationale, it is not strong enough to justify the restrictive view) 44 Whatever the 
force of those two points, however, it simply is not the case that restrictive contextualism 
and compositionalism are obviously in conflict, such that one would be forced to abandon 
one or other position; again, if Glock’s point here is to work, more argument is needed.
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VII
I have argued that Glock’s criticisms of the austere view of nonsense, and of the
attribution of that view, at least to the early Wittgenstein, by way of the context-principle,
do not succeed. Some of those arguments -  for instance, against Glock’s way of
presenting the austere view itself, and also the contrast between the forms of
contextualism Glock distinguishes -  apply equally to Glock’s arguments against
attributing the austere view to the later Wittgenstein too. There, Glock claims that
Wittgenstein’s contextualism is far weaker than the version present in the Tractatus’.
[I]n the Investigations Wittgenstein quotes Frege’s restrictive principle with 
approval.... But, with occasional exceptions, Wittgenstein explains the context- 
principle in a non-restrictive way, one that is compatible with the idea that 
individual words can mean something without actually occurring in a 
proposition.... What he insists on is that they must be capable of occurring in 
propositions.45
There, Glock claims, Wittgenstein’s view is that ‘the meaning of a word is determined by 
how it can be used in sentences’, that a word has a meaning if it has a use. And, Glock 
emphasises, ‘[t]here is a difference between having a use in the language and being 
actually used on a particular occasion’.46 Hence, words even in the context of a 
nonsense-sentence can, in that sense, have a meaning.
Glock recognises that ‘New Wittgensteinians’, as he calls them, would deny that 
that is the extent of Wittgenstein’s contextualism in his later work. Thus, the stricture is 
applied once more at the level of sentences (which may consist of only one word), and 
the range of variables making up the relevant context is extended to include the ‘whole 
language-game’, though, as Lars Hertzberg writes, ‘there is no way of determining in 
advance what contextual considerations will be relevant’.47 But what Glock does not
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recognise is that his account o f Wittgenstein’s contextualism and of nonsense is 
susceptible to a similar objection to that put forward by Diamond against Hacker in 
relation to the Tractatus. That is, in order for Glock to make the case for the existence of 
combinatorial nonsense, consisting of prohibited combinations of words, he needs the 
words within a nonsense-sentence to be capable of having meaning in a sense over-and- 
above the sense in which they simply have a use in the language; for it may be the case 
that the words have a use in the language, but are not being used in that way here, in 
some nonsense-sentence, nor in any other way, and in that case their nonsensicality 
would be due not to the meaning they do have, but to their not having any meaning at all 
in this occurrence. So, like Hacker, what Glock needs to supplement his view is either 
the claim that words can have at most one meaning, or a violation-conception of the rules 
for their use, such that any deviation from that would result in nonsense. Both of these 
options are incompatible with linguistic creativity, with the idea that we can give words 
new uses, without laying down in advance the rules governing such uses, and Glock 
provides no evidence for thinking either to be true to Wittgenstein’s later view.
VIII
I have argued, then, that Glock’s objections to the austere view of nonsense, and to its 
ascription to Wittgenstein, early and later, by way of the context-principle, fail for a 
number of reasons. First, Glock’s presentation of the austere view distorts what kind of 
view it is, and in doing so lays down a requirement for a particular kind of justification 
which the austere view need not meet. Further, Glock’s presentation o f the context- 
principle, and of his different versions of it, impose a version of that principle upon the
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austere view that it need not accept. Hence, it seems, Glock’s objections to the austere 
view based on his understanding of the context-principle may not even be relevant to the 
austere view at all. Finally, I have tried to show that even were we to accept Glock’s way 
of presenting the matters at stake, still his arguments against the austere view do not 
succeed -  for instance, because it is not clear that Resolute readers cannot make some 
kind of appeal to a technical notion of meaning in the Tractatus (though such a notion 
will have to be, in some sense, ‘overcome’), or because it is not clear that restrictive 
contextualism and compositionalism are incompatible as Glock suggests. I have also 
wanted to suggest, in the previous section, that Wittgenstein’s later contextualism is not 
at all how Glock suggests, but that even were it so, that would not suffice to establish the 
case for Glock’s understanding o f nonsense there; rather, Glock’s account, like Hacker’s 
must be supplemented with a further idea, and that it is implausible to attribute to later 
Wittgenstein. These points serve to undermine Glock’s arguments for point (2), as laid 
out above (section III), and their substantial counterparts (B) and (C). Without those 
points, and without the mispresentation of the austere view assumed in Glock’s paper, 
Glock’s claim that the austere view lacks independent plausibility ((3) and (D)) is also 
undermined. Hence, Glock’s case against austerity fails.
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Frege’s context-principle is nowhere explicitly adapted by him to his later distinction between sense and 
meaning (Sinn and Bedeutung) and, though the principle does appear in Frege’s later work (i.e. post the 
Sinn/Bedeutung distinction), there is a question-mark over how it might be so adapted and, indeed, over 
whether it can be or should be so adapted. (Much o f  the evidence o f  Frege’s later contextualism -  post- 
Grundlagen and post-‘Sense and Meaning’ -  is compiled in Theo M.V. Janssen, ‘Frege, Contextuality and 
Compositionality’, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (2001), 115-136; see especially 
pp.l25ff.) Wittgenstein not only reformulates the sense and meaning distinction in the Tractatus, but also 
adapts the context-principle to it. Although Tractatus 3.3 talks explicitly o f  names, I do not think it absurd 
to hold that Wittgenstein already in this work is attacking the view that all words function as names for 
entities, just as he does in the opening sections o f  the Philosophical Investigations.
10 See, for instance, Cora Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, in The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, 
Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1995), pp.95-114 (especially 
pp.97-100) -  although this paper o f  Diamond’s is concerned largely with the discussion o f  Frege, it is also 
intended to suggest parallels with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (see p.l 12 and note 7); and James Conant, 
‘Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein’, in The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and 
Rupert Read (London and N ew  York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 174-217 (especially section 5, pp. 189-195).
11 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN on sense’, pp.227-228 and p.229. Since Glock seems to note the point that ‘it is 
individual words rather than whole sentences that have a meaning’ (p.229; similarly, p.226) as though it 
counts against strong contextualism, it might be thought that he associates the latter view with the absurd 
position that the individual words o f  a sentence no more have a meaning than do the individual letters o f a 
word. See also here Michael Dummett, ‘Sense and Tone’, in Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: 
Duckworth, 1973), pp. 1-7 (p.3).
12 So, for instance, Wittgenstein writes in that passage that a proposition ‘is understood by anyone who 
understands its constituents’ (4.024); or that translation between languages proceeds not by translating 
whole propositions ‘but merely by translating the constituents o f  propositions’ (4.025); or that a proposition 
‘must use old expressions to communicate a new sense’ (4.03). See below, pp. 124-125.
13 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN on sense’, p.228. Glock also notes the incompatibility o f  restrictive contextualism 
and compositionalism (in general) as a substantial objection to the restrictive principle (i.e. and not simply 
as an exegetical objection) on pp.226-227.
14 Glock makes this suggestion in ‘All Kinds ofN onsense’, p.228, where he writes as follows: ‘This [the 
compositionalism o f  Tractatus 4.024-4.026] suggests that the early Wittgenstein did not take TLP 3.3 
[Wittgenstein’s Tractarian context-principle] as literally as the proponents o f the austere conception
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suppose, and as they themselves need to do in order to construct the aforementioned argument against 
combinatorial nonsense’. (The argument Glock refers to here is given at the bottom o f p.225 and is cited 
below, p. 116.) Nevertheless, Glock also seems to concede that the early Wittgenstein did hold a restrictive 
view (p.227 and p.228), but argues that that view involves a notion o f meaning incompatible with the aims 
of a Resolute reading. Glock seems to want further to suggest that Wittgenstein was already moving away 
from his restrictive principle in the Tractatus, even if  he had not explicitly resigned it.
15 That objection -  namely, that the austere view o f nonsense is incompatible with Wittgenstein’s later use 
of reductio ad absurdum arguments - 1 address at the end o f  Chapter One above. Similar arguments to 
some o f Glock’s here based around Wittgenstein’s interpretation o f the context-principle are rehearsed by 
Genia Schonbaumsfeld in her paper, ‘Is Wittgenstein’s Ladder Real?’ (unpublished manuscript, presented 
at ‘The Tractatus and Its History’ conference, Stirling, 11.09.2005), specifically in relation to Conant’s 
work on the Tractatus. Like Glock, Schonbaumsfeld claims that if  we take Wittgenstein’s Tractarian 
context-principle ‘absolutely literally’ -  in the way presupposed by Conant’s reading, as implying that 
‘words only have meaning in the context o f  a proposition’, then (1) ‘it just has to be false’; (2) it 
‘contradict[s] the later Wittgenstein’s dictum that the meaning o f  a word is its use in the language’; (3) it 
‘renders superfluous the employment o f  dictionaries’; and (4) it ‘leaves it altogether mysterious how a 
sentence gets to mean anything in the first place’. See Schonbaumsfeld, ‘Is Wittgenstein’s Ladder Real?’, 
pp. 17-20. Much o f  my argument against Glock is also applicable to Schonbaumsfeld’s objections.
16 The latter view, Glock associates with the position he attributes to the later Wittgenstein, and which 
Glock himself endorses, that a word has a meaning if  it is capable o f  occurring in a proposition; if, that is, it 
has a (rule-governed) use in the language.
17 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN on sense’, p.227.
18 It is not entirely clear which version o f  contextualism Glock thinks is to be found in the Tractatus. On 
the one hand, Glock writes o f ‘the early Wittgenstein’s restrictive principle’ (p.227), and explains its 
restrictiveness in terms o f  Wittgenstein early notion o f  meaning, and in terms o f the picture-theory (p.228). 
On the other hand, Glock asserts that the compositionalism o f Tractatus 4.024-4.03 contradicts the 
restrictive principle, suggesting ‘that the early Wittgenstein did not take TLP 3.3 [Wittgenstein’s context- 
principle] as literally as proponents o f  the austere conception suppose’ (p.228). (The purpose o f  the latter 
point may be to suggest that Wittgenstein already in the Tractatus had reasons to be moving towards the 
weak version o f contextualism Glock claims is to be found in the Investigations. A version o f  the point 
also appears as part o f  Glock’s substantial case against austerity (pp.226-7).) Glock’s argument (above) 
covers both eventualities.
19 The view that nonsense is only ever a result o f  our failure to give to words (in such a context and to date) 
a meaning.
20 Again, in the sense that they have a use in the language, even if  they are on such occasions being 
misused, and so cannot be said to have, or stand for, a meaning.
21 The view that there are no logically distinct kinds o f  nonsense.
22 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN onsense’, p.222 and p.237.
23 Nevertheless, there is some confusion about the sense o f  conflict between those two views in Glock. In 
that same paper (‘All Kinds ofN on sense’), for instance, Glock describes restrictive contextualism as the 
‘flipside’ o f compositionalism: ‘The flipside o f this compositionalism is that the role o f  names is to 
contribute to the determination o f  the sense o f  an elementary proposition. Outside that context, 
Wittgenstein seems to have held, they cannot have such a role’ (p.227). Likewise, elsewhere Glock refers 
to compositionalism as forming the ‘implicit rationale’ behind strong contextualism, even if, as Glock goes 
on to say, as such a rationale, it proves insufficient (A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 
p.87).
24 The suggestion that Glock treats the austere view as itself amounting to a substantial philosophical 
position is also made by William H. Brenner in his review o f the collection in which Glock’s paper appears. 
Brenner writes: ‘I believe that Glock’s criticisms o f  Diamond depend on ascribing to her some special, 
draconian notion o f  nonsensicality, over and above the ordinary notion o f having failed to say anything’. 
Brenner, ‘Review o f  Wittgenstein and Scepticism (ed. Denis McManus) and Wittgenstein at Work (ed.
Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer’, Philosophical Investigations, 2005, 375-380 (p.380).
25 That, however, is not to say that that fact is not worth emphasising, nor that the view itself is not worth 
defending, precisely because, and in spite o f  its apparent triviality, it is nevertheless very often the case that 
it is assumed that nonsense can be more substantial than that, and for a variety o f  purposes. Moreover, that
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acknowledgement brings the view into line with what the later Wittgenstein has to say about what 
philosophy does result in, or consist o f  (PI §§126-128).
26 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN onsense’, p.225.
27 Rupert Read, ‘What “There Can Be No Such Thing As Meaning Anything By Any Word” Could 
Possibly Mean’, in The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000), pp.74-82 (p.77).
28 Thus, the rhetorical role played by Glock’s argument (cited above, p.9) is crucial; it is the construction of 
that argument on behalf o f  the austere view that makes it seem as if  the restrictive view is what is required 
when in fact nothing nearly so strong is.
29 See above, note 8.
30 Cora Diamond, ‘Frege and Nonsense’, in The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1995), pp.73-93 (p.80).
31 That might seem like little consolation, since Frege’s later view here is widely regarded as false, as a 
retrograde step. My point here, however, is just that Diamond clearly does not think that the austere view  
of nonsense must deny that words can be used meaningfully outside propositions, and so need not take 
Glock’s strong, restrictive view. Rather, austerity only rejects certain ways -  such as Glock’s -  o f  cashing 
out the idea that words can have meanings in contexts other than their immediate use in propositions.
32 Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, p. 109. O f course, were Diamond talking o f  the early Wittgenstein 
here that use o f the word ‘senseless’ might be misleading, given the distinction between ‘senseless’ and 
‘nonsense’. See Introduction, p.3.
33 Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, p .109. See also Diamond, ‘Frege and Nonsense’, p.79 and p.81.
34 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN on sense’, p.226.
35 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN onsense’, p.226. Again, Glock goes on to note that a further reason for thinking 
the restrictive principle wrong is that it clashes with compositionalism; I discuss this below, section VI.
36 Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, p.98. (Note, by the way, the appeal Diamond makes here to 
(some form of) compositionalism in her explanation o f  (some form of) contextualism.)
37 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN onsense’, p.227.
38 One reason for thinking that might be this: that there would then be no such thing as recognising the 
occurrence o f a sign -  such as ‘meaning’ -  as a logical element at all, as one symbol rather than another. 
That is correct, but it ignores the idea -  central to Wittgenstein’s work -  that we very often do, in practicing 
philosophy, imagine ourselves to make sense, imagine our words to make sense, where in fact we, and they, 
make none: our use o f  words can have all the appearance to us o f making sense when all along we are 
failing to say anything. What Glock ignores is just the idea that Wittgenstein’s words might be written with 
the intention that they induce in the reader the illusion that they are being put to some, technical use, but 
that they fall apart when we tiy to make sense o f  them from the inside as it were. An apparently technical 
notion o f meaning might be utilised in this way, and may bring us to an understanding o f  nonsense as not 
consisting o f  words with meaning. But abandoning the idea that there was any sense behind those remarks 
would leave us not abandoning the austere view too, since that view follows not from a theory o f  sense or 
meaning, but from the rejection o f  such a theory.
39 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN onsense’, p.228 and p.226.
40 Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, p. 109.
41 Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, p.109.
42 Diamond, ‘What Nonsense Might B e’, p .l 10.
43 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN on sense’, pp.227-8.
44 Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, p.87.
45 Glock, ‘All Kinds ofN on sense’, p.229.
46 Glock, ‘AH Kinds ofN on sense’, p.229.
47 Lars Hertzberg, ‘The Sense is Where You Find It’, p.6. Available at:
http://www.abo.fi/fak/hf7filosofi/Staff/lhertzbe/The_Sense_Is_Where_You_Find_It.doc Accessed: 
02.03.2005. (NB. This quotation is taken from a passage omitted from the version published in 
Wittgenstein in America, ed. Timothy McCarthy and Sean C. Stidd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).)
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Chapter Four 
Austerity and Ineffability
A Reply to Adrian Moore1
/
The previous chapter was concerned with a number of substantial objections to the 
austere view of nonsense, and to its ascription to Wittgenstein, early and later. In this 
chapter, I shall want to turn to address a different kind of objection, focussing instead on 
the role of austerity within New or Resolute readings of the Tractatus. Two views are 
central to such readings: first, that Wittgenstein did not hold that there is such a thing as 
ineffable insight and nor did he hold that such insights are what it is the purpose of 
Tractarian nonsense to communicate;2 second, that Wittgenstein did not hold that his 
propositions there in the Tractatus are nonsense as a result of their failure to meet certain 
criteria or others laid down either in the Tractatus in those self-same nonsensical 
propositions or elsewhere. A corollary of that second feature, of course, is that 
Wittgenstein held instead to an austere view of nonsense, such that nonsense results only 
when we fail to give to our words a meaning, and not for any reason more philosophically 
substantial than that.3
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Adrian Moore, in his paper ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, presents an argument 
which seems to show that the austere view of nonsense in fact involves a commitment to 
the existence of ineffable understanding (or insight) and so that these two core or defining 
features of the Resolute program are in conflict.4 That would not exactly amount to a 
criticism of austerity, and in fact Moore himself clearly subscribes to such a view of 
nonsense and, furthermore, attributes such a view to Wittgenstein too.5 But such an 
argument would nevertheless have force against a raft of views typically held by New or 
Resolute readers and would present a substantial obstacle to the Resolute program.
Against such an argument, then, I argue in this chapter that the austere view is 
compatible with the general rejection of the very idea of ineffable insight (of any kind). 
Sections II  to V outline Moore’s argument and develop a response to it; and sections VIto 
VIII then apply part o f my response in reply to a similar objection to the austere view 
made by Ben Vilhauer, and focussing especially on part of Cora Diamond’s attempt to 
carry through the Resolute program.6 Before I turn to outlining what I shall call ‘Moore’s 
argument’, however, I need first to note one qualification. Although Moore develops the 
argument I rehearse below, it would be wrong to take Moore himself to endorse the 
argument, at least in relation to the kind of example I use below. Rather, for Moore, it is 
only when it comes to a particular ‘family’ of illusions of sense -  those of transcendental 
idealism7 -  that austerity commits us to ineffable understanding, and so not in relation to 
the kind of fairly pedestrian illusion of sense with which both Moore and I develop the 
argument. There may be reasons for thinking Moore to be more committed to the
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applicability of the argument beyond simply the case posed by transcendental idealism 
than he himself says; I shall not speculate on those reasons here.8 Even so, however, that 
argument is worth considering in its own right, and independently of Moore’s committing 
to it. I call the argument ‘Moore’s argument’ since Moore develops it, and not because I 
take him (in general or in an unqualified sense) to be committed to it.
II
On the austere view, all nonsense, logically speaking, is pure gibberish; there is no such 
thing as nonsense that results from the meanings of the words so combined. How could 
this view be thought to involve a commitment to ineffable understanding? Moore’s 
argument centers on the understanding involved in recognising that a given sentence is 
nonsense. In brief, the point is this: that our understanding that any particular string of 
words is nonsense will always depend upon a prior understanding -  understanding, say, 
of how not to use concepts9 -  that, on the austere view, will be inexpressible. Hence, 
followers of the austere view ought, if they are to be consistent, also to adhere to the 
existence of some kind o f ineffable understanding. This does not mean that we must 
reject the austere view o f nonsense out of hand; there is still a clear sense in which 
austerity is correct.10 Nevertheless, however, the argument, if correct, will have serious 
implications for austerity’s usefulness for New interpretations of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, since the novelty o f such interpretations depends in large part upon their 
opposition to the notion o f ineffability. The consequence of such an argument, then, will 
be not that austerity must be abandoned in general, but that, insofar as they do want to
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oppose any notion o f ineffability (and not just, say, the notion of ineffable truths), it must 
be abandoned by New readings.11
Moore’s argument runs as follows. On the austere view, nonsense ‘is only ever
sheer lack of sense’ -  though it may not always seem like it -  and the judgement that a
particular string o f words is nonsense ‘is always a judgement about the actual history, to
date, of some particular sign’.12 Such a judgement, that is, on the austere view, will
always be ‘empirical’ -  arrived at by observing the signs in use - ,  ‘provisional’ -  since
the fact that the signs have no use in this context does not preclude their being assigned a
meaning in the future - ,  and ‘metalinguistic’ -  the judgement is always about the signs
themselves, that no meaning has been attributed to them here. Thus, the judgement that a
certain string of signs is nonsense can, on the austere view, only be expressed by
mentioning, not using, those signs; the judgement is about the signs themselves, not any
concepts lying behind them since, if  they are meaningless, no concepts lie behind them at
all. So, for instance, Diamond writes:
[I]f you cannot make sense o f the sentence ‘God is three persons’ then you can 
say that Smith uttered the words ‘God is three persons’ and you can say that he 
uttered them with the intonation of asserting something, but you cannot say of 
him that he said that God is three persons. ‘Smith said that p ’ is itself nonsense 
unless what we put for ‘p ’ makes sense.13
For austerity then, the judgement that, say, the string of signs ‘a is F ’ is nonsense, should
be expressed as follows: ‘No meaning has so far been given to “a is F”.’
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Illusions of sense, however, Moore notes, have varying degrees of force, varying
degrees of hold over us; we are more prone to some, more inclined to take some for sense
than we are others, and more effort is required to rid us of some than of others too:
Some illusions o f sense are very superficial indeed (‘The square root of 2 is 
green’); some, a bit deeper (‘It is five o’clock on the sun’); some, deep enough 
that a little reflection is needed to carry conviction that they are illusions of sense 
at all (‘It is five o ’clock at the North Pole’); some, so deep that it can be a matter 
of unresolved controversy whether that is what they are (‘I have performed 
infinitely many tasks’).14
What this suggests, however, is that the judgement that some string of words is nonsense
‘is sometimes arrived at by reflection on concepts’ and, if this is the case, then that
judgement, contra austerity, is not simply empirical, provisional and metalinguistic.15 In
fact, far from it: in order to judge that no game is played with the signs in which the
sentence in question counts as a legal move, we must first reflect upon each game in
which those signs do feature. So, for instance, for a sentence ‘S’, consisting of the signs
‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z ’, we need to judge, for example, that (i) in game A, played with x, S is not
a legal move; and (ii) in game B, played with y, S is not a legal move; and so on for each
game in which ‘x ’, ‘y’, or ‘z’ feature, until judging (n) no other game is played with these
signs.16
While this last, along with our conclusion (that as yet no meaning has been given 
to the signs), does report a brute matter of fact, and does qualify as empirical, provisional 
and metalinguistic, the others (i, ii, and so on) do not. On the contrary, such judgements 
are carried out at the level of concepts and are therefore judgements which, Moore 
suggests, are properly expressed ‘by using, not mentioning, the corresponding signs’,17 
and so, for instance, in a sentence such as the following: ‘There is no such thing as its
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being five o’clock at the North Pole’.18 But if that is the case then the understanding or 
judgements in question will, on the austere view, prove ineffable since, in order to be 
used, the signs must be embedded (play a logical role) in a sentence that does make sense 
and that, if they are meaningless, is precisely what cannot be done.
This argument does not amount to a criticism of austerity; it does not imply that 
austerity should be rejected. In fact, the claim that some string of signs is nonsense is, as 
Moore notes, ‘always empirical, provisional, and metalinguistic’.19 But such a claim 
presupposes a prior judgement (or judgements) that is about the concepts involved -  the 
concepts, for Moore, that the utterer of nonsense intends to invoke20 -  and so is neither 
empirical, nor provisional, nor metalinguistic. ‘Reflection on those concepts’, Moore 
writes, ‘is required to recognise the illusions as illusions’ but, furthermore, he continues, 
‘reflection on those concepts is required to recognise that, at least as far as they go, no 
meaning has so far been given to these signs’ 21 The challenge to New interpreters of the 
Tractatus, and to the Resolute program in general, that the argument presents, then, is to 
explain why their commitment to austerity does not also commit them, in the way 
suggested, to some notion o f ineffability.
I ll
How, then, might New readers defend their use of austerity against such a challenge? 
There are, I think, a number o f ways to contest the point. One way would be to claim that 
it simply is not most appropriate to use rather than mention the signs; that the 
understanding is, after all, adequately captured by the sentence ‘No meaning has so far
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been given to “It is five o’clock at the North Pole”.’ Something like this objection is
clearly what Moore has in mind when he imagines the following response:
Someone might say, ‘This is all very well. But you have still not explained how it 
can be appropriate to express such recognition -  the recognition that something is 
a mere illusion o f sense -  by using, rather than mentioning, the relevant signs. 
Why is it not just as nonsensical to say, “There is no such thing as its being five 
o’clock at the North Pole” as it would be to say, “There is no such things as its
99being frumptiliously quirxaceous”?’
Moore’s own response to this is interesting for its similarities to certain remarks of 
Diamond’s, though, as Moore notes, ‘Diamond does not herself talk in terms of ineffable 
understanding’.23 Should she talk in terms of ineffable understanding? Is it best to use 
rather than mention the relevant signs?
One reason for answering ‘no’ to both of these questions is that, for Diamond, the 
reflection involved in arriving at the judgement that, as Moore puts it, as far as these 
concepts go, no meaning has been given to the signs, might be purely psychological 
since, for Diamond, one o f the things Wittgenstein inherits from Frege is a narrow, 
objective conception of what counts as a thought. From that perspective, the reflection 
on concepts involved in judging that a sentence is nonsense just doesn’t count and so is 
not best expressed by using the signs in the context of a sentence that attempts to pass 
itself off as a thought. Instead, as a purely psychological process, it is perfectly 
adequately expressed by simply mentioning the signs. Only if the judgement constituted 
a genuine thought would the use of the signs be a requirement for its expression.
Against this, however, the force of Moore’s argument seems to lie precisely in his 
having shown that reflection on concepts is required -  in all but cases of the most obvious
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gibberish, cases where there just are no relevant concepts (however exactly what is 
‘relevant’ might be determined here) that might be substituted for the signs -  in order to 
determine that a nonsense-sentence is nonsense. Thus, Moore’s argument might be taken 
to show that even if this reflection is a psychological process, still what it is a reflection 
on must be the concept itself, its logical role, since otherwise we would not be able to 
arrive at the judgement we need to arrive at prior to concluding that a given sentence is 
nonsense; we would not, that is, be able to judge, for any given concepts, that as far as 
they go, no meaning has been given to the signs. If Moore can correctly be taken to have 
shown this much, then if  this reflection on concepts is purely psychological it must be 
possible for there to be a logical component of a psychological process and, as a result, 
what would be required for the expression of this judgement would still be, as Moore 
says, a use not a mention of the corresponding signs.
Indeed, it seems hard to deny that using the relevant signs and not merely 
mentioning them would be not simply more appropriate, but necessary for any expression 
of the judgement in question. If we simply mention the signs (as in the sentence ‘No 
meaning has so far been given to “a is F’” ), we express the empirical, provisional and 
metalinguistic judgement that the signs, for the time being at least, have been given no 
meaning. But that is simply a different, more general judgement than the one that we 
want to express: namely, the judgement that, for a given pair of concepts (rather than for 
any given pairs of concepts, o f all those that the signs call to mind), those same concepts 
do not stretch to fit the case in hand. The expression of that judgement, as opposed to the
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metalinguistic one, requires that we use the signs in order to establish which concepts it is 
that we are making a judgement about.
So it seems, then, as if  it is indeed best to use rather than mention the relevant 
signs, and from that it seems to follow that this judgement will, at least from the point of 
view of austerity, prove ineffable. There is, however, a way of accepting this first point 
without accepting the second. There is, in other words, a way of accepting that it is best 
to use not mention the relevant signs, but without contradicting either the austere view of 
nonsense or the context principle, and also without committing oneself to the existence of 
ineffable understanding or judgements. Thus, were we to replace Moore’s sentence 
(‘There is no such thing as its being five o’clock at the North Pole’) which uses (or 
attempts to) the signs and (so) is undeniably nonsense, with the following sentence -  one 
that does not simply mention the signs but engages with the concepts behind them and yet 
is not, on the austere view, nonsense -  there would be no trouble of the kind Moore’s 
argument suggests:
There is no such thing as meaningfully saying, “It is five o’clock at the North 
Pole” and (i) meaning by “five o’clock” what you ordinarily would in arranging to 
meet someone in a particular place at five o’clock, and also (ii) meaning by “the 
North Pole” what you ordinarily would in saying that the North Pole is that Pole 
which was first reached by Wally Herbert.
The judgement, so expressed, would be effable and not, at least on the austere view,
nonsense. It asserts that, in the nonsense-sentence, the signs -  however else they may be
being used -  are not being used to express these concepts. All that is required for the
example to work is that there be a recognisable similarity of sign (and not of symbol)
between the genuine use o f the sign and its occurrence in the nonsense-sentence.24 Given
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that basic similarity, it is possible to assert the key difference that in one case the sign is 
being used to express this concept and in the other, however else it may be being used, it 
is not being used to express the same concept. Thus, the sentence clearly expresses the 
particular judgement that we want -  and not simply the empirical, provisional and 
metalinguistic judgement that Moore elsewhere refers to -  since it does engage with the 
relevant concepts; it says of these particular concepts that, as far as they go, no meaning 
has been given to the signs ‘It is five o ’clock at the North Pole’. Since the sentence 
requires only a recognisable similarity between the sign’s two occurrences, between its 
use and its occurrence in the nonsense-sentence, the expression is perfectly compatible 
with austerity.
IV
For austerity, then, there is a perfectly adequate means of expressing the judgement. The 
reformulated sentence shows that even if Moore is correct (exegetically or otherwise) and 
Diamond wrong in counting this a purely psychological process, still the judgement is not 
ineffable.
The sentence with which Moore illustrates his argument -  ‘There is no such thing 
as its being five o ’clock at the North Pole’ -  is not, then, the most appropriate attempt to 
express the judgement, but it might still be the best expression in that it might be 
understood as a kind o f shorthand for the longer, more wordy and awkward expression 
outlined above. In this way, then, we might, as Moore seems to want to, be able to ‘make 
room for the straightforward truth of an assertion of “Henry thinks that it is five o’clock
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at the North Pole’” .25 Such a statement might be understood as simply shorthand for the 
following:26
Henry thinks that there is such a thing as meaningfully saying, “It is five o’clock 
at the North Pole” and (i) meaning by the words “five o’clock” what one 
ordinarily means when arranging to meet someone in a particular place at five 
o’clock, and also (ii) meaning by “the North Pole” what one ordinarily does when 
using those signs in talking about the Pole that Wally Herbert was the first to 
reach.
Whether or not Moore’s version of the sentence may indeed be substituted for this longer 
sentence, however, the latter shows that austerity can offer a plausible way of 
empathising with the utterer o f nonsense as suffering from a particular illusion of sense 
rather than simply from some, not further specifiable, illusion. The purely psychological 
sense of understanding open to austerity’s followers does indeed go deep enough into the 
illusion; it is capable of distinguishing one illusion from the next. It is capable of 
expressing that the particular illusion that Henry is suffering from is one in which, when 
he utters the words ‘It is five o ’clock at the North Pole’, he imagines himself to be 
employing in his utterance o f the signs ‘five o’clock’ and ‘the North Pole’ the very 
concepts that those same signs actually do express when used, for instance, in arranging 
to meet at five o ’clock and in talking about the North Pole. What it will not do, of 
course, is let you into that illusion in the way that Henry himself inhabits it, or is gripped 
by it. It will not, that is, let you see it from the inside, as it were. Something more is 
required for that. But it does provide the austere view with a perfectly adequate means by 
which to distinguish between illusions of sense, and to specify an illusion as being that 
illusion in particular: e.g. the illusion of employing those concepts by means of that 
combination of signs. It is not at all clear that any more than this is needed.27
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New readings o f the Tractatus can, then, meet the challenge presented by Moore’s 
argument, and without having recourse to ineffable understanding: if  not simply because 
they operate with a different notion of what a thought is, then because, regardless of 
which conception is being used, there still is an adequate means of expressing the 
judgement or understanding in question. Thus, the austere view of nonsense does not 
involve, as Moore might be taken to suggest it does, a commitment to the existence of 
ineffable understanding. Nor does austerity prevent us from differentiating between 
illusions of sense, or from specifying which illusion in particular someone is labouring 
under. None of this is to say that austerity is incompatible with ineffability;28 only one 
way of taking that idea -  as meaning ineffable truths -  is specifically ruled out by the 
austere view of nonsense. All I have been concerned to show here is that the animosity 
towards any notion o f ineffability often displayed by New readers of the Tractatus is not 
in contradiction with what may be thought to be the one unifying principle of such 
readings: the austere view o f nonsense.
VI
In the previous sections, then, I hope to have established that the two basic features of the 
Resolute program are not, contrary to the suggestion of Moore’s argument, in 
contradiction with one another; New readers can meet the challenge Moore’s argument 
presents.29 In this section and the following ones, I want to put part of my argument 
against Moore’s to work in response to a different criticism; in particular, I want to show 
how this way of expressing what is involved in coming to see that a sentence is nonsense,
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developed in response to Moore, can be instrumental too in deflecting a criticism made 
by Ben Vilhauer. Vilhauer’s objection focusses on Cora Diamond’s account of 
elucidation in the Tractatus, and that account, Vilhauer thinks, reveals ‘a tension in 
Diamond’s account o f nonsense’.30 I first outline (two different parts to) Vilhauer’s 
objection and then argue that there is no such tension.
Vilhauer actually identifies two separate, though related, areas of conflict in 
Diamond’s account, the first o f which has much in common with Moore’s criticism. 
Vilhauer’s criticisms focus on Diamond’s ability to accommodate, within her austere 
conception of nonsense, Wittgenstein’s notion of elucidation. That is, for Vilhauer, 
certain remarks of Diamond’s on Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics make use of a notion 
of elucidation that is incompatible with the austere view of nonsense. This way of 
describing the focus o f Vilhauer’s critique might make it seem to be more a tension 
between two separate areas o f Diamond’s reading of the Tractatus -  between her account 
of nonsense and her account o f elucidation and of ethics. It is, however, a tension 
specifically within Diamond’s account of nonsense insofar as both Diamond’s account of 
ethics and Wittgenstein’s remarks on elucidation make it a requirement that nonsense be 
capable of functioning as an elucidation. It is, for instance, Wittgenstein’s elucidatory 
propositions that, at Tractatus 6.54, he declares to be nonsense.
What, then, is this notion of ‘elucidation’? Wittgenstein gives us some idea, 
Vilhauer notes, in some central remarks in the Tractatus on philosophy (remarks which, 
incidentally, might be thought to be part o f the ‘frame’ of the Tractatus on Diamond’s
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reading and so should, perhaps, be treated as straightforwardly senseful remarks, and not 
as nonsense31). Thus, Wittgenstein writes that ‘Philosophy aims at the logical 
clarification of thoughts’ and that ‘A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations’ (TLP 4.112). For Vilhauer, this is enough to conclude that ‘we can 
understand elucidation as the logical clarification of thought’.32 This may be rather brief 
(as well as, perhaps, being a little quick) but, for Vilhauer, even this minimal explanation 
of elucidation is enough to give cause for concern about Diamond’s account of nonsense. 
It is, Vilhauer thinks, hard to see how Diamond’s account of nonsense could find room 
for this understanding of elucidation. If nonsense is, as it is for Diamond, only ever plain 
nonsense -  no better or worse than ‘piggly wiggle tiggle’ -  then how could it, Vilhauer 
asks, ‘yield logical clarification of thoughts’?33
Vilhauer develops this initial suspicion by way of certain of Diamond’s remarks 
on the ethical point of the Tractatus and focusing on two aspects of Diamond’s account 
of nonsense. First, that ‘in a nonsense-sentence, there are no [logical] elements because 
there is no sensical proposition to have [logical] elements’.34 This, Vilhauer notes, is a 
consequence o f Diamond’s strict interpretation of Wittgenstein’s adoption of Frege’s 
context-principle. Second, that a nonsense-sentence, being nonsense, ‘cannot appear as 
a logical element of a sensical sentence’.36 This, for instance, is the point of Diamond’s 
remark that ‘ “Smith said that p” is itself nonsense unless what we put for “p” makes 
sense’.37
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For Vilhauer, these two elements of the austere view of nonsense conflict directly
with Diamond’s illustrations of two stages in her account of elucidation.38 These two
stages, as Vilhauer sees them, are as follows:
The first stage is becoming conscious of the fact that some of the things we say, 
especially when doing philosophy, are nonsense. This step involves coming to 
criticize nonsense’s nonsensicality. The second step is allowing ourselves to 
continue making our nonsensical utterances, but making them in a way that 
manifests our consciousness of their nonsensicality.39
For Vilhauer, these two stages conflict respectively with the two aspects of Diamond’s
view of nonsense outlined above. When Diamond criticises the nonsensicality of
nonsense, Vilhauer thinks, she treats nonsense-sentences as though they can and do have
logical elements. And when Diamond attempts to make nonsensical utterances in a way
that manifests her consciousness of their nonsensicality, for Vilhauer, she treats
nonsense-sentences as though they can be logical elements in senseful sentences. Against
this, my argument against Moore can, I think, show that in the first instance Diamond
does not (and does not have to) treat nonsense-sentences as having logical elements.
Other arguments, however, will be needed against the second.
VII
Vilhauer’s first criticism runs as follows. If, on the austere view of nonsense, a nonsense- 
sentence cannot have a logical element, then that view will have the following 
consequence:
[T]here is no way of equating the words in a nonsense-sentence with those same 
words as they appear in sensical sentences, and explaining that the nonsense- 
sentence is nonsense because if the words it contains are to yield sense, they must 
play the roles they play in the sensical sentences of which they are elements.40
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That point is actually two: there is no way of logically equating the words and so there is 
no way of explaining the nonsense of the one in terms of the sense of the other. These 
consequences, Vilhauer explains, put Diamond’s account of nonsense at odds with certain 
other remarks Diamond makes about ethics and which, for Vilhauer, exhibit the first 
stage in Diamond’s understanding of ‘elucidation’.
Diamond’s attempts to articulate the ethical point of Wittgenstein’s writing
involve repeated use of the phrase ‘attitude to life’ or ‘attitude to the world as a whole’
but, as Diamond herself notes, such phrases are problematic:
[M]y own phrases -  ‘attitude to life’, ‘attitude to the world as a whole’ -  are 
curious ones. An attitude is an attitude to something or other: to a person, or 
something else in the world; or to things being this way rather than that, as I may 
be disappointed or pleased by something’s having turned out as it has. The phrase 
‘attitude to the world as a whole’ is not only curious, but from the point of view of 
the Tractatus anyway, mere nonsense. If I am using a phrase which is simply 
nonsense in supposedly articulating Wittgenstein’s views, what can I think I am 
achieving?41
Vilhauer is less interested in Diamond’s answer to this question than in the self-criticism 
that prompts it, and in what that shows about the first stage in her account of elucidation: 
criticising the nonsensicality of nonsense. ‘If nonsense-sentences have no logical 
elements’, Vilhauer writes, ‘then nonsense-sentences cannot have any [logical] elements 
in common with sensical sentences’.42 But if this is the case, Vilhauer continues, ‘then 
studying the roles played by logical elements in sensical sentences should have no role in 
the criticism of nonsense’. Here, however, according to Vilhauer, Diamond’s criticism of 
her own remarks proceeds exactly as if it could play a role, and so as if there were a 
‘logical relationship’ between the sign as it appears in a nonsense-sentence and as it 
appears in a senseful sentence:
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When she explains the nonsensicality of the phrase ‘attitude to the world as a 
whole’, her explanation appears to be grounded in the role of the word ‘attitude’ 
as a logical element in the sensical sentences in which it appears. In other words, 
she seems to be saying that ‘attitude to the world’ is nonsense because of the role 
attitude must play if it is to yield sense.43
This, Vilhauer continues, were it the case, would be obviously incompatible with the
austere view of nonsense. It is, he writes, ‘exactly what her account rules out’.
Vilhauer proceeds to note two possible objections to his criticism. The first is an 
objection to his way of describing what is going on in Diamond’s self-criticism; that he 
appears to be playing a little fast and loose with Diamond’s account in attributing to her a 
causal link between the senseful and the nonsensical occurrences o f the sign ‘attitude’. 
That is, Vilhauer is aware that his insertion of the word ‘because’ in his description of 
Diamond’s view (above) is prejudicial since no such link between the role of the word 
‘attitude’ as it occurs in genuine sentences and as it occurs in nonsense-sentences is 
explicitly asserted by Diamond. Nevertheless, Vilhauer thinks, it is implicit in her 
remarks:
[Wjhether or not Diamond explicitly states a logical connection between ‘attitude’ 
in the nonsense-sentence and ‘attitude’ as a logical element, the logical 
connection is clearly implied by adverting to ‘attitude’ as a logical element in the 
process o f criticizing ‘attitude’ as nonsense.44
For Vilhauer, then, there is a more-or-less tacit appeal to a causal connection of some
kind in Diamond’s explaining that her attempts to articulate Wittgenstein’s view of ethics
fall into nonsense, and why they do so; an explanation that is ruled out by her account of
nonsense.
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Against this, I do not think that Diamond need imply nor does imply any logical 
relationship between the two occurrences of the word ‘attitude’; nor need she or does she 
imply that a nonsense-sentence can, after all, have a logical element. Before I say why, 
however, I want to consider the second objection to his criticism that Vilhauer imagines 
and draw out the similarities between (what I have been calling) Moore’s argument and 
Vilhauer’s, similarities that may perhaps not be evident when focusing on this one 
specific instance. Vilhauer’s second imagined objection, then, is this: ‘how can we 
criticize nonsense at all, without saying the kind of things Diamond says about 
“attitude”?’45 It is, he replies, a good question, but one which gives us reason to be 
concerned about Diamond’s general account of nonsense. Vilhauer, then, is suggesting 
that Diamond’s account o f nonsense leaves us with no means of criticising nonsense as 
nonsense at all, since for that we seem to need to be able to treat nonsense-sentences as 
having logical elements. Just as for Moore we seem to need to be able to reflect on the 
ordinary concepts o f ‘five o’clock’ and of ‘the North Pole’ in coming to see that ‘It is five 
o’clock at the North Pole’ is nonsense, for Vilhauer, to criticise nonsense as nonsense, 
and to say why it is nonsense, we need to treat signs appearing in nonsense-sentences as 
logical elements standing in logical relationships to signs in other, senseful sentences. 
And indeed, like Moore, Vilhauer might suggest, though he does not, that this could call 
into question the effability o f our critique of nonsense and so the compatibility of ‘New’ 
interpretations’ opposition to ineffability and their reliance on austerity, rather than 
simply casting doubt on austerity itself.
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If Vilhauer’s criticism shares a similarity with Moore’s argument, however, it also
shares a susceptibility to the same objection. Vilhauer’s insertion of a causal link into his
description o f Diamond’s account o f the nonsensicality of her phrase is disingenuous
because there need be no such logical relationship between the two signs for Diamond’s
account to work. When Diamond discusses the role ‘attitude’ plays in ordinary
sentences, we can say o f this the sort o f things Moore says in discussing the sentence ‘It
is five o’clock at the North Pole’. For Moore, the rules of language ‘can proscribe as well
as prescribe’, but they do so only, he says, ‘by default’. Diamond, then, in describing the
role of ‘attitude’ as always being ‘an attitude to something or other: to a person, or
something else in the world’46 is, o f course, ruling things out as well as in. As far as what
she says goes, we might say, no meaning attaches to the phrase ‘attitude to the world as a
whole’. This judgement we might express as follows:
There is no such thing as uttering the phrase, ‘attitude to the world as a whole’ 
and meaning by the word ‘attitude’ what one ordinarily means when talking about 
one’s being disappointed or pleased at how something has turned out, and also 
meaning by ‘the world as a whole’ not some thing in particular, but everything.
Again, as above, there is no need to recognise in the nonsense-sentence a logical element;
all that is required is a recognisable similarity of sign. We can say that as far as these
concepts go, no meaning has been given to the signs, without saying that it is because of
the meaning the signs do have that the sentence is nonsense. If we can take this to make
clear the psychological process involved in criticising or recognising that something is
nonsense, this makes plain that nonsense-sentences need not be capable of having logical
elements for it to be possible to criticise them as nonsense. It is, perhaps, Vilhauer’s
readiness to assume that if  two sentences do not have a logical element in common then
they can have no element in common at all, that leads him to overlook the possibility of
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comparison offered by the repetition o f signs and so the judgement that, as far as these 
concepts go, no meaning has been given to those signs.
VIII
This first tension is, then, I think, no tension at all. Vilhauer’s second objection is that the 
second stage in Diamond’s account o f elucidation commits her to holding, contra 
austerity, that nonsense-sentences can themselves be logical elements in senseful 
sentences. The second stage in Diamond’s account of elucidation involves continuing to 
use and utter nonsense, but ‘with an awareness of its nonsensicality’.47 This, Diamond 
thinks, is part o f the method o f the Tractatus; it employs nonsense-sentences, but does so 
self-consciously and Wittgenstein frames this nonsense with other remarks (such as TLP 
6.54) that indicate how he himself views those elucidatory remarks. Diamond illustrates 
this as follows:
If I say ‘I am inclined to say that the letter e is green’, I frame the sentence by 
putting at the beginning words that may in a particular context indicate that I do 
not regard the sentence ‘e is green’ as sense. Note how this differs from ‘I should 
like to believe that Vitamin C prevents colds’. The framing words there are 
entirely consistent with the sentence ‘Vitamin C prevent colds’ being good sense. 
But ‘I am inclined to say that e is green’ may be meant to distance the speaker 
from any commitment to the sensefulness of saying ‘The letter e is green’.48
What is wrong with this, Vilhauer notes, is that ‘a sentence that has nonsense as a part is
nonsense as a whole’49 and so the framing device ‘I am inclined to say’, when prefixed to
a nonsense-sentence as above, will itself be nonsense and therefore bears no logical
relationship at all to those same signs as they appear in a senseful sentence. ‘So how’,
Vilhauer asks, ‘can “I am inclined to say” in a nonsense-sentence “indicate” anything at
all?’50
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Diamond’s chosen means o f expression here is, Vilhauer is right, not overly
cautious, but two things can nevertheless be said in her defence. First, we should beware
the extent of the criticism. While it may be a sound objection to Diamond’s mode of
illustrating her point, that is as far as it does go. Though the notion of the frame, and in
particular which remarks are and which are not parts of the frame, is in dire need of
further specification (see below, note 31), still those remarks which most obviously fulfil
this function do not take the form o f Diamond’s illustration. They do not, that is, attempt
to include the frame and the nonsense within the same sentence; rather, the framing
sentences occur as separate sentences and so do not require that nonsense-sentences be
capable of functioning as logical elements within them. Such remarks as ‘this book is not
a textbook’ (TLP Preface), ‘Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity’ {TLP
4.112) and Tractatus 6.54 are not susceptible to Vilhauer’s objection and so neither is
Diamond’s general account o f Tractarian elucidation. But a way of rescuing Diamond’s
remarks may be possible too. I suggested earlier that we might make room for the
assertion of ‘Henry thinks that it is five o’clock at the North Pole’ by considering it to be
a kind of shorthand for a longer form of expression that is compatible with austerity.
Something similar might be possible here. That is, you may express your understanding
of an illusion that still has some hold over you, or may continue to use nonsense in a self-
conscious way as follows:
I am inclined to say or I feel I need to be able to say ‘the letter e is green’ and 
mean by ‘the letter e ’ the letter that features twice in the word ‘green’, and also 
mean by ‘green’ what one ordinarily does in a sentence such as ‘Grass is green’.
Chapter Four 157
Austerity and Ineffability
It may be that Diamond’s version could then be considered a kind of shorthand for this 
means of expression. Either way, however, her account of Tractarian elucidation in 
general is quite compatible with the demands of austerity. Vilhauer’s second tension is, 
then, at best, too local to be worth troubling over.
IX
In this chapter, then, I have outlined two possible objections to the austere view of 
nonsense and its role within New or Resolute readings of the Tractatus. Moore’s 
argument may show -  as Moore himself wants it to -  that the austere view is not 
incompatible with a notion o f ineffable understanding or insight, as distinct from the idea, 
which Moore in agreement with Resolute readers finds ‘foreign’ to the Tractatus, of 
ineffable truths. But Moore’s argument (as considered here) will not suffice to establish 
the stronger point that the austere view is incompatible with the rejection of ineffable 
insight in all its forms. Instead, I hope to have shown that there are ways (or at least one 
way) of expressing the understanding in question and which are not incompatible with an 
austere view of nonsense (and hence that the understanding is not, from the perspective of 
austerity at least, ineffable). In sections VI to V IIII have argued that an in some ways 
similar objection by Ben Vilhauer, and focussing specifically on Cora Diamond’s 
development of the Resolute program is at least in part susceptible to essentially the same 
point as made against Moore’s argument. Vilhauer’s first criticism or tension rests on not 
seeing possibilities o f expression that are available to austerity such as that outlined in 
response to Moore’s argument; and Vilhauer’s second objection is simply too narrow or 
localised a point to have any significant force.
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words, to come out with them in certain circumstances, to associate them with images, feelings and so on’ 
(Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Tractatus’, p. 157). What is wrong with this, according to 
Diamond, is just that it gives us nothing that could be called an illusion that so-and-so.
On the other hand, however, Diamond recognises that, in understanding the utterer o f  nonsense, 
‘you are not inside his thought as you are when he makes sense and you understand what he says, because 
there is no such internal understanding, there is no thought that such-and-such to understand’. There is, 
then, no ‘inside’, but, for Diamond, ‘what it is to understand a person who utters nonsense is to go as far as 
one can with the idea that there is’ (Ibid).
I think that the understanding captured in my sentence above about Henry’s beliefs probably is as 
far as one can go with that idea, and so I think there is little to be said for Diamond’s imaginative
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understanding o f  the utterer o f  nonsense insofar as it is intended to go further than this. Certainly, my 
account goes beyond mere empirical psychology, and shows how one can engage with the concepts (where 
there are any) that the utterer o f  nonsense intends to invoke, but without contradicting austerity. Whether it 
goes far enough for Diamond, however, and just how far her imaginative understanding is intended to go, I 
do not know. It should be noted here that since it is this role for the imagination that forms a key 
difference, for Diamond, between her reading and a positivist one, my view has the consequence that I need 
to find another story o f  that difference. See Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Tractatus’, Sections 4 
and 7.
28 In fact the point o f  M oore’s argument (from p.186 through to the midway point on p. 189) seems to be 
largely to establish just that these two ideas or views are not incompatible.
29 As noted above, I do not include in this the especial difficulty Moore thinks is posed by that class o f  
illusions o f  sense o f  which transcendental idealism is perhaps the exemplary case; I shall have more to say 
about this in the postscript to this chapter, below.
30 Ben Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account o f  Tractarian Nonsense’, Philosophical 
Investigations 26:3 (July, 2003), 230-238. It may be that Vilhauer’s (first) objection, in the light o f  
comments already made on M oore’s argument, is all-too-obviously flawed. However, it is, I think, worthy 
o f inclusion here, partly as a means o f  showing that Diamond’s account o f  nonsense is capable o f  
accommodating some notion o f  elucidation, and partly because the only previous response that I know o f  to 
Vilhauer (in Rupert Read and Rob Deans, ‘ “Nothing is Shown”: A “Resolute” Response to Mounce, 
Emiliani, Koethe, and Vilhauer’, Philosophical Investigations, 26:3 (July, 2003), 239-270 (pp.261-263)) 
seems by and large to accept his argument. Thus, Read and Deans write:
We acknowledge our deeper-than-deep indebtedness to Diamond’s groundbreaking work, but 
regard the early work from which Vilhauer quotes very much as a prolegomena for a resolute 
reading, not as the reading itself. ...
There is o f  course very much in Diamond that we are in agreement with. However, in 
our opinion, Diamond’s account is in part susceptible to the criticisms that Vilhauer makes.
(p.262.)
Read and Deans do o f  course detail other objections to Vilhauer’s argument, but ones aimed primarily at 
defending resolutism in general and not Diamond’s account o f it. As will become clear, the only part o f  
Diamond’s paper that is susceptible to Vilhauer’s objection, in my opinion, is itself largely inconsequential.
31 The notion o f the ‘frame’ (as opposed to the body) o f  the Tractatus is a controversial one. For Diamond, 
the frame consists o f  a number o f  remarks that straightforwardly make sense, rather than being elucidatory 
nonsense. They are ‘remarks about the aim o f  the book and the kind o f  reading it requires’ (Diamond, 
‘Ethics, Imagination and the Tractatus’, p. 149):
The frame o f  the book contains instructions, as it were, for us as readers o f  it. Read it in the light 
o f  what it says at the beginning about its aim, and what it says at the end about how you are meant 
to take what it contains. (Ibid, p. 151.)
I discuss this distinction, and a couple o f  criticisms o f  it, briefly above, Introduction, pp.23-25.
32 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.231.
33 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.231.
34 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.232. There is, I suspect, something telling about
Vilhauer’s ommittance o f  the word ‘logical’ here. Initially, he writes that ‘nonsense-sentences have no
logical elements’, but drops the ‘logical’ when repeating the sentiment. It may, o f  course, simply be that, 
second time round, he feels the qualification unnecessary. On the other hand, there may be some substance 
to the feeling that Vilhauer’s criticism only works if  one assumes, as this suggests he might, that if  a 
senseful sentence and a nonsense-sentence cannot share a logical element, then they cannot share any kind 
of element at all. For more on this, see below, note 42 and pp.154-155.
35 See above, Chapter One, pp.48-50 and Chapter Three.
36 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.234.
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37 Op. cit. See above, this chapter, p. 139. This, o f  course, runs counter to my suggestion (above, this 
chapter, p. 146) that there may be a way o f  making room for the sense o f  this kind o f  assertion. However, 
little hangs on the difference.
38 Vilhauer notes that, although Diamond does not enumerate the different stages o f  her account, were she 
to do so, there would be at least these two. Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.234, note 4.
39 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.234.
40 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, pp.232-3.
41 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination, and the Method o f  Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, p.155.
42 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.235. Again, Vilhauer might be interpreted as 
implying, in dropping the word ‘logical’ second time round, that i f  no logical elements can be shared, no 
other elements can be shared either. As we saw in arguing against Moore, however, all that needs to be 
shared between a nonsense-sentence and a senseful sentence for the kind o f  comparison Diamond wants to 
make, is a sign, not a symbol. See above, this chapter, pp. 144-145 (and note 24), note 34, and below,
pp. 154-155.
43 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.235-6.
44 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.236.
45 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.236.
46 Op. cit. This chapter, pp.151-152.
47 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.236.
48 Diamond, ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Tractatus’, p. 160.
49 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.237.
50 Vilhauer, ‘On a Tension in Diamond’s Account’, p.237.
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Postscript to Chapter Four
Austerity and Ineffability Revisited
I
In this postscript, I should like to return to Adrian Moore’s paper (‘Ineffability and 
Nonsense’) and to his argument there for the possibility of some form of ineffable 
understanding. Although Moore does not commit to -  indeed he explicitly distances 
himself from -  what I have been calling ‘Moore’s argument’, there is also a sense in 
which he does commit to a version o f the argument specifically as it applies to a 
restricted range of ‘illusions o f sense’. I shall want to outline that argument and why my 
previous response to it might be thought to beg the question to some degree against it, 
and then I shall want to attempt to develop a more robust, non-question-begging response 
to Moore here.
First, then, I want to return to the role of (what I have been calling) ‘Moore’s 
argument’ within his paper. That argument, as I have described it above, goes something 
like this:
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(1) On the austere view, the judgement that a sentence is nonsense is provisional, 
empirical (or contingent), and metalinguistic.
(2) Such a judgement is best expressed by mentioning not using the signs involved 
(e.g. ‘There is no such thing as meaningfully saying “It is five o’clock at the 
North Pole”’).
(3) That judgement, however, depends upon a prior judgement (or judgements) that is 
(or are) about the concepts involved (e.g. that these concepts will not suffice to 
give the sentence a sense).
(4) The latter is not merely provisional, empirical, and metalinguistic, and so is best 
expressed by using, and not simply mentioning, the signs involved (e.g. ‘There is 
no such thing as its being five o’clock at the North Pole’).
(5) The latter judgement(s) or the understanding that issues in it, on the austere view, 
will prove inexpressible.
(6) Hence, the austere view involves a commitment to ineffable understanding.1
In relation to the kind o f (fairly pedestrian) nonsense-sentence which Moore at first 
considers (and on which I focus in Chapter Four) -  such as ‘It is five o’clock at the North 
Pole’ -  Moore is clearly not committed to step (4), which is pivotal, or indeed to anything 
quite like it.
In fact, Moore explicitly distances himself from such a claim. Thus, Moore 
imagines the question: ‘But you have still not explained how it can be appropriate to 
express such recognition -  the recognition that something is a mere illusion of sense -  by 
using, rather than mentioning, the relevant signs. Why is it not just as nonsensical to say, 
“There is no such thing as its being five o’clock at the North Pole” as it would be to say, 
“There is no such things as its being frumptiliously quirxaceous”?’2 To this, Moore 
canvasses three possible (and, as Moore notes, mutually incompatible) responses. 
Furthermore, Moore declines to speculate on what other responses may be available, 
thereby acknowledging at least that others (such as that given in Chapter Four) may
-i
indeed be available.
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O f those responses which Moore does consider, only the third would commit him
to something like step (4) o f the above argument. That response runs as follows:
Third Response: It is indeed as nonsensical to say, ‘There is no such thing as its 
being five o ’clock at the North Pole’ as it would be to say, ‘There is no such thing 
as its being frumptiliously quirxaceous’. But this is still the best we can do when 
trying to express our recognition of that illusion, as of any other similar illusion -  
the point being that our recognition of that illusion, as of any other similar 
illusion, is incapable o f being expressed. It is of a piece with the ineffable 
understanding afforded by the Tractatus.4
Of that response, however, Moore writes that he is ‘uncomfortable’ with it and, as he
goes on to say: ‘I find the postulation of that link between ineffability and nonsense
overly crude’. So, even though Moore acknowledges a certain pressure to take such a
response, he clearly does not give in to it: ‘I recoil from the third response’, he writes.5
But if that is the case, what is this argument doing in Moore’s paper?6 Moore’s
answer follows straight away; for despite ‘recoiling’ from the third response, Moore
continues, ‘I do ultimately want to endorse something of that sort’. Having distanced
himself from such a response, and so from the crucial premise (step (4)) in the argument
given above, is Moore now going to commit to it after all? Well, yes and no. No, in
relation to the kind o f nonsense-sentence with which Moore illustrates the argument, but
yes (or so, at least, it appears), in relation to a particular and ‘altogether more
fundamental fam ily  o f illusions to which we are subject’:
I have in mind illusions that manifest the urge we have, itself ill-conceived, to 
transcend our limitations: illusions that arise when we try to apply concepts that 
are adapted to these limitations as though they were not, indeed as though they 
were not adapted to any limitations at all. An example, I suggest, is the illusion 
that attaches to the sentence ‘The world exists as a limited whole’.7
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Moore’s suggestion, insofar as I understand it, is that here, in relation to this kind of 
nonsense-sentence, our recognition of their nonsensicality is apt for an application of 
(something like) that third response; our understanding that these sentences (the sentences 
that the ‘urge we have to transcend our limitations’ issues in) offer no more than an 
illusion of making sense will itself prove inexpressible in the way that Moore’s original 
argument suggests.
Why, however, should that be so? This, Moore only gestures at (while 
recognising that much more is required here) by way of the following rhetorically-posed 
questions:
Consider the understanding which someone might have of this general 
phenomenon, and the associated capacity to recognise the illusions in this family 
as illusions. Can that understanding be expressed? Will not the attempt to 
express it involve producing more of the very nonsense in question? Will it not 
involve trying to transcend the relevant limitations in an effort to stake off the 
territory that is home to the illusions; and perhaps also trying to implement some 
form of transcendental idealism whereby we cannot talk about anything that is not 
part of ‘our’ world, a world that is itself in some mysterious way bound by these 
limitations? In sum, will it not involve trying ‘to draw a limit to thought’ -  where 
this is something that cannot be done unless ‘both sides of the limit [are] 
thinkable’?8
The attempt to express our recognition or understanding that the sentences in this family 
of illusions are mere nonsense will inevitably, so the suggestion is, issue in further 
nonsense (and, what is more, in nonsense belonging, so it would seem, to that self-same 
family of nonsense-sentences: i.e. in ‘more of the very nonsense in question’). 
Specifically, perhaps, it is for Moore the understanding of this family of illusions (not just 
as illusions but) as a fam ily o f  illusions -  the understanding ‘of this general phenomenon’ 
-  since (again, perhaps) to recognise them as a family is to recognise them as sharing a
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common source in the attempt to ‘transcend our limitations’. And what that recognition 
involves is some recognition of those limitations (recognition of them as limitations and 
recognition of where they lie), and hence expressing, or attempting to express, our 
understanding o f these limitations would then seem to involve us in the attempt to draw 
(those) limits to thought -  and that attempt itself, so Wittgenstein seems to suggest in the 
preface to the Tractatus (and in spite of the almost inevitably misleading presentation of 
matters there9), can only issue in nonsense.
O f course, as Moore notes, much more needs to be said here, with regard to these 
reasons. But without further elaboration o f those reasons, my response to Moore’s 
argument in the previous chapter (Chapter Four) must to some extent ‘beg the question’ 
against Moore here, since it is clear that Moore thinks that no (attempt at) expression of 
our understanding -  not any o f those three responses he canvasses, nor any of the further 
possibilities he declines to speculate upon -  could possibly suffice in relation to this 
family of illusions, and our recognition of them as illusions (and, of course, specifically 
as a family of illusions). Against this, it would be futile to insist that the understanding in 
question just can be expressed in such and such a way.
Rather than do that, then, and rather than (alternatively) invent reasons on 
Moore’s behalf (and which then to counter), I want to explore the possibility of a more 
thorough-going response to Moore, suggested to me by Cora Diamond, and in terms 
taken (fairly) directly from the Tractatus itself, and which makes use of the notion of a
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propositional variable there, and which might deny to Moore not the inexpressibility of 
the understanding in question, but the understanding itself.
That understanding is characterised by Moore as understanding of how not to use
concepts. Moore writes:
[0]ur grasp o f concepts comes to have two aspects. Alongside our knowledge of 
how to use them, there is our knowledge of how not to use them; alongside our 
command o f what sense they can be used to make, there is our command of what 
ostensible sense they can be used to make. Each of these admits of degrees. Our 
command in the latter case can be more or less complete, just as our command in 
the former case can.10
For Moore, then, there is a very substantial notion of what it is to understand how not to 
use concepts; a notion, that is, that is substantially different from (i.e. something that is 
more than just the flipside of) our understanding of how to use concepts correctly. The 
problem arises when our understanding of how not to use concepts seems to involve us in 
grasping something about the limits o f thought itself.
In order to see how we might usefully bring the Tractatus notion of a 
propositional variable into play here in denying the (as it were) ‘substantial-ness’ of that 
understanding o f how not to use concepts, I want to return to Moore’s original, pedestrian 
example: the sentence ‘It is five o ’clock at the North Pole’. What Moore suggests is that 
in coming to recognise that this string only purports to make sense we must reflect first 
on ‘the relevant concepts’ -  the concepts which the utterer intended to invoke or, 
alternatively, the concepts which these signs do express when used elsewhere with a 
sense, in sentences such as ‘It is five o ’clock in Paris’, or ‘It is five o’clock at the Eiffel 
Tower’. At Tractatus 3.315, Wittgenstein writes the following: ‘If we turn a constituent
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of a proposition into a variable, there is a class of propositions all o f which are values of 
the resulting variable proposition’. Immediately prior to that remark comes 
Wittgenstein’s reiteration of the context-principle, at 3.314, and his application of that to 
the notion of a variable: ‘An expression has meaning only in a proposition. All variables 
can be construed as propositional variables. (Even variable names.)’ We might then 
imagine applying those two remarks (3.314 and 3.315) to the second of those two 
sentences given above: ‘It is five o ’clock at the Eiffel Tower’. If we turn the words ‘the 
Eiffel Tower’, as they appear as a constituent o f that proposition, into a variable, the 
result will be, on the one hand, a variable proposition of the form, ‘it is five o’clock at 
. . .’, and, on the other hand, that there will be a class of propositions all of which are 
values of that variable proposition. (In Fregean terms, what we will have is a function, 
and a course of values for it which together will be all of the ways that that function can 
be sensefully completed.) The common characteristic of those propositions making up 
that class will just be that variable proposition, Wittgenstein seems to suggest (3.317).
So, what we end up with, if  we turn ‘the Eiffel Tower’, as it appears in the 
sentence, ‘It is five o ’clock at the Eiffel Tower’, is something like this:
Variable Proposition:
Fx It is five o’clock at ....
Values of the Variable Proposition:
Fa It is five o’clock at the Eiffel Tower.
Fb It is five o’clock at London Bridge.
Fc It is five o ’clock at the White House.
The class o f propositions making up the values of the variable proposition will give all
the ways in which the expression ‘it is five o’clock...’ gets used with a sense. And what
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all those uses have in common is just their being uses of that same symbol, represented 
by the variable proposition.
In our example, there seem to be (at least) three different ways of specifying the
values of that variable proposition, and so three different classes of propositions giving
the values of what are in fact three quite distinct variable propositions. (Again, in 
Fregean terms, what we have are three different courses o f values for three different one- 
place functions which themselves are, in Frege’s terminology, ‘concepts’.) One way of 
individuating those three alternative classes of propositions would be to follow the sort of 
route that Moore would perhaps take, and give them by way of three different ‘concepts’. 
That, for our purposes, is also the most convenient way forward, but it might also be 
thought to be not what the Tractatus says is either needed or wanted here, when 
Wittgenstein writes that the stipulation of values for a variable proposition will ‘be 
concerned only with symbols, not with their meaning’ (3.317). So, although this is a 
convenient short-cut, it is not one the Tractatus would countenance. That is important, 
because it suggests that nothing in the Tractatus account would commit Wittgenstein to a 
notion of concepts and o f the kind of reflection upon them that Moore thinks is involved 
in our understanding o f the nonsensicality of some (nonsensical) string of signs. The 
three concepts I have in mind, then, are as follows:
(1) ‘Zone’ time.
Here, the surface o f the globe is divided into twenty-four different time zones, 
with one hour added or subtracted (respectively) for each zone travelled to the 
east or west o f the Greenwich meridian.
(2) ‘Sun’ time.
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For instance, time defined in terms of the number of hours since the sun rose 
above the horizon (with one o’clock being one hour after the sun’s initial 
appearance), or, differently, in terms of the height of the sun above the horizon. 
(The latter seems to be the conception behind the idea that ‘noon’ at the North 
Pole comes when the Sun reaches its highest point on the horizon, midway 
through a six-month long day.)
(3) ‘Political’ time.
So, for instance, here we might imagine a simple stipulation that the time in one 
region will track that of another. That might occur with regard to a (far-flung) 
colony, say, or within a country spanning two or more time zones (such as China) 
or on a much smaller scale (an example might be suggested by the following entry 
in Bill Wilson’s polar diary: ‘January 17. We camped on the Pole itself at 
6.30pm this evening’11). Another example of this kind of thing might be that of 
British Summer Time.
Corresponding to these three ‘concepts’, we can then identify three different classes of
propositions which will constitute the values of three different variable propositions.
Suppose we were then, armed with these three variable propositions and their associated
classes of propositions, to turn to someone who wished to utter the sentence ‘It is five
o’clock at the North Pole’. Clearly, under the values of the second variable proposition,
we might well find that sentence. And we might well find it under the values of the third
too.12 For our case to be analogous with Moore’s however, we need to imagine that our
utterer refuses to accept that either of those sentences are what they meant; what they
want, instead, or so they insist, is the first sense. On the model suggested by the
Tractatus notion o f a variable proposition, we are then in a position to point out to that
person that the sentence they want simply does not appear among all those specified as
values for the variable proposition; in that context, they just have not given their remark a
meaning.
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What is the sense o f contrast that this Tractarian alternative provides with respect 
to Moore’s account? I want to suggest that it is something like the contrast presented in 
the preface to the Tractatus (and reinforced in the Tractatus 4.11s) between on the one 
hand, the (assuredly absurd) idea that we can draw a limit to thought, where that requires 
us to be able to both think and talk on either side o f that limit, and the very different 
notion that we can work outwards towards the limit to the expression of thought, where 
that limit is not taken to be equivalent somehow to the limit to thought -  not because 
there are thoughts that cannot be expressed, but because working outwards simply 
involves saying all that there is to be said and not then grasping by means of that project 
some substantial idea o f a limit (to anything) which we can understand and think about 
independently of that working outwards; working outwards is not a means by which we 
are afforded a separate and substantial grasp of some limit or other (to thoughts or to the 
expression of thoughts), but it does nevertheless grant us a means of showing someone 
(someone else or ourselves) when they (or we) have failed to give to their (or our) words 
a meaning. What I want to suggest is that the picture Moore leaves us with is more akin 
to a conception of drawing a limit to thought, has more in common with that idea, than 
with the idea that we simply work outwards through what can be said in a way that does 
not leave us with the temptation to imagine that we have thereby grasped something 
substantial about the limit to thought. That, it seems to me, is what is involved in the 
contrast between, on the one hand, concepts failing to give a sense to a whole and, on the 
other, the simple absence of a string of signs from the set o f values of some variable 
proposition. The application o f the Tractatus notion of a variable proposition leaves us 
not with the substantial understanding of how not to use concepts that Moore’s account
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leaves us with, but simply with the understanding that we have not given a sense to these 
words, and that, so far, we do not know what it would be like to do so.
Nevertheless, the kind o f approach suggested by the Tractatus idea of working
outwards through what can be said and by the notion of a variable there might be thought
also to have the negative consequence that it cannot account for one aspect of the
Tractatus view which Moore’s account can explain. That is, that by denying the
substantial understanding o f how not to use concepts which is central to Moore’s account,
it may also seem that we lose the ability to account for an aspect that might be thought to
be crucial to the purpose o f the Tractatus, and which Moore sums up as follows:
If there is such a thing as understanding Wittgenstein via the Tractatus, in the way 
that he intends, then it includes a capacity to recognise as nonsense not only the 
nonsense in the Tractatus, but other, similar ‘transcendental twaddle’. It includes 
a capacity, ‘whenever someone ... [wants] to say something metaphysical, to 
demonstrate to him that he [has] failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions’.13
The point is that if  we do not end up with a substantial understanding of the limits to the 
expression of thought or, in Moore’s terms, of how not to use concepts, then we will not 
end up with the capacity to recognise straight-off, as it were, other ‘similar’ nonsense as 
such; that is, recognising that one sentence is nonsense will not allow us to draw any 
conclusions about the nonsensicality or otherwise of any other sentence. Still, however, 
we will have the means, for instance through the Tractatus"s conception of a variable, to 
come to recognise such utterances as nonsense. What we will not have, and I think 
cannot have, on such a view, is the understanding, suggested by TLP 6.53, that some 
whole region of discourse (here, ‘metaphysics’) is nonsense. That objection is something 
very like Warren Goldfarb’s suggestion,14 that we cannot simply come to recognise that
Postscript to Chapter Four 173
Austerity and Ineffability Revisited
nonsense is as it were the mark of something metaphysical, aside from individual 
instances of utterances turning out, upon examination, not to have been given a sense; we 
cannot, that is, given the austere view, generalise from any number of instances of 
remarks failing to have sense to a whole area of talk’s failing to have sense. The austere 
view itself seems to block such a move. So, if this view is correct, one of the things the 
Tractatus must be taken to be teaching us is that the kind of catch-all response presented 
in 6.53 is itself only an illusory possibility which must be ‘overcome’.
I hope, then, in this postscript, to have drawn out what Moore’s view might 
actually be, and where he might be committed to the argument discussed in Chapter Four. 
I also hope to have developed a response to Moore’s argument where he does commit to 
it, and which draws on terms taken directly from the Tractatus itself, but which does not 
simply beg the question against Moore, given how underdeveloped his arguments for that 
position are in his paper.
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Notes to Postscript
1 There is something awkward about this formulation, which stems from trying to move from talk o f  
‘judgements’ in the first five steps, to talk o f  ‘understanding’ in the last, as Moore might seem to want to. 
Moore certainly begins with judgements (in steps (1) and (2) above). So, Moore writes that, on the austere 
view, ‘the judgement that something is nonsense is always a judgement about the actual history, to date, o f  
some particular sign’ ( ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume LXXVII (2003), 169-193 (p. 186)). And Moore also seems to suggest that steps (3) and (4) deal in 
judgements: ‘the discussion above suggests that the judgement that something is nonsense is sometimes 
none o f these things [i.e. neither empirical, nor provisional, nor metalinguistic]. It suggests that the 
judgement is sometimes arrived at by reflection on concepts’ (p. 186).
Moore also talks in this context o f ‘recognition’: ‘So reflection on those concepts is required to 
recognise the illusions as illusions’ (p. 187). And he talks also o f  a ‘capacity to recognise as nonsense’ 
certain illusions o f  sense. So too, Moore very clearly wants to end up with a notion o f  ineffable 
understanding, understanding o f  Wittgenstein, the utterer o f  nonsense. Equally clearly, given his rejection 
o f ineffable truths (p. 175), Moore does not want to end up with a notion o f  ineffable judgements, since 
judgements are generally taken to be truth-apt. How, then, do these terms relate in Moore’s paper, such 
that he can move from the idea o f  judgements, to that o f  understanding? I think, like this:
For Moore, w e have an understanding o f  how to use concepts and o f  how not to use concepts. Our 
understanding o f  how not to use some concept itself issues in an ‘associated capacity’ to recognise illusions 
of sense involving apparent uses o f  that concept as illusions. That recognition will result in the judgement 
that certain concepts will not serve to give sense to such-and-such a string o f  signs and, ultimately, if  no 
other relevant concepts are forthcoming, that the string o f signs lacks a sense. I think that, for Moore, even 
in the case o f  the kind o f  illusion o f  sense that might attach to the sentence, ‘The world exists as a limited 
whole’, the first o f  these two types o f  judgement will be expressible in ways such as that presented in 
Chapter Four. What Moore takes to resist expression here is not that judgement, but the understanding o f  
the general phenomenon behind this kind o f  illusion, and which issues in the capacity to recognise these 
kinds o f utterances as illusions, thereby providing what is needed to make that judgement.
If that is correct, what it suggests is that my previous response to Moore is not question-begging in
the sense that it focuses on a very pedestrian kind o f  illusion, but that it misses entirely the force o f  Moore’s
argument, by equating judgements and understanding in a way that Moore’s paper does not permit. I hope 
that this postscript goes some way to making clear what Moore’s argument is, and to addressing this aspect 
o f Moore’s paper, by way o f  the alternative response developed here.
2 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, p.187.
3 Moore’s responses are given on pp. 187-8. He follows them with the words: ‘I shall not try to arbitrate 
between these responses. Nor shall I speculate on what others may be available’.
4 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, p. 188.
5 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, p. 189.
6 For the argument, or something very much like it, is in Moore’s paper.
7 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, p. 189.
8 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, pp. 189-190. The reference in the final sentence is to TLP, preface.
9 Here I am agreeing to some extent with Peter Sullivan, who writes that ‘it is no accident -  it is part o f  the 
way these paragraphs [o f the preface] are written’ that one will read or try to read Wittgenstein as saying 
that the limit to thought cannot be drawn in one way but can in another; that ‘the limit’ on both occasions in 
the preface refers to the limit to thought (and so that drawing the limit to the expression o f  thoughts just 
amounts to drawing the limit to thought). Thus, Sullivan continues: ‘So, if  one were to say that these 
paragraphs belong to a “frame” in which Wittgenstein offers instructions for reading the book, then that 
ought to come with a warning that the instructions will be tricky to follow straight o f f .  Peter Sullivan, 
‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume LXXVII 
(2003), 195-223.
10 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, pp. 184-5. Moore here talks o f ‘knowledge’ rather than 
‘understanding’. I take it that he is thereby exploiting his remark (p. 178, note 35) that for him ‘states o f
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understanding are states o f  knowledge’ (though see note 35 o f  Moore’s paper for a qualification to that 
claim).
11 Quoted in Apsley Cherry-Garrard, The Worst Journey in the World (London: Picador, 1994), p.521. 
(Wilson is, o f  course, referring to the South, not the North, Pole.)
121 want to comment here briefly on how what I say here fits with the following remark o f  Wittgenstein’s 
from the Philosophical Investigations:
“But if  I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as 
I have so often had.” -  That gets us no further. It is as if  I were to say: “You surely know what ‘It 
is 5 o ’clock here’ means; so you also know what ‘It’s 5 o ’clock on the sun’ means. It means 
simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o ’clock.” -  The explanation by 
means o f  identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o ’clock here and 
5 o ’clock there “the same time”, but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak o f  its 
being the same time here and there.
In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say: the supposition that he has a pain is 
simply the supposition that he has the same as I. For that part o f  the grammar is quite clear to me: 
that is, that one w ill say that the stove has the same experience as I, if  one says, it is in pain and I 
am in pain. {PI §350.)
J.L. Mackie, in his ‘Five O ’Clock on the Sun’ (Analysis, 41:3 (1981), 113-114), argues that the suggested 
parallel here, between the difficulty o f  understanding the sentence ‘it is five o ’clock on the sun’ and (e.g.) 
‘He has a pain’, will not work, just because we can specify contexts which will give the former sentence a 
clear sense. And it might look too as i f  the third concept illustrated above might itself be used to give a 
sense to the remark ‘it is five o ’clock on the sun’, in line with one o f  Mackie’s suggestions: e.g., that ‘It is 5 
o’clock on the sun by GMT [Greenwich Mean Time] just when it is 5 o ’clock by GMT in Oxford or in 
Tokyo or anywhere else’ or, alternatively, that ‘it will be 5 o ’clock on the sun by GMT when some 
disturbance occurs there which is seen from the earth ... at 8 minutes past 5 by GMT’ (p.l 13).
I am not at all sure that such statements do give a clear sense to statements purporting to be about 
the time on the sun, but at the same time, I want to suggest that the explanation o f  the sense o f  the remark 
‘It is five o ’clock at the North Pole’ by way o f  the third o f  these concepts is not simply (what Wittgenstein 
above says will not suffice in the case o f  the sun) an explanation by means o f  identity. That is, it does not 
simply say that we will say that it is the same time here (Cardiff) and there (the North Pole) if  one says five 
o’clock here and five o ’clock there, but specifies a sense in which one might say that it is five o ’clock here 
and five o ’clock there. That that sense may be such that it will always (by simple stipulation) be five 
o ’clock there if  it is five o ’clock here does not mean that the explanation o f  the sense is as in Wittgenstein’s 
example purely by means o f  identity. Hence, were this explanation to give a sense to Wittgenstein’s 
example ( ‘It is 5 o ’clock on the sun’) it would not, I think, conflict with his point there.
13 Moore, ‘Ineffability and N onsense’, p. 184. The quotation in the final sentence is from TLP 6.53.
14 Discussed in Chapter One, above, pp.68-70.
1 7 6
Concluding Remarks
/
I have, in the course of this thesis, been concerned to defend the austere view of nonsense 
and its ascription to Wittgenstein against a variety of criticisms. That view -  the austere 
view -  has, as I see it, two aspects: a trivial (trivially true) aspect, and a non-trivial one. 
The trivially true aspect is simply that any string of signs -  no matter how far they might 
deviate from, say, familiar (established) phonetic patterns, etc -  could, by appropriate 
assignments of meanings, be given a sense.1 Hence, in this, trivial sense, if a string of 
signs is nonsense, that will be due, at the last, to our failure to make just such a 
stipulation, such an assignment of meanings. The non-trivial aspect o f the view is just 
this: the denial that there is any further, non-trivial story that needs to be, or indeed could 
be, told here. That is, what is not trivial about the view (but is in fact, and on the 
contrary, quite clearly controversial to many) is the idea that the trivial story is all the 
story to be had.
If the austere view is correct, as an account of Wittgenstein’s use of the word, 
then that use can, I want to suggest, be understood by the reader o f Wittgenstein without 
their needing to enter into a technical or theoretical account of what nonsense is or might 
be at all.2 In some sense, then, it would be wrong to say of Wittgenstein that he held a 
‘view’ of nonsense at all, just as it might be thought to be misleading to talk (as I have
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done throughout) of the austere ‘view’. Such a view, insofar as it might be called one, is 
entirely negative: that there is nothing more philosophically substantial to nonsense than 
a simple failure to make sense. Still, if that is indeed all there is to Wittgenstein’s ‘view’ 
of nonsense, that is not quite to say that his use of the word ‘nonsense’ remains uniform 
throughout his life: one way in which it does change from early to later is marked by 
Wittgenstein’s increasing willingness to use the word not simply of instances of linguistic 
nonsense, but also more colloquially, as it is often used to refer to something absurd, or 
obviously false. That is not a move from a technical use of a term to non-technical uses, 
but from a narrow to a broader range o f non-technical uses.
I have tried to defend that view of nonsense and its attribution to Wittgenstein 
against criticisms primarily from Peter Hacker and Hans-Johann Glock, and against an 
altogether different kind o f criticism from Adrian Moore, which does not reject the 
austere view (in fact, far from it) but rather brings into question its place alongside other 
features typical of Resolute readings of the Tractatus -  most notably, the rejection of the 
very idea of ineffable insights as having a place in the lesson of that work. I shall want 
here to say a little in conclusion about each of these criticisms, and where my responses 
leave ‘New’ readings o f Wittgenstein’s work.
I shall begin with Hacker. Against Hacker, I have argued, with Diamond and with 
Conant, that the conception o f logical syntax to be found in the Tractatus is not one such 
that nonsense is produced when one violates the rules of logical syntax. Violating logical 
syntax, in this sense, need not produce nonsense at all, since there may be other uses of
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the sign (or signs) available, or an entirely new use might be being made of it (or them). 
Nor is logical syntax in the Tractatus a system of rules which serve to license or prohibit 
combinations of signs or symbols: the rules of logical syntax are not concerned to 
prohibit anything on the Tractatus view — not combinations of signs, because logical 
syntax is not concerned merely with signs as signs, and not combinations of symbols 
either, because there is nothing here coherently to proscribe. Hence, on the Tractatus 
conception, and against Hacker, the difference between a sign-language that is governed 
by -  or that obeys -  the rules o f logical syntax and one that is not so governed, is not that 
the rules of the latter permit the construction of strings which do violate logical syntax, 
which are not permitted by the rules o f the former; rather, it is that, in the former, what 
symbol a symbol is will be clearly reflected in the sign for that symbol -  the use of signs 
will track or reflect how symbols are used in accordance with logical syntax -  and in the 
latter we may find one sign being used for more than one symbol, or signs for two quite 
different symbols being used in superficially similar ways. We could, as Diamond notes, 
call the latter kinds of use o f signs ‘violations’ of logical syntax, even though it would be 
misleading to do so,3 but the result o f such ‘violations’ would be a lack of clarity, and not 
-  though the unclarity might eventually give rise to it -  nonsense.
Glock’s view o f nonsense, I have argued, is very similar to Hacker’s view, in 
which nonsense, as well as sometimes being the result o f our failure to give words a 
meaning, is also sometimes the outcome of a specific violation of a specific rule, or set of 
rules, governing the use o f some sign. Where their views differ, is over the question of 
what would constitute a logical difference between nonsense-sentences. For Hacker, it
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would have to be a difference in the end-product, a difference in the sense of the resulting 
nonsense-sentence. Hence, for Hacker, there can be no different logical kinds of 
nonsense. For Glock, on the other hand, a difference in the cause of the sentence’s being 
nonsense, for instance a difference in what kind of failure of understanding makes the 
sentence seem nonsensical, would constitute a logical difference, and hence there can, for 
Glock, be many different logical kinds of nonsense.4
Glock’s criticisms o f the austere view seem to begin by assuming that there must 
be something more to the austere view than the account I have given above suggests, that 
austerity is more substantial a view than that, than I have wanted to allow. That idea 
seems to lie behind Glock’s treatment o f the austere view as consisting of two quite 
substantial and independent philosophical claims, which he labels the ‘privation’ view 
and nonsense ‘monism’, and which themselves require a deal of philosophical argument. 
Glock’s approach is to begin with those two ‘strands’ he identifies to an austere view and 
treat them not as the outcome o f rejecting the very idea of a theory of sense, but as 
assumptions or premises o f a Resolute reading, which must themselves be argued for 
within the context o f some theory o f sense.5 In my argument, in Chapter Three, I have 
tried to show that one can go a long way down the road that Glock wants to go down, and 
yet still his arguments will not provide a sound case against the austere view, exegetically 
or substantially. That approach may end up conceding too much to Glock, but it might 
nevertheless also be useful against someone like Glock, who refuses to see, or to take 
seriously, the possibility o f a non-theoretical approach to nonsense.
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Finally, against Moore, I have offered two very different responses to his claim 
that our understanding o f why certain sentences offer no more than the illusion of making 
sense to us is inexpressible, given the basic correctness of the austere view of nonsense. 
One of the consequences I have drawn from the austere view (at the end of Chapter One) 
is that our recognition that certain sentences on some occasion fail to say anything tells us 
just that and no more: coming to see some string of signs as failing to make sense cannot 
have the consequences that we might have thought, or that Wittgenstein’s remark, at 
Tractatus 6.53, seems to suggest it could. It will not, that is, tell us anything about 
whether or what other strings o f signs are nonsense. Ultimately, I think, Moore’s claim 
stems from the conviction that such recognition, at least in places, must be capable of 
being more consequential than that, and that is what I have wanted to deny.
Inevitably, much o f my defence has centred on the attribution of the austere view 
to the Wittgenstein o f the Tractatus, since that is where criticism of austerity has most 
often (and most vociferously) been focussed. Nevertheless, many of my arguments are 
applicable to the attribution o f the austere view to the later Wittgenstein also. Against 
Glock, I have argued that Wittgenstein’s understanding of the context-principle in the 
Philosophical Investigations was other than Glock’s, and my criticisms of Glock’s 
presentation both o f the austere view of nonsense and of the different versions of the 
context-principle available apply equally to the later as to the earlier Wittgenstein. 
Similarly, my criticisms o f Hacker have a ready parallel in the case o f the later 
Wittgenstein’s notion o f rules o f grammar, where Hacker must imagine those rules too to 
be prohibitive.6 So too, although centred on the Tractatus, Moore’s claims about the
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consequences of the austere view of nonsense are not limited to that work; if the austere 
view does involve a tacit commitment to the existence of ineffable understanding, then it 
will involve that commitment in relation to the later work as much as to the earlier.
Where does my defence of the austere view of nonsense, and of its attribution to 
Wittgenstein, leave New readings o f Wittgenstein’s work, and the debate between such 
readings and their ‘Standard’ alternatives? Although that view is a central feature of New 
readings of Wittgenstein’s work, early and later, that defence can only ever go part of the 
way towards making the case for New readings, and for a variety of reasons. In relation 
to the Tractatus, that is, in part, because the austere view is a corollary of only one of the 
two basic features o f such readings and, as Moore succeeds in showing, one idea rejected 
by the other feature, the idea o f ineffable understanding, is at least compatible with the 
austere view of nonsense, even if Moore’s claim that the latter involves a commitment to 
the former is mistaken. So too, as Moore again suggests, it may also be that, in relation 
to the Tractatus, even on a reading which sees the lesson of that work in terms of 
ineffable truths ‘there is no reason why we should be not be left realising that the book is 
sheer lack of sense’.7 At the same time, however, without the kind of defence of the 
austere view offered here, such readings are bound to be left looking somewhat shaky. 
Hence, I take it that this defence contributes to establishing the basic plausibility of New 
readings -  not least because (and notwithstanding Moore’s two suggestions) the anti- 
theoretical spirit o f the austere view simply sits more comfortably with Resolutely anti­
metaphysical readings o f the Tractatus as a whole, and so too of Wittgenstein’s later 
work as continuing in that spirit, not as being concerned to reject the realist doctrines of
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Standard readings. As Conant and Diamond stress, that leaves a lot still to be done: the 
austere view is a corollary of only one of two basic features of Resolute readings, and 
those features amount at best to a programme for reading the Tractatus, not a reading of 
that work, and something similar is clearly true of the Investigations. The details of such 
readings, however, are beyond my concerns here; I hope only to have defended the 
austere view against some of the more serious objections to it, exegetical and substantial, 
and provided some reasons for thinking its most plausible alternative, developed by 
Hacker, to be confused.
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Notes to Concluding Remarks
1 That is not to say anything about how one does go about assigning meanings to signs, about what exactly 
that process involves. Rather, the point is just that, however one does do that, there is nothing to stop one 
giving a sense -  any sense -  to any string o f  signs. Hence, I do not think that this remark conflicts with the 
following remark o f  Wittgenstein’s:
Can I say “bububu” and mean “If it doesn’t rain I shall go for a walk”? -  It is only in a language 
that I can mean something by something. This shews clearly that the grammar o f  “to mean” is not 
like that o f  the expression “to imagine” and the like. (/V, p. 18.)
Wittgenstein does not reply to his question either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ -  so there is no prohibition here on that sign, 
“bububu”, coming to have the sense Wittgenstein postulates. Instead, Wittgenstein replies by highlighting 
the kind o f context within which one can mean anything at all.
2 Here I am agreeing with a point made by Denis McManus (in conversation). I do not rule out the 
possibility o f  there being the occasional exception in the many pages o f  Wittgenstein’s notes; it is just that I 
think such an exception would be just that -  an exception, a lapse -  and not evidence o f  his knowingly 
having held a very different kind o f  view  o f  nonsense at any point.
3 Since a rule prohibiting giving a sign more than one use would not, in the Tractatus sense, be a rule o f  
logical syntax (or so, for instance, TLP 3.334 suggests).
4 Thus, Glock identifies a range o f  different failures o f  understanding, each o f which might lead to a 
different kind o f  nonsense. Glock, ‘All Kinds o f  Nonsense’, in Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the 
Philosophical Investigations, ed. Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (London and New York: Routledge, 
2004), pp.221-245 (pp.239-240).
5 The suggestion that Glock treats the austere view as itself amounting to a substantial philosophical 
position is also made by William H. Brenner in his review o f  the collection in which Glock’s paper appears. 
Brenner writes: ‘I believe that G lock’s criticisms o f  Diamond depend on ascribing to her some special, 
draconian notion o f  nonsensicality, over and above the ordinary notion o f  having failed to say anything’. 
Brenner, ‘Review o f  Wittgenstein and Scepticism (ed. Denis McManus) and Wittgenstein at Work (ed.
Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer)’, Philosophical Investigations, 2005, 375-380 (p.380).
6 See, for instance, Edward Witherspoon’s paper, ‘Conceptions o f  Nonsense in Carnap and Wittgenstein’, 
in The New Wittgenstein, ed. A lice Crary and Rupert Read (London: Routledge, 2000), pp.315-349.
7 A.W. Moore, ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volume LXXVII (2003), 169-193 (p.179). Moore’s point is just that, even if  such readings must commit to 
the existence o f  two kinds o f  nonsense ( ‘substantial’ and ‘mere’), still there is no reason to suppose that 
they must read the Tractatus as composed (even in part) o f  the substantial variety.
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